70. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State1
45547. EA for Assistant Secretary Holbrooke. Department please pass White House for Owen and Denend and DOD/ISA/EAPR for Armacost. SUBJ: Cambodia Not Much Solace in Sight.
1. (S–Entire text)
2. The deteriorating situation on the Thai/Cambodian border prompts another review of the political aspects of Cambodian dilemma and the role of the United States.
3. For the second time this year the Cambodian war and all it has brought in its wake have reached the border of Thailand. Refugees keep streaming in and the population of much of western Cambodia has already drifted to the border. But unlike last spring the greater Vietnamese pressures have prompted the Thais to take a more generous attitude toward receiving Kampucheans in order to win wider international political support. But the dangers of fighting on Thai territory have become much greater. Pol Pot forces keep running in and out of Thai territory and receive some degree of supply, courtesy of Thai military. The Vietnamese have brought up forces to stamp out the resistance this dry season. The tensions on the Thai/Cambodian border are sure to grow as the tempo of Vietnamese military operations picks up. It is doubtful the SRV will allow Thai covert involvement to continue unchecked despite what Nguyen Co Thach has told us.
4. From SRV military dispositions, logistical problems and political constraints, it is unlikely that the security of Thailand is at stake on the border. The political stability of Thailand, and in particular the future of the Kriangsak government, is. We are of course not wed to any specific Thai Government and should be able to work with almost any government established in Thailand. But the demise of the Kriangsak government and the breakdown of Thai and ASEAN resolve because of SRV pressures and success in consolidating Heng Samrin legitimacy in Cambodia would inevitably result in significant erosion of U.S. interests throughout the area. While such a development will not be cataclysmic and the Thais will certainly survive as an independent state, it is one of such broad significance as to warrant the most serious reassessment of our options and of the constraints we have [Page 245] accepted thus far on our ability to influence the direction of events in Indochina. Situation also obviously could test our Manila commitment.2
5. (I) The Players and Their Intentions.
(A) The SRV shows every indication of destroying Pol Pot. Pol Pot forces are insufficient for large scale action and SRV is proceeding by “search and destroy” missions. However they must obviously balance actions to this end against such factors as possible PRC counters and the views of the international community. They obviously prefer not to go into Thailand and so far have acted with caution. Vietnam’s concern over the international community also means it will likely take no decisive steps before UNGA has concluded its debate on the ASEAN resolution.3 The SRV is also engaged in a psychological effort to cow the Thais into ceasing support of Pol Pot and, with 5 to 6 divisions on the border, will make life difficult for both the RTG and ASEAN over the next few months. Vietnamese leaders couple their declarations about not intruding into Thailand with attacks against Thai covert support of Pol Pot. Most worrisome is that lower level SRV commanders seem to have some authority to intrude into Thailand. For the moment SRV has no interest in a compromise solution.
(B) The USSR has so far gotten away virtually clean despite its role in Cambodia. As far as can be seen there is nothing on the horizon to limit them from providing any needed military supplies to the SRV. It values its access to Vietnam and relishes the humiliation suffered by the PRC as Vietnam succeeds in Kampuchea. It is not displeased to see Chinese bogged down with Vietnamese.
(C) The PRC appears to have toned down at least its rhetoric on Vietnam. It talked big over the summer and perhaps misled the Thais. Pol Pot may not live up to their expectations. China appears to be looking to a much more protracted struggle of attriting the SRV. They see no possibility of political settlement given the present situation on the ground.
(D) The RTG continues its game of public neutrality and superficially disguised covert support for Khmer resistance elements. The Vietnamese clearly know what they are up to. But it would be wrong to equate relatively small Thai activities to make life difficult for Vietnamese with Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Kriangsak thought he had a strong partner in the PRC, but he now apparently is worried that the Chinese are back-tracking. Kriangsak, as the framer of current [Page 246] RTG policies, could be in very difficult straits as border incidents and other SRV actions spook his more jittery and unsure countrymen at home. The Vietnamese moreover may be out to get him politically as best way of severing the Thai/PRC connection. Thai “neutralism” is rising as fear of trouble at the border increases.
(E) ASEAN is starting to flounder as rising tensions in the area exacerbate the differing perceptions within the group—Thais, Malaysians and Singaporeans remain fixed on SRV expansionism, but the Indonesians focus on China. The Philippines have trouble focusing on anything. It is becoming increasingly more difficult for ASEAN to work effectively and more complicated for us to work with it. Cambodia once brought them together; it is now tearing them apart. Moreover, leadership and follow-through are lacking.
7. (II) Outlook and Implications
The SRV is in the military driver’s seat and has already gone far to vitiate Pol Pot. It further has all the initiative on the border and can orchestrate pressures on the Thai by incidents and incursions. Nevertheless, the war is not over and the Vietnamese have a difficult row to hoe in Kampuchea. Thailand will survive some limited SRV military operations on its territory, but Kriangsak may not. He cannot easily reverse his covert China alliance and stay in office. Thai humiliations on the border could catalyze opposition to Kriangsak or spur a hasty search for an alternative. His fall would be followed most likely by a government more accommodating to the SRV and willing to recognize Heng Samrin. (The opposite right anti-Communist takeover is a remote possibility. That posture would be short-lived.)
Such a Thai political crisis along these lines would be a serious blow to ASEAN as a political entity, if not a fatal one. This in turn would obviously negate the effort to establish a stable progressive order in the area.
The SRV campaign through the dry season also, of course, means a continued outflow of refugees into Thailand and suffering within Kampuchea.
8. (III) Where We Stand
The U.S. wants to get the SRV out of Kampuchea, but we find other policy interests and constraints precluding us from trying to do so. We appear contradictory. Chinese-Thai efforts to support anti-SRV forces in Cambodia seem at present only real effort possibly affecting SRV willingness to entertain Cambodian political solution but we have, for good reasons, opposed them. However, we have no significant dialogue with the PRC on their support for Pol Pot, and there is no political solution possible with Pol Pot on the scene. We have generated no focus for pressure toward a political solution. We extend our com [Page 247] mitments as the Thais get deeper involved. Nor have we taken steps to keep the RTG from going out on its limb with China. At the same time we have given not insignificant material aid to the Thais, but our help has been less than spectacular (especially in comparison to the Soviet flood of materials into Vietnam), although our tanks and the 5 airlifts did make a good impact. Our somewhat successful efforts to make the Thais believe that we have done much more for them should not delude us. We are doing reasonably well at working with ASEAN, but have found relatively little means to push the group together when cracks appear.
9. (IV) What To Do
I assume recognition of Pol Pot is too damaging to our position in the area at this time. If other interests prevent us from making life really difficult for the SRV, we can only continue and intensify our current lines of policy focusing on constraining the SRV along the border.
—Stir up more effort to internationalize the border and introduce greater foreign presence inside Kampuchea in connection with the relief effort;
—Follow our recent initiatives with stronger pressures on the USSR to exert some influence on SRV;
—Consider enhancing Sihanouk’s latest initiatives. He remains the only real “name” in the vast gap between Pol Pot and Heng Samrin;
—Consider upping the ante by more direct support to Thailand, although we must be very careful not to imply a threat we will be unable to carry out (This is a prime concern we have with suggestions for any U.S. military air or sea presence);
—Encourage ASEAN to get its act together, mobilize diplomatic resources and more actively constrain the SRV. It should seek to pressure countries such as India and should itself open negotiations, preferably secret, with Hanoi over the nature of possible Kampuchean solutions. It could send an observer mission to the Thai border;
—Encourage the RTG individually to strengthen its diplomatic efforts, to take better advantage of its internationally attractive positions on refugees and internationalization of the border; and
—We must of course pursue the Khmer relief effort on its merits.
Our objectives through such moves should be to keep Khmer alive, preclude or limit SRV incursions into Thailand, promote ASEAN unity, and keep international pressure on SRV military to get out of Kampuchea. The departure of the Vietnamese army will not create a neutral Kampuchean state. Realistically, we must be prepared to accept SRV domination but not its troops. It is in any case essential to get international aid into Kampuchea following on emergency relief because [Page 248] reconstruction is beyond Khmer resources and the SRV will contribute little.
To move in these general directions, it is imperative in the first instance to defuse the border and shake the present assumptions of the concerned parties. We must do our best to open up diplomatic scene. It is tragic that we cannot foresee a quick-fix that will save more Khmer lives, but keeping up pressure for more humanitarian aid may succeed in saving many of them as the political drama unfolds. Our talks with Vietnamese have become sterile and we should stop running after them.
There is an argument for more forthcoming recognition of the political vacuum that exists in Kampuchea. We could encourange Thais to anticipate possible complete Pol Pot failure. We would have to be extremely cautious since any steps along such lines risks immediate and exaggerated perceptions of our cutting and running.
None of this offers much promise of accomplishing what we want in the short run. But I frankly have exhausted my ability to transcend the existing constraints.
10. Recommend Dept pass this to AmEmbassies in Peking, Tokyo, ASEAN posts and Moscow.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Far East, Box 13, 9–11/79. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis.↩
- Reference is presumably to the U.S. commitment under the Sutheast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, known as the Manila Pact, signed on September 8, 1954. The treaty established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. (6 UST 81; TIAS 3170)↩
- The General Assembly adopted the ASEAN resolution as Resolution 34/22 on November 14. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1979, pp. 294–295 and 306–307.↩