Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

333. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State¹

Manila, June 20, 1980, 0922Z

11988. Subject: Aquino. Ref: State 158981.²

1. (C–Entire Text.)

2. Summary: Embassy considers opposition document transmitted reftel overstates both unity of opposition and its readiness to launch systematic and violent destabilization campaign in Philippines. We acknowledge, however, there may be more momentum behind opposition plans and somewhat greater inclination to move in violent direction than previously. Document appears to reflect heavy input by Movement for Free Philippines whose stateside leadership seems readier to fight to the last oppositionist than those currently active in this country. Consider we should make clear to Aquino and all others in opposition our condemnation of violence. We need also weigh what, if anything, we should say to Marcos about the document. End Summary.

3. It is evident, from our contacts with various segments of the opposition that the January local elections deepened opposition frustration as to ever being able to remove Marcos by legal means.³ Degree of frustration varies according to geographic region. Mindanao Alliance people, for example, came out of the election with relatively few races won, but with conviction that they had established a base on which to build in future elections, if only they could find some money somewhere. Likewise, Laurel⁴ forces in central Luzon have become more active precisely because they demonstrated they could win in face of KBL hanky panky. At the same time, the elections seemed to strengthen the conviction of certain opposition elements that whether Marcos ended martial law or not, he would manage to retain essential power. Hence, the line that Marcos would have to step down or be removed, by whatever means.

4. GOP, on the other hand, is heartened by fact that, with exceptions of Cabanatuan, Davao City, and San Fernando, Pampanga, furor raised over election irregularities has largely died down, and public proved too apathetic even to participate in any sizable numbers in freedom rallies organized by opposition June 12, except in Cebu, where substantial amounts of money were spent to feed and transport marchers.

5. There is increasing reference to the growing acceptability of violence. None of this points to the imminence of any violent campaign, but references by Salonga⁵ and others to the fact that “some moderates” were finding more attractive the concept of violence, including cooperation with the NPA and MNLF, have become more frequent in recent months. Cardinal Sin is evidently concerned about this as well, stressing to us (Manila 11568)⁶ his interest in guiding the opposition in a non-violent direction and in retaining Marcos through an orderly transition period. Marcos told the Ambassador he had evidence of some of Aquino’s associates making contact with the NPA, though he did not know how serious they were about collaboration (Manila 11239 or 12239).⁷ In sum, there is credible evidence that more oppositionists are thinking about the possibility of violence, and at least some of them may have taken some initial steps to explore the possibilities.

6. We also think it likely that these same groups have been penetrated by the regime. For example, ranking member of Christian Social Revolutionary Force, who had just returned from Mindanao, told PolCouns June 19 that SocDems were nervous and rather demoralized by arrest of suspects in Light A Fire Movement and particularly of those arrested in connection December 31 alleged military plot.⁸ He added that, while some of the prominent moderate opposition figures may be concluding that violence may be the only effective recourse, many of those who would be called upon to carry out the violence have concluded that it makes little sense to do so, so long as they lack the organization, resources, and public support to carry their actions through to a successful conclusion. (Note: This represented a distinct change in mood from that displayed by the CSRF member in earlier meetings with us.) By same token, he said Light A Fire Movement was gutted by arrests for all practical purposes, and new recruits were not forthcoming.

7. We note an increasing tempo of contacts among the opposition, including those such as Manglapus in the U.S. with an eye to forming an umbrella organization. There is some overlapping of information provided by different sources. The “junta” being referred to by Aquino, for example, is probably the same organization [less than 1 line not declassified] though claims of leadership vary. Laurel’s own ambition to head opposition appears increasingly clear, following his prominent role in June 12 freedom rallies [1½ lines not declassified]. (Laurel’s [1½ lines not declassified] activities underscores his ambition, which, of course, has never been far below surface.)

8. [name not declassified] discussion of SocDem plans for violence reflects, slightly varied in detail, reports we have had from Manglapus and others. It is evident that opposition figures are in close contact with one another and aware of various plans being proposed. On other hand, [less than 1 line not declassified] named as one of key junta figures, has stated unequivocally to Ambassador that he personally opposes violence and that those who were beginning to view violence as the only recourse were still a long way from translating their convictions into overt acts.

9. Probably the major factor behind whatever new impetus there exists in opposition activity has been Aquino’s release and trip to the U.S.,⁹ where he is beyond Marcos’ control. This has probably given renewed hope to some fading old oppositionists and budding new ones alike, who have lacked a rallying point until now. For others, who are still unsure of Aquino’s future plans and distrustful of his motives in dealing with Marcos, their sudden burst of energy is part of their effort to persuade Aquino to remain actively involved. Aquino’s trip, together with the May Day opposition labor rally and the GOP’s tolerance of the Independence Day rallies, has surely encouraged the opposition leaders in their plans. (It should be noted, however, that the authorities adeptly kept school closed until after June 12, thereby depriving rally organizers of major student participation.) Another factor spurring them on may be the increasingly prominent role of Mrs. Marcos in public life, and the growing rumors that she has already been secretly appointed Deputy Prime Minister, which may dash remaining hopes that Marcos would opt for an orderly transition of power to traditional political figures. Persistent rumors about Marcos’ failing health, though they have subsided greatly since his Honolulu visit,¹⁰ add to the impetus, despite the equally persistent lack of proof that they are true.

10. All of foregoing notwithstanding, we still lack evidence either that country is on the verge of a campaign of violence or that the opposition is indeed as united as the “junta” would make it out to be. None of our contacts has suggested that the trends of which they speak are on the point of being realized. We also see no signs other than the holiday rallies that the divisiveness of opposition leaders has been ended. (Some of them in fact are unabashedly jockeying for positions of greater authority, now that Aquino may be away from the scene for some years.) In fact, Marcos’ liberality in allowing the rallies to proceed evinces a certain confidence that the situation is not getting out of hand. Crackdowns, such as the roundup of student leaders, the publicizing of the Colonel Reyes new year’s “coup” plot and the like, are in the Marcos tradition of serving notice that there are limits to what he will allow.

11. For these reasons, we assess the document [less than 1 line not declassified] with some caution. It could be an attempt on the part of one group of opposition leaders to gain [name not declassified] blessing, which would then be used to further their own stature with other opposition groups, perhaps thereby gaining agreement to the very plan which they claim already to have activated. There seems to be heavy [less than 1 line not declassified] input into the document. [name not declassified] who evidently lends credence to the plan and who shows signs of moving towards endorsement of “controlled violence,” may be being manipulated by the document’s authors. It is not inconceivable that opposition is using references to violence, [less than 1 line not declassified] as means of provoking him to forego any “unholy deal,” to opt for active political role, and to resume leadership of opposition movement in order to nip in the bud advocates of violence. Another possibility relates to fact that both Aquino and opposition here would dearly love to persuade the U.S. to press Marcos harder to lift martial law, to restore habeas corpus, or somehow compel him to negotiate with opposition on more equal terms. Raising the spectre of violence may be viewed as one surefire means of doing so.

12. We frankly find it difficult to believe that all of the “junta” could agree on anything so detailed and far-reaching as this particular plan, even if they did all know about it. We are also struck by the rather bizarre wording and ideas of parts of the document. We have detected no broad acceptance among leading opposition figures here of document’s aims to “restructure the present feudal society along the Christian Socialist Democratic model” or to “re-orient national policies along nationalist anti-monopolist (imperialist) programs.” We also note fact that strategy paper contains no attack of U.S. bases, unless we assume that to be subsumed under subpara 2.3. [1 line not declassified] Nor do we think many oppositionists would subscribe to the clear willingness to incur or cause 1,000 or 3,000 casualties as a calculated prelude to bringing the military to desert the regime and help force Marcos to negotiate an “orderly” (sic) transition.

13. Statistical predictions re military response to violence, discussed in para 5.2, reflect fine hand of some coffee house planner. To be sure, the first phase of the violent struggle would be the easiest to launch. A box of grenades and some hired thugs are all it would take. (Would note, however, that acts of post-election violence in Mindanao and Nueva Ecija have not triggered any wider terrorist actions.)

14. Whatever the origin and bona fides of the document, however, having been apprised of this plan, consider we have an obligation again to go on the record categorically [1 line not declassified] here against the violence it advocates. Given the loose lipped characteristic of opposition members, the regime has probably already largely penetrated opposition’s latest plans and is possibly aware even of the fact that we have been made privy to document. Therefore we should consider also advising Marcos re our receipt of document and our reaction to it. Silence on our part could easily be misinterpreted by GOP.

15. State 152264¹¹ giving follow up on Aquino’s position reflected in his June 18 conversation with EA/PHL Country Director received after this was drafted. We find ourselves in general agreement with Aquino’s cautious view of opposition prospects and his realism about regime’s likely response.

Murphy

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 64, Philippines: 1/80-1/81. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. Telegram 158981 to Manila, June 17, is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880031–1815.
3. The elections took place on January 30.
4. Salvador Laurel, a leader of the United Nationalist Democratic Organization, opposed the Marcos regime.
5. Jovito Reyes Salonga, a Philippine politician and Marcos opponent.
6. In telegram 11568 from Manila, June 16, the Embassy described Murphy’s June 13 meeting with Sin. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800293–0490)
7. In telegram 12239 from Manila, January 19, the Embassy summarized a meeting between Israeli Ambassador to the Philippines Moshe Raviv and Murphy, during which Raviv offered the use of two supertankers for U.S. charter in exchange for U.S. assistance in docking Israeli ships and securing dead storage at Subic Bay. Murphy and Raviv also discussed the actions of the MNLF. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D800035–1263)
8. See “Manila Reports Uncovering Plot to Kill Marcos and Other Aides,” New York Times, January 1, 1980, p. 3.
9. In May, Aquino was released from detention in the Philippines in order to seek medical treatment in the United States for a heart condition. (“Detained Philippine Politician Allowed to Fly to U.S.,” New York Times, May 9, 1980, p. A1)
10. See Document 332.
11. In telegram 162264 to Manila, June 20, the Department provided a status report on Aquino. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880031–1810)