Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

332. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Honolulu, April 19, 1980

SUBJECT

• Secretary Rusk’s Meeting with President Marcos

PARTICIPANTS

• Philippines

  • President Marcos
  • Manuel Collantes, Under Secretary of State

• U.S.

  • Secretary Rusk
  • Assistant Secretary Holbrooke
  • Ambassador Murphy
  • Mr. Frazier Meade, Director of Philippine Affairs

Introduction

To begin the discussion, Secretary Rusk told President Marcos that since he had retired as Secretary he had been reluctant to take up any foreign missions. But when President Carter asked him to welcome President Marcos he could not say no because of his high regard for President Marcos and for the Philippines. The President had asked him to deliver a letter of greeting to President Marcos,² which he then presented. When Marcos expressed the hope that the President was well, Secretary Rusk replied that the President was well but very concerned, in particular about the problems in Iran. Nevertheless, the President had asked that his warmest greetings be conveyed to President Marcos.

President Marcos read the letter carefully. Looking up after reading the letter, Marcos noted, with reference to the last paragraph of the letter (thanking Marcos for his hospitality to Jeff Carter) that he had enjoyed having the President’s son in Manila.

The Secretary said that the U.S. had been very appreciative of the Philippines’ prompt reaction to the hostage situation in Iran and to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The U.S. was also appreciative of the Philippines’ offer to provide a site for the Refugee Processing Center. It had given a tremendous lift to everyone concerned with the problem. Marcos replied that it was their hope that the RPC would be a help but the Philippines also hoped the RPC would be replicated in other countries, especially Indonesia. Work on the RPC in the Philippines was continuing.

ASEAN

Secretary Rusk asked whether Marcos was encouraged by developments in ASEAN. Marcos said he was. At one time, for example, Malaysia and Indonesia seemed interested in establishing their own exclusive relationship with Hanoi that might have broken up ASEAN. The Portuguese Timor problem³ had also strained ASEAN. In response to the Secretary’s question, Marcos confirmed that ASEAN felt threatened by developments in Indo-China.⁴ If incursions by the Soviet Union or its surrogates continue, he said, there was really nothing that ASEAN could do to stop them. ASEAN was consequently intensely interested in what Vietnam in particular indicated it wished to do in the area. When the Secretary said the President had asked him to discuss mutual security issues, Marcos said he would be pleased to convey the U.S. position to his ASEAN colleagues. He was concerned, for example, that American preoccupation with Middle East problems threatened abandonment of ASEAN. The Secretary replied that the American people had taken 600,000 casualties since 1945 in the interest of collective security. We were quick to mobilize and forever hopeful that we would not have to be involved in future conflict. We believed in peace, and we had paid and would pay a heavy price for it. In that respect, the Secretary noted that the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines is deeply rooted in the interests of the U.S. and its people. The Military Bases Agreement was especially important because it located American forces in the Philippines. It represented, from the American point of view, a deep historical commitment to the Philippines. There could be no question about our attitude.

Marcos said he did not question U.S. sincerity but its capacity. Should the U.S. get involved in the Middle East or elsewhere, Asia would take second priority. He was concerned, too, about China. If China were armed for aggressive wars, it would become ASEAN’s problem.

Secretary Rusk quoted Napoleon, “Let China sleep, for when it awakes the world will tremble.” Everyone, he continued, had an interest in what happened in China over the next two or three decades. There were important signs that China was on the road to modernization. It would be encouraging if China were to move in the next 25 years toward normal and constructive membership in the community of nations. But our interest in China’s progress did not mean we wished to ally ourselves with the Chinese, nor did we wish to arm China.

The President, he said, was interested in Marcos’ views of Chinese development. Marcos said it was his impression that China would try to buy all kinds of arms. He feared China more than Japan before the year 2000. For now, the Chinese had adopted “smiling diplomacy,” and that might continue for 20 years. On the other hand, if China were to feel greatly threatened by either the Soviet Union on her northern borders or by Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea, China’s smiling diplomacy might change sooner than we expected.

FMS

The Secretary said the President was disappointed by the action of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in cutting $5 million in FMS from the Security Assistance request for FY 81. Marcos said that he was afraid Congressmen Wolff and Hall did not understand the significance of so-called small cuts. The unfortunate aspect of such an action is the effect it has on other countries’ perception of the U.S. commitment to mutual security in Asia. Secretary Rusk said that the action so far represented only the first move on a long Congressional trail. The Security Assistance request would also have to be considered in the Senate and then, assuming differences between the House and the Senate, there would be a House-Senate conference to resolve those differences. We were hopeful the Senate would be supportive. In that connection, Senator Inouye had asked him to deliver a letter to President Marcos⁵—which he handed to Marcos. The Senator was very disappointed at not being able to come. Marcos noted that he and some Congressmen had been in touch with each other in connection with the FMS problem. Chairman Zablocki had told him, for example, that he couldn’t help now but would do so later. The Secretary said he would try to get Senator Nunn and others to help, and Assistant Secretary Holbrooke said that Senators Glenn, Javits and Percy had all asked him to assure Marcos that they were going to help. The Administration, Holbrooke continued, was really going to push. Marcos acknowledged that he was aware of the Administration’s commitment to help. He had been kept informed of the efforts the Administration had made so far.

Swing Strategy

Secretary Rusk said he wanted to make a personal point, one that he had not discussed with President Carter. He personally doubted that a lengthy engagement either with the Soviet Union (on conventional warfare terms) or in the Middle East would occur that would distract us from our other commitments. It was important in that connection for us all to speak out against continued expansion of Soviet aggression. He had found it significant and encouraging that (a) the UN General Assembly had called for Soviet withdrawal⁶ (104–18) and that (b) the Muslim countries had unanimously condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Such global reactions touch the Russian nerve. For example, the Philippine decision to boycott the Olympics was important in developing propaganda pressure on the Russians; they are sensitive to propaganda values.

Mr. Holbrooke said he wanted to add a point. During the Vietnam war, he noted, the U.S. had developed the “Swing Strategy.” It was only a contingency plan but, when the plan was publicized recently in Japan, it had alarmed the Japanese and we had subsequently reviewed the validity of the plan. We had just made a decision which significantly reduced the number of ships in the Pacific Fleet “earmarked” for service in Europe in the event of an attack there. The significance of that decision was that the U.S. is going to maintain its commitments in Asia. It redressed an historical anachronism left over from the Vietnam war. Since the war, the U.S. had rebuilt its South East Asian policy around ASEAN.

Marcos remarked that Asia did not so much feel abandoned as it felt that the U.S. had grown allergic to fighting land wars. He had discussed this perception with Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua and asked him what sort of understanding the Chinese had with the U.S. in the event of an attack by the Soviet Union. Huang Hua said there was no understanding.

Noting that what he was about to say was personal, Secretary Rusk pointed out that there were some 7,000 nuclear weapons in NATO. If the Soviet Union were to attack in Europe, no American President could permit the Soviets to capture those weapons and the Soviet Union knew that. Consequently, he saw little likelihood of a major diversion of U.S. forces to Europe. The world had changed since the days when we had automatically given first priority to Europe. Marcos should not lose sleep over the meaning of our Mutual Defense Treaty.

Alliances in Asia

President Marcos said ASEAN leaders were not losing sleep over the issue of European primacy but were concerned with the extent to which the U.S. would help them or Kampuchea or even Pakistan against Soviet threats. President Zia had written to him saying that the $400 million offered by the U.S. would merely provoke the Soviet Union and would be of no help if the Soviet Union were to attack. In reply, the Secretary said helping Pakistan militarily was always complicated by the question of whether such aid might be used against India. It was further complicated, Holbrooke said, by (1) Pakistani moves to develop nuclear weapons, a move that had triggered the Symington amendment⁷ and (2) the execution of Bhutto.⁸ The President had nevertheless courageously offered to help Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Congress had in fact been receptive to waiving the Symington Amendment in January. But after President Zia rejected that assistance, it became difficult to ask Congress for help in the remainder of this year. The Chinese were also pressing us to help Pakistan.

Referring to Chinese pressures for the U.S. to help Pakistan, the Secretary noted that the Chinese Vice Premier had recently reminded us that China is the Middle Kingdom, and that all the rest of us are barbarians. We were unlikely to be willing to be a pawn in Chinese games. Marcos said the ASEAN countries hope not. They hope that China can be kept to the Mainland. Most Asian leaders were less afraid of Japan than of China. Holbrooke said the real threat was the Soviet Union. Marcos agreed but said it was his feeling that Vietnam would reach a critical point in a decade. If it did not revert to a policy of development, it would face internal struggle.

Holbrooke said that ASEAN unity in the face of Asian instability was fundamental. Marcos said that it was more than simply a question of unity. ASEAN nations needed to develop a much more sophisticated policy to deal with Vietnam, the USSR, etc. He wrote Pham Van Dong constantly because he felt Vietnam was violating Ho Chi Minh’s own testament.

Martial Law

Secretary Rusk remarked that the ASEAN countries were concerned about security. The lives of Americans were pledged to the security of the Philippines. That means, he said, that the Philippines had a constituency in the American people. The Philippines should interest itself in that constituency. (Comment: The Secretary’s remarks were intended to suggest to President Marcos that he should make some effort to (a) address the criticism that was developing in the U.S. of the Philippines; and (b) present a credible outline for political normalization. Marcos later told the Secretary privately he would try to deal with these matters in his speech to the American Newspaper Publishers Association.)⁹

Marcos said the U.S. need not worry about Philippine ability to handle internal security problems. The Philippine people had reacted strongly to the threat of a Muslim secession. They had volunteered to fight against the secessionists just as they had volunteered to fight against the Spanish. The Filipinos were not going to allow any foreign invaders to take over their soil.

Notwithstanding criticism of Martial Law, Marcos continued, the Filipinos know it’s only temporary. Without the upsurge in MNLF activities in 1978, Martial Law would have been lifted in 1978 or 1979. Now the Philippines had developed intelligence that both the Maoist and Soviet branches of the Communist Party had established contact with the MNLF. Their latest intelligence was that a liaison officer of the Soviet Embassy was in fact working with the MNLF and providing funds.

The President noted further that he was in touch with church elements. They were convinced that there was no moderate faction that could take over if he, Marcos, left the Presidency. The church was changing its tune. Cardinal Sin had told his priests not to engage in politics but instead to work to build up the moral standards so badly needed in the younger generation. In talking with the Jesuits, Marcos said he had asked what their alternative was to Martial Law. Would the Jesuits think of giving the leadership to Manglapus?¹⁰ The Jesuits replied that such a solution was impossible; Manglapus was weak and doesn’t know what he wants. “What about Aquino?” he rhetorically continued. The Jesuits had answered that Marcos couldn’t take such a chance because Aquino was impulsive and would give the country second priority attention. Even Cardinal Sin said he did not want to have anything to do with Aquino. So, Marcos said, I think there is no problem.

With respect to the MNLF, the Philippine Government was in the process of contacting MNLF field commanders. The Muslims knew Marcos, he grew up partly in Mindanao, and the Muslims trusted him. And with respect to the NPA, the Philippine Government had captured almost all of its commanders. Although a new echelon of leadership had taken over, it was not numerous and the Philippines Government had penetrated its ranks. Consequently, the fighting with the NPA had died down. In response to Holbrooke’s question as to NPA ties with China, Marcos said that both Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai had promised him that there would be no contact. And in fact NPA activities had died down. The NPA understood that the New Society helped the poor.

The legitimate opposition was contacting the NPA. But it knew the Government was aware of this activity and had drawn back. Now the opposition was attempting to establish a United Front. Father Intengan had established a Socialist Party.¹¹ That move, however, was a mistake because it had drawn resistance both from the right and from the communists.

The military were dependable. They supported Martial Law but they also supported civilian government. That was due in part to General MacArthur.¹² That tradition lived on. The military must never involve themselves in politics. Marcos added that he was organizing a reserve force of one million men, providing a battalion in each province. They had already proved their mettle in fighting outlaws.

Economic Change

Secretary Rusk referred to the revolution that had occurred since his own boyhood in Georgia, thanks to changes brought about by better education, public health and productivity. He asked how President Marcos saw the development of the poorer Filipinos. The President noted that the Press always criticized the Philippines when in fact changes in the Philippine economy since the introduction of Martial Law had been very favorable. The President recited statistics on increased rice production, increased rural credit, and increased rural development.

Civil Aviation

Secretary Rusk said that civil aviation was a jungle war and that he had been scarred more by civil aviation wars than by almost any other issue. He didn’t know of any other field where friends were so tempted to face each other down. But civil aviation is subject to precise legislation. He was, he said, no expert in the field. He asked only that President Marcos give the current U.S.-Philippine civair problem his personal attention because it could get worse. He said he could assure Marcos that President Carter would give it his own personal attention.

1. Source: Carter Library, President’s Files, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 3, Philippines, 6/78–4/80. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Frazier Meade (EA/PHL). The meeting took place in the Presidential Suite at the Ilikai Hotel in Honolulu.
2. See Document 331.
3. Reference is to East Timor’s 1975 declaration of independence and Indonesia’s subsequent invasion and occupation. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976.
4. Vietnam’s invasion and occupation of Kampuchea began on December 25, 1978. See Documents 36–39.
5. Not found.
6. The sixth Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly convened January 10–14 to address the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. UN General Assembly Resolution ES–6/2, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,” was adopted on January 14.
7. The Symington Amendment (1976) banned both military and economic assistance to countries that used or transferred nuclear enrichment equipment, materials, or technology that did not comply with the regulations established by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
8. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, former President and Prime Minister of Pakistan, was executed on April 4, 1979, after being sentenced to death by the Supreme Court of Pakistan for having authorized the murder of a political opponent.
9. See “Marcos Speech to Publishers,” Washington Post, April 22, 1980, p. A9.
10. Raul Manglapus, a former Philippine Senator, had been in exile since the imposition of martial law in 1972.
11. Father Romeo Intengan and Norberto Gonzalez founded the Philippine Democratic Socialist Party in 1973.
12. General Douglas MacArthur was relieved by President Truman as Commander of UN Forces in Korea in April 1951 for making public statements on policy matters.