Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

293. Study Prepared by the Interagency Group on Philippine Base Negotiations¹

Washington, March 7, 1977

[Omitted here are the index and a map of Asia.]

SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The United States has long operated major naval and air force bases in the Philippines in a friendly and cooperative environment. We could legally operate under the existing agreement² for another 15 years but, in response to Filipino requests for new arrangements, we have repeatedly told them that we are willing to make appropriate changes. The current round of base negotiations began in April 1976,³ and negotiations are now in suspense pending completion of this review of our policy. Manila has not pushed to conclude negotiations, but President Marcos expects word from us by May on how we expect to proceed.

This response to Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 14 proceeds as follows:

—Part I looks at the record and issues in the base negotiations and analyzes Philippine objectives and strategy. This analysis focuses on how Marcos uses the negotiations to achieve Philippine objectives regarding manifestations of sovereignty, financial compensation and security guarantees. An assessment appears at page 6.

—Part II examines the bases and their capabilities, their relation to our broader interests in the area, and alternatives to our existing posture.

—Part III develops four alternatives for dealing with the inter-related questions of our force presence, the scope of the Mutual Defense Treaty,⁴ financial compensation and major base rights issues in light of the differing viewpoints of the United States and the Philippines. It also discusses options regarding timing and approach to negotiations.

This study is not a re-examination of our force posture in the Pacific. That work is proceeding under PRM 10.⁵ The study takes note of that central problem and other general issues raised by a review of the bases.

PART I: THE STATUS OF THE U.S. DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PHILIPPINES

The United States has been dealing with Philippine dissatisfaction with provisions of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) ever since the Agreement became effective in 1947. Forty-one amendments and many negotiations later, the Philippines continues to seek adjustments in the relationship, suggesting that keeping the base issues open may be an end in itself for the Philippine Government. The most recent attempt to conclude a new agreement sputtered to an anti-climax at the end of 1976⁶ admidst uncertainty as to the future of our defense relationship.

The Negotiations

Why has the United States been negotiating?

The US does not need a new agreement. The MBA is valid until 1991 when either party can terminate it on one year’s notice, unless terminated sooner by mutual agreement. Its provisions are highly satisfactory to the US—granting rent-free, relatively unfettered base operating rights.

The Philippines does not like the existing arrangement and has requested change. We know that dissatisfaction can grow to the point that our presence is no longer sustainable. We recognize that the post-World War II environment which gave rise to the defense relationship has changed, and that events in Vietnam and in the Philippines add urgency to the quest for a more equal and modern relationship. In turn, Philippine demands cause us to examine base requirements and alternatives.

What has been our experience in negotiations?

It remains unclear whether Marcos has ever been willing to make the choices necessary to conclude negotiations. Formal negotiations began in 1971 but Marcos terminated them in 1972 because of domestic turmoil. The Philippines again voiced interest in talks in 1973. The US again presented negotiating positions in 1974 but Marcos never responded. In December 1975 he and President Ford issued a joint communique,⁷ emphasizing the importance of bases to both countries and announcing base negotiations in full recognition of Philippine sovereignty. By September 1976 the negotiations had produced a list of 25 unresolved issues reflecting Philippine demands of varying degrees of unacceptability to us.⁸

In the meantime Marcos raised broad questions about the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). In a meeting with Dr. Kissinger October 8,⁹ Foreign Secretary Romulo appeared to accept general assurances about mutual defense and asked for the US compensation package. He subsequently raised questions about our treaty assurances, however, and rejected the US compensation offer. He made a counter proposal which we rejected. On November 30 Romulo appeared to accept the US offer but, after consultation with Marcos, refused to announce an agreement, thus ending the latest round.¹⁰

Marcos has since publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the US approach to negotiations, demanded payment of rent for the bases, sought clarification of the MDT, and hinted at closing the bases. The Philippines says its domestic concerns prevent reopening negotiations before May, but indicates anxiety about the silence of the new Administration on our intentions.

What are the issues?

Three agreements define our security relationship. Each contains significant issues which relate to the base negotiations.

The Military Bases Agreement. The problem is to reconcile persistent Philippine demands for full recognition of its sovereignty over the bases (and nationalistic overtones of seeking to abolish “extra-territorial rights and privileges”) with our need for unhampered operation of forces and bases.

An April 1976 US draft agreement contained some concessions we believed possible in this regard. It included a role for a Philippine base commander, increased Philippine participation in base security, and reversion of some base lands with clear recognition that the remaining bases belong to the Philippines. The Philippine Government was not satisfied and insisted upon positions (summarized in Annex A)¹¹ which would interfere with the following US requirements:

1. Integrated facilities—including cohesive land and water operating areas at the bases.

2. Operational control—determination by the US of the purposes for which the facilities are to be used, US force levels, the conduct of base operations and armament configurations, provision of security by US forces at US facilities and participation wherever else necessary, and free access to and free movement within and between facilities.

3. Priviliges and immunities—US jurisdiction over official duty cases and offenses solely involving the US and US personnel, and exemption from Philippine taxes and customs.

4. Tenure—sufficient duration of the agreement to assure continuity of the US regional defense posture (i.e., more than the Philippine proposal of 5 years).

The Military Assistance Agreement (Revised 1952).¹² The Philippines does not believe we have lived up to the implicit quid pro quo between our use of bases free of rent and the Military Assistance Agreement we signed when we gained our base rights.

Marcos wants more money because: The Philippines has received less military assistance than other allies, although providing significant facilities. Since 1962 cumulative US grant military assistance to the Philippines has totaled 20% of the assistance provided Turkey, 47% of that for Greece, 35% of that for the Republic of China, and 76% of that for Thailand.

—Marcos needs additional funds for force modernization and to counter insurgencies.

—Manila presented a $3.6 billion military shopping list during negotiations of which we estimate about 10% can be absorbed and supported for realistic Philippine security needs.

—He demanded a five-year package of $1 billion in military aid (3/4 grant) with economic aid to be negotiated separately.

Insisting that compensation be tied to real Philippine needs, the previous Administration offered a “billion dollar” five-year package, equally divided between military and economic assistance. (Spain received a “$1.2 billion” package and Turkey was offered a like amount.) The $1 billion tag is misleading. The economic part of the package would probably have gone to them anyway and was added to make the package more appealing in the Philippines.

The breakdown of the five-year totals is as follows:

	Grant Military Assistance	FMS Financing	AID & EXIM	Totals
Philippine Request	$750 M	$250 M	—	$1,000 M
1976 US Offer	$200 M	$300 M	$500 M	$1,000 M
Projected Expenditures at Present Levels without New Package	$100 M	$100 M	$500 M	$700 M
Additional Amounts of US Offer over previous Projections	$100 M	($200 M in loan guarantees)	—	$300 M

Manila objects to the uncertain process of MAP grants: The Philippines wants a “congress-proof” assurance of compensation for the bases. Increasingly Filipinos refer to rent as more certain and less demeaning than reliance on the annual legislative process for military assistance. They also see rent as preferable to US statutory constraints on assistance, which include the monitoring and approval and human rights provisions of current legislation. We have refused to consider rent, maintaining it to be contrary to the spirit of mutuality in our relationship.

The Mutual Defense Treaty. Under the treaty each party obligates itself in the event of an armed attack in the Pacific area on either party “to act to meet the common danger” in accordance with its constitutional processes. This commitment includes armed attacks on either’s metropolitan territory, island territories, or armed forces in the Pacific. It has never been invoked.

The Philippines has expressed increasing dissatisfaction:

—That US constitutional processes would delay or obstruct a US response, and that the US could determine that something less than an all-out military response might satisfy its obligation to “act.” It has consistently sought embellishment of these provisions to make the US obligation more automatic. Early Eisenhower and Dulles statements pointed out that US forces were so distributed throughout the Philippines that any attack would necessarily involve them, and that they would, of course, defend themselves. Subsequently, President Johnson gave more assurances. Manila now wants a reaffirmation of these earlier assurances as a precondition to progress in the bases negotiations. However, US forces are no longer so widely distributed throughout the Philippines that they would automatically be involved in every attack.

—That the treaty lacked applicability to insurgencies which receive external support. The Philippines has not tried to invoke the treaty because of our indications that we would not consider it to apply. Filipinos view the MDT as irrelevant to their immediate security concerns.

—That the treaty gives no commitment to its disputed territorial claims. Manila sought recognition that the treaty would apply in the event of an attack on its oil extraction activities in the Reed Bank and Spratly Islands claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, and China. The MDT might apply to such attacks under some circumstances; the US has resisted clarification because of the dangers of specifying which circumstances would make it applicable, and because of the risks of provoking the other claimants. The Philippines has now refined the demand by asking obliquely whether the South China Sea comes under the “Pacific Region” to which the treaty applies.

The Philippine Setting

Marcos’ negotiating behavior embodies the ambivalence of the Philippine relationship with the United States. Long-standing discomforts with the patron-client relationship now interact with new perceptions of the international scene and of national interests. While still valuing the American connection, Filipinos see the bases as benefitting the United States more than themselves.

How stable is the Marcos Government?

With the 1972 declaration of martial law,¹³ Marcos eliminated the political free-for-all—often violent and always corrupt—characteristic of Philippine democracy. He has established a political system completely dependent upon his leadership. The opposition is weak and fragmented and there are no immediate threats of any consequence to his power or to Manila’s control over the country. A generally prospering economy—the average real growth rate has been about 6% since 1972—cushions the impact of widespread economic inequities and population growth. The long-standing communist insurgency constitutes no real threat to the government, nor is Manila’s control over most of the country affected by the Muslim insurgency in the South.¹⁴

Marcos is responsive to but not governed by the senior military, the mainstay of his regime. They have confidence in him. While the extent of Imelda Marcos’ influence over her husband is uncertain, it is not decisive and her power and position depend upon him.

What factors support retention of the defense relationship?

The strength of old ties. The military relationship is only part of a broad range of historic and current ties that link Filipinos to Americans; these ties could not be abruptly broken without serious disruption to the economy and social fabric as well as to Marcos’ own power base. Especially among the older generation with memories of World War II and cooperation in Korea, attachment to the American connection remains strong. This is particularly true of senior military officers; almost all of them received American training and operate under a doctrine that centers around the MDT.

The economic relationship. The Philippines needs the US as a trading partner, source of investment, and aid giver (bilateral military and economic aid 1946–1975 was $2.4 billion; some $80 million per year economic aid is now 12% of their total foreign assistance). Filipinos also need the bases for foreign exchange (over $200 million per year) and employment (32,000 directly employed, many more indirectly).

Economic negotiations, started in 1974 at US initiative, are suspended. The issues are Philippine desires for duty free access to US markets, especially for coconut oil and mahogany, and US desires for investment guarantees to replace the Laurel-Langley economic agreement.¹⁵ Manila occasionally seeks to link its objectives in these negotiations to our interests in the bases.

Military sales and assistance. Because the US has been virtually its sole source of supply, the Philippines depends on us for spare parts and munitions, and cannot maintain its armed forces without our continuing military cooperation.

The regional perspective. The Philippines shares the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) view that a continuing American presence in Southeast Asia is important for the security of the region. Because of their commitment to ultimate neutralization and the elimination of foreign bases, it is difficult for ASEAN countries publicly to call for retention of the bases. However, Marcos is conscious that his removal of the American military presence from the Philippines would cause great nervousness in ASEAN.

What are the factors that weaken the defense relationship with the US?

Nationalism. The desire to eliminate the stereotype of the Filipino as the American’s “little brown brother” is strong. The base presence is the most potent symbol of this inequality in Filipino eyes, limiting the jurisdiction of the Philippine government on its own soil and conspicuously confronting the ordinary Filipino with an alien standard of living much higher than his own.

Disparities in defense interests. Although not irrelevant, the global competition of the superpowers is no longer the main framework within which the Philippines defines its security. The present perceived threats stem from national and regional problems. The Muslim insurgency draws heavily upon Philippine resources, ties down 75% of its armed strength, and complicates relations with the oil producing Arab states. Disputed territorial claims loom as a potential source of military involvement. The Philippines finds the US unwilling to involve itself in these problems, but fears that the defense relationship will involve it in disputes in which it has no real stake or—as in the Middle East—in which its own interests could be jeopardized. As a result the Government seeks to develop greater self-reliance in national defense while still looking to us for general security, protection of the sea lines of communication, and military assistance.

Foreign policy reorientation. The Philippines has endeavored to develop a more independent foreign policy. Its defense relationship with the United States has not impeded its efforts to establish relations with communist countries or prevented it from playing an active role in some Third World councils—the Group of 77, for example. It has, however, prevented the Philippines from gaining much-desired membership in the non-aligned movement.

Human Rights. Measures stifling political activity, muzzling the press, controlling the judiciary and suppressing dissent—although not as harsh as in many other countries—have attracted unfavorable American attention. Critics of Marcos in Congress and among the public desire a more distant official relationship with him. Marcos, in turn, has been irritated by what he regards as American interference in Philippine domestic affairs.

Assessment

Marcos and the Philippine people want us to stay in the Philippines for the near term; but they also want to alter the arrangements. The greatest danger is that Philippine negotiators will be backed into corners of national pride which could result in an impasse and eventual harassment of the bases. Marcos has not yet given us clear signals of his priorities or bottom-line positions. The best assumptions on which we can proceed are:

—The mutual defense issue is not the critical factor. Marcos probably knows that the United States is not going to give him the assurances which he has sought, e.g., on internal security. He expects the Carter Administration to reaffirm the US role as the ultimate guarantor of Philippine security against outside powers. He will continue to press for explicit guarantees whenever he thinks he can use that tactic to drive up the assistance level by demonstrating that the Philippines must arm to protect itself against threats to which the US refuses to respond.

—Money is an important ingredient. Marcos has no real idea how much he can get. He believes the Philippines has gotten unfair treatment and looks at Spain and Turkey as examples of what persistence in bargaining can achieve. He would find it difficult to accept the level we already offered or less without a different overall arrangement that satisfies aspirations for sovereignty. He is likely to press for a rental arrangement in which we pay for bases and he continues to enjoy a security guarantee.

—The range of solutions to base operations/sovereignty issues is limited. Marcos is not yet willing to make major concessions. Money can soften his position but he will never permit himself to deserve the criticism that he traded Philippine sovereignty for it. Marcos and his advisors overestimate our room to compromise.

—Marcos may want to keep the negotiations going indefinitely. Expressions of discontent have succeeded in eliciting ever more forthcoming responses from us, enhanced Marcos’ credentials in the Third World, and served his own domestic interests while keeping the bases intact. But, by failing to sign an agreement, Manila has passed up several years of possible benefits such as increased military assistance and has no assurance that the US will ever make as favorable an offer again.

—The US has almost run out of negotiating room within the present definition of the problem. Our tactics of taking the initiative in proposing changes to an agreement we find quite satisfactory have succeeded in our continuing to operate in the Philippines on a favorable basis. So far Marcos’ delay has worked to our advantage. If Marcos pushes for a conclusion of negotiations we must either convince him to reduce his demands, or the US must find new ways to modernize the relationship.

The options open to us in pursuing either of these courses of action depend in large measure on our assessment of the importance of the bases and alternatives to our basing structure discussed in the following section.

[Omitted here is a map of U.S. Facilities in the Philippines.]

PART II—THE BASES

This section addresses the following questions:

1. What military capabilities do the bases help provide?

2. What broader strategic and policy purposes do they serve?

3. What alternatives are available for performing existing functions?

4. What would be the impact of relinquishing facilities?

What military capabilities do the Philippine bases help provide?

The location of the bases permits the US to sustain or interdict naval or air operations along the periphery of Asia and project this power throughout the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean areas and over China and the Asian mainland. For the same geographic reason the location plays a key role in worldwide and regional communications networks. They are the only US bases near mainland Asia which are not vulnerable to combined Soviet air and naval attack from bases in the Soviet Far East. The utility of the location of the bases with regard to the vast expanse of the Pacific theater is demonstrated in the table at the end of this section.

The two primary components of the US presence in the Philippines are Clark Air Base and the Subic Bay naval complex. Both have a wide range of activities and are supported by a network of less extensive facilities providing largely communications support. The bases serve mutually supporting military purposes, but one base is not dependent on the other. We have invested over $1 billion in these facilities.

Clark Air Base—Clark is the main Air Force operating and logistic base for the South Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. It occupies 130,000 acres and can handle 3,700 tons of cargo and 28,000 passengers daily. Clark is a major communications nodal point with automatic switching systems, satellite terminals, and high frequency radio facilities. Its communications control all aircraft operating throughout the area, as well as supporting Presidential and in-theater command and control requirements. Collocated Air Force and Navy signals intelligence facilities satisfy national and tactical intelligence requirements; Clark is also the major fall-back site for signals intelligence functions located in Japan, Okinawa, and Taiwan. The Crow Valley gunnery range is the only Pacific range with integrated electronic warfare strike and air-to-air facilities and is a major element in the readiness of all combat air assets in the Pacific.

Subic Bay Naval Complex—The natural harbor anchorages, collocated ship and air capabilities, weapon range complex and amphibious maneuver areas of Subic Bay/Cubi Point provide a full range of naval aircraft and ship repair, logistics, command and control, communications, training and medical functions available at no other naval facility outside the United States. The ship repair facility, including floating dry docks, performs 65% of the ship repair work for the Seventh Fleet. The current man-day rate of $22 at the facility is by far the lowest in the area and probably in the world ($96 at Yokosuka and $142 at Guam). If we do the repairs at Yokosuka that we presently do annually at Subic the added costs will be $70–80 million more per year. Cubi Point is the only facility in the Western Pacific where aircraft can be offloaded for repairs directly from a carrier and the air wing can maintain proficiency while the carrier accomplishes upkeep. It has the capacity to perform complete engine repair in addition to other maintenance support functions. The supply depot includes a freight terminal operation which moves over one million tons of supplies annually and stores 2.5 million barrels of POL. The ammunition depot holds over 85,000 tons of ammunition. Marine Corps training exercises also rely on the Subic Complex.

Personnel Strengths—1977

	US Military	US Civilians	Phil Nationals
Clark	7,660	256	10,000
Subic	5,079	330	20,000
Other	1,004	9	2,000
Totals	13,743	595	32,000

US Forces—The principal US forces in the Philippines are two tactical fighter squadrons and one tactical airlift squadron. The fighters now perform the air defense mission for the Philippines and are available for contingencies anywhere in the theater. All Seventh Fleet ships visit Subic but only a submarine is homeported there.

Military Capabilities—In summary the bases are an essential element in maintaining the following military capabilities at very low costs:

—A continuous naval presence in the Western Pacific and occasionally in the Indian Ocean with surge augmentation;

—Naval contingency capability in the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and East African waters;

—A high state of readiness of existing Pacific forces;

—Land and sea-based tactical air assets—both fighters and airlift—and the ability to redeploy those assets rapidly anywhere in-theater.

—Strategic and tactical logistic support during contingencies, with current planning for such contingencies focusing on Korea and Taiwan;

—Comprehensive support for all forces in-theater, including communications, intelligence, logistics, maintenance, training and personnel requirements;

—Major war reserve materiel storage.

What broader purposes do the Philippine bases serve?

The bases and their utility can only be considered in a setting broader than the Philippines. They have been part of a post-war posture of “forward defense” with forces stationed in key foreign areas for purposes of bolstering the confidence of our allies, signalling our resolve to potential enemies, contributing to the readiness of US and allied forces, and enhancing the flexible response capability of US forces to meet various contingencies.

The Asian Environment—In light of the transformation in Asia in the past decade we have already significantly reduced our Asian deployments and base structure, and altered the way we think about our Asian defense posture.

—The Sino-Soviet dispute and the focusing of PRC forces on the Sino-Soviet border have largely removed China in our thinking as a major military threat to neighboring countries. Defense planning now emphasizes our capability to counter the Soviet threat worldwide. Concurrently the improvement in relations with the PRC has permitted us to move virtually out of Taiwan. Our main hedges against a Chinese threat in Asia are forward deployed conventional forces, including those in the Philippines, and nuclear capable forces.

—The Soviet Union’s major buildup on the Sino-Soviet border threatens China. Their slow but steady growth of naval and air assets in the Pacific can threaten the US directly and also our allies. North Korea has made significant improvements in its capability and remains our immediate concern in Northeast Asia. However the growing strength of South Korea has permitted us to reduce part of our forces and to consider further reductions.

—We have developed greater interests in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. The Philippine bases and our naval forces in the Pacific are related to those concerns.

US Force Posture—Our personnel strength in East Asia, including forces afloat, has declined to about 135,000, some 50,000 less than in 1960, the year before any Vietnam buildup began. Our base structure has been reduced to Japan, Korea, the Philippines and Guam with significantly reduced base areas.

The major Asian contingencies that US forces in East Asia are specifically tasked for are a Korean one and as part of a worldwide conventional war with the Soviets. Forces also serve a wide variety of general purposes: maintaining stable regional balances of power, insuring the continuation of close US-Japan ties, maintaining Chinese confidence in our willingness to stand up to the Soviet Union, securing our allies from attack, containing the growth and spread of Soviet power and influence, and insuring the defense of the LOCs.

Despite changes in Asia our regional goals remain constant: the preservation of stability, the prevention of regional hegemony, the honoring of commitments, and keeping access to trade and investment. Normalization of relations with Peking and Hanoi and maintenance of our community of interests with the PRC against the Soviets could imply future changes in our political and military alignments. There is some uncertainty as to what extent a change in our presence in the Philippines might affect PRC-US relations. We set the greatest priority on our alliance with Japan, which while increasingly important as a stabilizing element in the whole Pacific picture, is dependent on the US for its national defense and very much concerned with our force posture in Asia. We expect further reductions in our strength in-theater through force withdrawals from Korea and minor adjustments in other areas. There is also a diminished willingness on the part of the US to be involved in foreign countries and bases without full and open acknowledgement by those countries of our mutual interests. In the case of the Philippines our interest in them depends to a greater extent than in the past on their freely acknowledged mutual interest in having US forces there.

While we can examine the benefits and liabilities of Philippine basing, the ultimate desirability of the bases must be determined in the light of a broad Pacific defense posture.

Global Interests—The bases greatly reduce the cost of US naval presence and power projection into the Indian Ocean area. This affects US capabilities in crises and contingencies on the east coast of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, the Persian Gulf, Iran, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh and Australia.

—They act as a symbol of US military and political power in an area of obvious concern to the Soviet Union and the PRC. They help to demonstrate the potential importance of the United States to both sides in their continuing conflict, and may contribute to reducing potential pressure on the PRC to respond to Soviet military superiority.

—They provide unique communications and signal intelligence facilities of importance to US national and strategic nuclear interests and strategic targets.

—They provide us important capabilities in the event of a worldwide war with the Soviet Union or Soviet-PRC hostilities. At a minimum they complicate Soviet military planning.

Regional—The Philippine bases give the United States unquestioned naval and air superiority in Southeast Asia. (A shift of US forces to Guam or Japan might still leave the US with naval superiority and probable air superiority in most regional contingencies at this time.) This broad strategic certainty has the following implications:

—The Philippines remain a secure military bastion. Unless it were party to an effective insurgent effort, no outside power could challenge their security.

—The Japanese see our presence in the Philippines as important if not vital to the protection of their sea lines of communication to their sources of oil. This presence is a major protective symbol in an area where they have a large and growing stake.

—The bases contribute to the psychological well-being of all non-communist countries in the area and their interest in not being left alone to possible Soviet or Chinese pressuring. They create uncertainty in the minds of potential aggessors.

—They are a deterrent to PRC action against Taiwan and provide a major tool for defeating hostile PRC action against Taiwan.

—They directly provide support in a Korean contingency and add flexibility to deal with trouble in Korea.

Local—The bases ensure positive ties between the Philippines and the US as well as act as a divisive issue. They have major economic impact on the Philippines, which would face serious problems through the loss of jobs, assistance, US investment, and their status as “secure ally” in the eyes of US and Western businessmen.

—The Philippines have never asked for removal of the bases. Sudden unilateral withdrawal or major reductions would create concern regarding the future of our relations and could well affect the stability of the Philippine Government.

Uncertainties—PRM 10 and other policy studies will address topics that may affect our overall defense posture in the Pacific. Our view of the Philippine bases could change dramatically if these studies resulted in significant changes in our defense posture or threat perceptions, such as:

—A reduction of forces in the Pacific so that the US was no longer able to sustain adequate forces at the bases.

—A determination that contingencies which would involve the use of the bases are so remote or so limited by US domestic constraints as not to justify the costs of the bases, and that resources could better be used in NATO or elsewhere.

Problems—While the bases are available in peacetime they may not be available in support of some of the principal contingencies we are worried about, notably a crisis in the Indian Ocean, Middle East, or for that matter any crisis in Asia that is not directly threatening to the Philippines.

—A US military presence in the Philippines leads to the inevitable charge that we are perpetuating colonialism and a mendicant Philippine personality.

—Our presence could involve us in Philippine regional disputes. These interests do not presently present serious risks, although issues like the Spratly dispute have a potential.

—Our bases propel us into the Philippine political process and leave us vulnerable to harassment and blackmail. They inhibit a positive Philippine role in the Third World.

The Question of Timing—The prospect of resuming negotiations with the Philippine Government on a new base agreement comes at a time when our intent to withdraw ground forces from South Korea¹⁶ has been announced and when it is generally expected that further moves will be made to fulfill the terms of the Shanghai Communique,¹⁷ moves that are likely to involve changes in our security relationship with Taiwan. An announcement of planned significant reductions to our military presence in the Philippines, whether at our initiative or at Philippine requests, coming on top of these developments, could be widely seen in Southeast Asia, Japan, China and elsewhere as very destabilizing and as demonstrating a pattern of US conduct in which our policy changes without a real consideration of the interests of our friends and allies. The possible effects of this perception may be uncertain but they could be great.

What are the alternatives to the present U.S. base structure in the Philippines?

With some exceptions the functions currently performed in the Philippines might be transferred to other locations in the Pacific. In the real world, however, the technical option of relocating facilities may be optimistic since access to land or facilities in alternate host countries would be politically difficult or unfeasible. Even if such transfers proved politically possible, substantially higher operating costs would usually result and procurement of extra ships would be necessary to maintain capabilities.

Under various degrees of relocation, degradation in current military capabilities would be unavoidable. In particular the capability to employ forces in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia would be impaired, and logistic support of contingency operations ranging from the Middle East to Northeast Asia would be more austere. Some capabilities which are geographically sensitive—communications and intelligence—would be irretrievably degraded if relocated.

The movement of forces if achievable to existing bases would also exacerbate the problems we already face such as overcrowding, unaccompanied tours, and urban encroachment, and might further arouse political sensitivities among host governments. At least five years would be required to carry out major relocations, after the lengthy process of planning, negotiating other sites and obtaining appropriations were completed.

We have examined four major alternatives to our present basing structure. They range from minor consolidation which retains all our present capability through relinquishment of some or all the functions of the bases. Alternatives were examined in terms of relocation (Japan, Korea, Guam, Pacific Trust Territory) and operational shifts (greater use of ships afloat, aircraft staged from greater distances). The implications of these more extensive shifts on our capabilities will depend on the location of the contingency, e.g., Straits of Malacca, Northeast Asia. Annex B summarizes this analysis in greater detail.¹⁸

Alternative A: Consolidation in the Philippines

Because of space limitations and the fact that many of the functions currently performed in the Philippines provide interlocking support, only minimal consolidation of facilities can be realized without degrading capabilities. Such consolidation is feasible but would be of only marginal help to the success of negotiations.

The first priority would be the reversion of unused or less used lands such as the 47,200 acre portion of Clark Air Base (about 35% of the total area and Camp John Hay, which has already been offered. We would give positive consideration to the Philippine requests for additional lands. In addition, some consolidation of outlying command and control communications facilities could be realized.

Key communications facilities could be centralized at Naval Communications Station San Miguel and at Clark Air Base. Assuming the centralization is feasible (in light of technical constraints), relocation and regeneration of capabilities would cost about $8.9M. Operating costs and manpower requirements would require at least four years to complete and there is high technical probability of degradation.

Alternative B: Filipinization

Under this alternative the Air Force and Navy would both continue most functions but gradually turn them over to Philippine management, control or joint use. We would be trading in-hand operational capability and flexibility for greater Philippine satisfaction with our defense relationship and wider economic benefits. Elements of this alternative could include, but not be limited to:

—Training the Philippine Air Force to operate and maintain portions of Crow Valley, i.e., the standard scoreable target complex normally used for basic continuation training. This is feasible after suitable preparation.

—Removing tactical fighters and turning over air defense and area air traffic control (less the control zone at Cubi) to the Philippines. Current threat assessments indicate the effect on Philippine defense would be negligible. It would reduce 1,000 local national positions with salaries of $4,500,000. U.S. assistance to the Philippine Air Force and a four-year training period to train Philippine Air Force controllers would be required.

—Converting base service functions to Philippine commercial operation. Areas under investigation range from routine maintenance functions through complex aircraft maintenance such as that performed in Taiwan and Singapore which is now well beyond Philippine capabilities.

Some functions such as area traffic control and air defense might be turned over in several years. Others would take considerably longer to train the necessary technical force. We could make an early statement of principle of our readiness to work out Philippine programs during the life of the agreement and continue Filipinization as long as our operational capability and flexibility were not significantly impaired.

Alternative C: Major Reduction of Air Force Functions

Tactical fighter and airlift operations, the gunnery range complex, and much of the base operating support including Wallace Air Station would be relocated to other WestPac bases (new land area required for the range). Aerial port facilities, war reserve materiel storage, and some intelligence and communications would be retained provided access and operating rights were guaranteed. Implementation of this alternative would:

—Decrease deterrent capability in Southeast Asia.

—Reduce the readiness of all WestPac combat air assets (in the absence of a suitable alternative range).

—Degrade strategic and tactical airlift capabilities in Southeast Asia and to the Indian Ocean.

—Decrease flexibility in logistic operational and contingency response in-theater.

—Impair other theater missions through crowding of receiving bases.

Total costs associated with this alternative are about $147 million for relocation and an annual increase of $3.4 million in operation and maintenance costs. Lead times are at least 3–5 years. Air Force personnel savings in the Philippines of 1,869 are possible.

Alternative D: Base Relinquishment

This would be a near total withdrawal from the Philippines, including all residual combat and combat support operations, logistic support, pre-positioned stocks, base infrastructure and major portions of the communications facilities. Efforts should be made to retain high frequency direction finding and nuclear test ban monitoring facilities since these activities cannot be satisfactorily resited. Attempts should also be made to retain geographically sensitive national command control communications capabilities. We would want ship access and aerial transit rights. Finally, we would seek to obtain guaranteed operating rights in crises, although the actual availability of usable facilities could be in doubt.

Operationally, this alternative would mean:

—Decreased presence/deterrence in the Southwest Pacific/Southeast Asia region.

—Severe impairment of naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean.

—Decreased flexibility for support of WestPac contingencies.

—Reduced readiness of tactical air assets.

—Impairment of other theater missions through crowding of receiving bases.

Relinquishing bases and trying to maintain current capabilities would involve the procurement of additional forces and increasing O&M costs. Assuming no changes in strategy and deployment patterns, total costs associated with this alternative could be over $5 billion for relocation and procurement and an increase of $340 million in annual operating costs. Increased personnel requirements would vary around 10,000. Lead times are estimated to be more than 4–5 years.

[Omitted here is a chart outlining the distances and transit times from Clark and Subic Bay to selected points.]

PART III—COURSES OF ACTION

Parts I and II dealt with the status of our defense relationship with the Philippines and the U.S. interests in the bases as separate topics. In examining U.S. options we must deal with their interrelationships. The decision as to the future need for and nature of the U.S. military presence limits U.S. options on base rights issues, financial compensation, and scope of the Mutual Defense Treaty. At the same time all of these issues impact on our ability to maintain our desired force presence and may themselves influence the decision regarding that presence. We have interrelated the issues into packages which can be selected as a unit or with variations as outlined below. It is possible to select a course of action which permits movement from a higher level of U.S. base requirements to a lower one depending on negotiating demands or on changed circumstances.

Option A—Consolidation Under The Status Quo

This option recognizes that only limited consolidation of facilities and functions is possible without degrading capabilities and that major changes in basing will take years to accomplish and be costly. Maintaining our activities and base operating rights in a satisfactory host country environment is the goal. Its elements are:

Force Presence: Maintain all major facilities with limited consolidation.

Base Rights Issues: Maintain established U.S. positions, employing variables such as returning more baselands like Camp John Hay and shortening the duration of the agreement (e.g., ten years, subject to review after five years). Remain firm on such Philippine demands as:

—Restriction on U.S. use of the bases to regional defense and prohibition on their use for combat operations without Philippine consent.

—Ultimate determination by Philippine courts of whether an offense by a U.S. serviceman grew out of the performance of official duty.

Financial Compensation: Start at lower levels but be prepared to work up to the Ford Administration’s offer ($200 million military assistance over 5 years with additional economic and FMS credits to bring it to the cosmetic “$1 billion” level).¹⁹

Scope of the MDT: Reaffirm U.S. commitment to the Treaty.

Discussion

Our stance on base rights issues would demonstrate some degree of compromise without affecting operational effectiveness. The compensation offer can be explained to Congress for its true value in terms of the limited increases over programmed levels of aid, and to Marcos and the Congress as both consistent with offers to Spain, Turkey and as commensurate with the military requirements of our defense partner. We reaffirm a treaty to which we are already legally committed without embellishing it in ways inconsistent with current foreign policy realities.

Pro: This option would preserve the global, regional, and local military and political interests outlined in Part II. It continues a course of negotiations with which both partners are already familiar. It could also offer some variables that may be more attractive to Marcos.

The bases now exist and the relocation options do not. We must be cautious about paper trade offs. Real world trade-offs take time and, are usually more costly than initial estimates indicate. They also are likely to be subject to intense domestic political debate, and it is unlikely that plans to carry out significant force/base changes would emerge from Congress in the way they went in. It may be difficult to maintain the Administration’s control over what happens if the U.S. makes major cuts in its Philippine bases.

The political and strategic uncertainty about our defense posture in Asia argues for slow and considered action. The present negotiations are an irritant but no crisis exists in our relations with the Philippines which forces us to take precipitate major base or force structure positions in the absence of a well-conceived, well-integrated notion of what we want to do in the Pacific.

Con: There is little new in this approach and Marcos has rejected many elements of it. It would not reflect the lessened U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. It could draw increasing U.S. domestic criticism as reaffirming our close association with a repressive regime.

Marcos would continue to press us for assurances that we will, in effect, “instantly repel” any attack on the Philippines and we can not meet these demands without going beyond the obligations we have under the Treaty’s language. Any declaration about the Treaty emphasizes a potential involvement by the U.S. in distant conflict.

Variations: To meet some of Marcos’ likely objections we could move closer to the Filipinization option described later. Such variation would include:

—Making broader concessions on base operating issues (e.g., assistance in converting facilities, responsibilities of the Philippine base commander). All would carry some costs or reduction of existing capabilities. We could for Philippine political purposes or for shock value reduce or remove entirely Air Force tactical fighters. These additional changes do not go to the heart of Philippine demands on sovereignty but provide Marcos a face-saving device to reduce his demands on compensation.

—Changing the compensation offer. We reject a substantially higher package than the Kissinger proposal as being unacceptable to the Congress. We believe that a lower offer is possible but it may not be feasible without important U.S. concessions on our presence or other elements of the negotiations. We also reject linking the concessions on trade sought by Marcos with the bases issue because a separate set of constraints apply. We could offer an increased economic assistance component or a totally economic package, which would be more acceptable in the U.S.; this would provide a fresh approach to the compensation issue without increasing costs and free other GOP resources for military purposes. Probably neither Marcos nor the Philippine military will like this. It also would be mostly a face-saving device.

—Indicating to Marcos the conditions under which we believe foreign attacks on Philippine armed forces protecting resource extraction activities in the disputed Reed Bank would come under the Treaty. By careful draftsmanship we would attempt to demonstrate the utility of our defense commitment to legitimate GOP activities. Such an approach might be based on the applicability of the Treaty to forces in the Pacific (including Reed Bank) but be limited by the provisions of the Treaty concerning peaceful settlement of disputes and restraint from threat or use of force. The danger is that it might encourage Marcos to test the limits of our assurances and entangle us in Philippine disputes or even armed clashes with China or Vietnam.

Congressional Dimension: Congress views with suspicion the Kissinger package on the Philippine bases, feeling it was ill and hastily conceived and too high a price. In addition, Congress may not accept the idea of a multi-year package (except on a rental basis), which in any event would be subject to annual authorization and appropriation. While the Administration could reconfirm our commitments under the present Mutual Defense Treaty, any reinterpretation of those commitments would face strong opposition, and an effort to modify or replace that treaty would be a hazardous undertaking.

Option B: Filipinization Under a New Defense Relationship

This option examines a range of variations both in our basing presence and in the relationship we are prepared to offer the Philippines. It emphasizes the changes in our regional interests and relationship with the Philippines. It recognizes that reductions in our facilities, functions, and operating rights are likely to lead to a decrease in existing capabilities but assumes a willingness to examine a range of such risks. It would also involve a more protracted and complex negotiating arrangement.

So long as we retain major base activities in the Philippines Marcos’ demands will remain similar regardless of the size of our presence. Indeed, he may look for assistance to offset effects of any drawdown. Nonetheless, as we consider a continuum of reduced presence alternatives we also expand the room for both sides to maneuver in modernizing the other aspects of the defense relationship and we provide a framework for future adjustments. Marcos would have to share the initiative with us in exploring these new approaches. Leaders of both nations would have to agree on the extent of the new relationship and the principles to guide it. Its elements could be:

Force Presence: Reduce our own forces including the removal of tactical fighters. Reduce facilities while enhancing Philippine capabilities to perform functions such as: control and operation of portions of bombing and training ranges; air defense and area air traffic control; base service functions.

Base Rights Issues: Maintain our key positions as under the status quo, but exercise considerably more flexibility in making concessions on land areas (e.g., return Wallace Air Station), assistance in conversion of facilities to civilian use, length of the agreement, and labor issues.

Compensation: Offer a package consisting of: Increased FMS financing for Philippine self-reliance; declining levels of grant military assistance as Filipinization progresses; and economic assistance and military cooperation for specific projects to utilize relinquished facilities and serve continued needs, e.g., assistance in creating an aircraft maintenance industry or a thermal power plant.

Scope of the MDT: Retain the Treaty but de-emphasize its importance and resist any attempts to embellish it. The self-reliant defense posture we are helping the Philippines to create is its protection against threats of external support for insurgency or incidents involving disputed territory.

Discussion

Pro: This option would allow the U.S. to lower somewhat its silhouette in the area but still retain major military capabilities. It would be evidence of U.S. willingness to adjust its position on base issues in response to Philippine desires. The adjusted compensation package would place emphasis on economic development and is more likely to gain congressional support. It would also force Marcos to think more seriously about the importance of the bases to the Philippines rather than his ability to exploit our own requirements. Our limited treaty commitment should deter Marcos from taking rash actions which could embroil us with China or Vietnam and retain our own flexibility. This should be more defensible to Congress and avoid setting precedents for U.S. policy toward resource extraction in other disputed areas.

Cons: We risk both some decrease in existing capabilities and escalating costs by relying on the Philippines to take over important functions for us. The approach requires collaboration on Marcos’ part to a degree that he has not demonstrated in the past.

Minimal reductions in our presence would not materially reduce friction with the Philippines; but, as the reductions become more significant the risks to our capabilities, limitations on military flexibility, and the relocation problems would all increase.

We would deny Marcos the cosmetic effects of the “billion dollar” package while U.S. opponents of Marcos might well view the arrangement as a potentially open-ended commitment to him. The more narrow definition of the applicability of the MDT would confirm Marcos’ argument that it is irrelevant to his immediate security concerns. Encouraging the military development of the Philippines could stimulate Philippine adventurism.

Option C: Major Reduction of Air Force Functions

This option accepts the degradation and costs associated with removal of most Air Force assets and functions. The goal is to retain essential air and naval facilities by trading major revisions to the Philippines for reduced demands on their part. Elements would be:

Forces—Remove USAF F–4s, C–130s, and T–38s; cede Wallace, John Hay, Crow Valley and all of Clark but retain use of aerial port facilities, war reserve materiel storage and some intelligence and communication sites.

Base Rights Issues—Maintain the essentials of the U.S. position and trade concessions on base lands and related issues for continuing operating and access rights.

Compensation—Economic assistance and/or rent would be paid commensurate with our remaining base rights.

The MDT—We would retain the Treaty but de-emphasize its importance and avoid any attempts to embellish it.

Discussion

Pro: We would attempt to pay less for our remaining presence and we would reduce Air Force manpower requirements in the Philippines by 1800. We would remove a highly visible element of our military presence. We would show some separation from Marcos.

Con: Manila has never asked the Air Force to leave nor indicated that its demands on the key base rights issues, compensation or the MDT would be any less if we did. The impact on the Philippine economy and stability would be severe and we could incur relocation costs of $147 million and additional annual costs of $3.4 million while substantially degrading our capabilities. We would still be involved in Philippine security.

Option D: Base Relinquishment

Implementation of this option could arise from a hardening of Marcos’ demands to the point that we were no longer willing to maintain our basing presence or from a U.S. decision to reduce capabilities or requirements. Our goal would be to retain some ability to meet important needs and to gain sufficient time to make necessary adjustments. Once out of facilities, we could not base military plans on ever again being able to return to them, though the Philippines might want us to return if they later saw a need for our protection.

Force Presence—Return all bases to the Philippines. Try to retain high frequency direction finding, nuclear test ban monitoring and access rights.

Base Rights Issues—Maintain the essentials of U.S. position as long as we have forces and bases in the Philippines.

Compensation—Any payment would be based on services rendered and assistance, whether economic or military, would be based on the merits of the specific proposal.

The MDT—Lacking an extensive and flexible basing presence we would no longer have an interest in the Treaty. A limited commitment to the defense of the Philippines might be necessary to secure continued support for our remaining defense interests, but new congressional approval would be unlikely.

Discussion

Pro: Reductions of forces and of our commitment to the MDT would reduce the potential for friction with the Philippines and involvement in conflicts throughout the region. We would pay less to the Philippines. It would please critics of U.S. involvement with Marcos.

Con: We would reduce our general defense capability and signal a major reduction in our interest in the area. We could incur costs of over $5 billion if we tried to replace all lost capabilities and need to engage in extensive base rights negotiations elsewhere. In the end, we would likely have sacrificed great military capabilities and gained little in our relations with the Philippines whose economic interests and political stability would be severely damaged by our complete withdrawal.

The Question of Rent

The possibility of paying rent rather than providing MAP grants has been suggested as having potential applicability to all of the options. Rent would be a more assured form of compensation than legislated military assistance. The Philippines could plan more confidently and it would carry a higher value for Marcos as a “free dollar.” It might also be easier to justify to Congress (as an annual line item in the budget) than a multi-year assistance package, but this is uncertain; it could also involve new Congressional procedures. Paying rent would encourage the cost/benefit evaluation of basing requirements. Philippine demands in any event may compel us to consider rent or some other form of compensation such as security supporting assistance.

Paying rent is not likely to reduce the level of Marcos’ demands. Moreover such payment for extensive bases like those in the Philippines is unprecedented and would contravene the present global policy of not paying rent to allies. Because this issue goes beyond the Philippines, its implications for our worldwide basing position would have to be assessed. If we did proceed, we would also have to negotiate a very tight arrangement providing a definite sum for a specific period and allowing us flexibility in changing circumstances. Without such firm guarantees rent would leave us open to constant and exorbitant demands and to a process of fragmentation of functions as we were forced to justify each one in terms of Philippine national interests or to pay an increased price for exercising it, or both. Finally many Americans (and foreigners also) will find it difficult to understand an arrangement (Options 1–3) whereby the Philippines continues to receive economic benefits from our basing and a Treaty guarantee against external enemies but charges us rent as in any landlord-tenant arrangement.

Timing and Approach to Negotiations

The way we approach Marcos may be based on the option he chooses but it does not have to be. The three courses of action discussed below assume that with regard to the U.S. military presence, we will choose to continue our presence in some form. We will have to discuss with Marcos how we wish to proceed with the negotiations. This could be done either by our Ambassador in Manila or by a high level USG emissary. Marcos has privately expressed his desire for such an envoy. Given the lapse in negotiations and the transition to a new U.S. administration, early dispatch of a special emissary has merit. Regardless of the modalities the following negotiating approaches could be put to Marcos:

A. Inform Marcos we are ready to negotiate, but that the next move is up to him. Put no new proposals on the table until he does.

Pro: This is consistent with the fact that the original initiative for new base negotiations came from Marcos and that the immediate cause of impasse was his rejection of the previous Administration’s offer; might pressure Marcos to adopt a more realistic position on the key negotiating issues; provides little ground for Philippine suspicion that we are stalling.

Con: This is likely to be resented by Marcos and to promote friction and irritation (small country being browbeaten by large country); would give initiative to Marcos and might lock us in with reduced room for maneuver.

B. Sound out Marcos on which approach he finds more acceptable. Giving some of our thinking to the extent we have developed choices, tell him that our final consideration among possible basing arrangements will be heavily influenced by Philippine preferences. Whether or not they feel a mutual interest in U.S. basing will influence us. This would be the first step in a dynamic process in which our responses would be keyed to Philippine reactions and our desires. We should be prepared to resume the negotiating panels after the initial approach if Marcos desires. At the same time we should hold back compromises on specific issues until we can gauge Philippine flexibility.

Pro: This would place on Marcos the responsibility for difficult choices and force him to reassess his own interests; would offer him a real choice in light of his own view of his interests; would constitute a more cooperative U.S.-Philippine effort; would provide an opportunity to give Marcos a more realistic understanding of the limitations in our positions.

Con: This would limit our own choices and flexibility; might encourage Marcos to insist on selected portions of our compromise alternatives (e.g., rent, conversions) outside of the context in which they were suggested and without inducing any compromise on his part; could reveal our positions prematurely.

C. Postpone direct approach to Marcos until we have explored Philippine flexibility on operating rights once again in negotiating panels.

Pro: This shows Marcos we are not about to discuss things he is interested in (compensation, treaty obligations) until we see the shape of a base agreement.

Con: This is very likely to be a sterile exercise and be seen by Marcos as an unconstructive ploy.

SUMMARY OF OPTIONS

A. Consolidation Under the Status Quo

Forces: Minimal consolidation.

Base Rights: Maintain established positions or make broader concessions.

Compensation: 5-year package up to $200 million MAP, FMS credits, economic assistance, or rent.

Treaty: Reaffirm or extend to Reed Bank.

B. Filipinization Under a New Defense Relationship

Forces: Reduce U.S. presence, give functions to Philippines.

Base Rights: Extensive concessions on non-essential operating requirements.

Compensation: Lower level of MAP over time, FMS financing, economic aid or rent

Treaty: Retain but de-emphasize.

C. Major Reduction of Air Force Functions

Forces: Eliminate most of Clark functions.

Base Rights: Major AF land reversions, maintain U.S. essential operating requirements.

Compensation: Lowered levels of assistance or rent commensurate with remaining rights.

Treaty: De-emphasize.

D. Base Relinquishment

Forces: Give up all bases, retain access rights.

Base Rights: Negotiate transitional Status of Forces Agreement.

Compensation: Payment only for services rendered.

Treaty: Abrogate.

Timing and Approach to Negotiations

A. Inform Marcos we are ready to negotiate but the next move is up to him.

B. Sound out Marcos on which approach he finds more acceptable.

C. Postpone direct approach to Marcos until we have explored Philippine flexibility on operating rights in negotiating panels.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 35, PRM 14 [2]. Secret. Michael Hornblow, Acting Staff Secretary of the National Security Council, sent a copy of the study to Mondale, Vance, Brown, Blumenthal, Young, Lance, George Brown, and Turner under a March 8 memorandum. (Ibid.)
2. Reference is to the Military Bases Agreement signed on March 14, 1947. For the text of Acting Secretary of State Acheson’s statement about the agreement, see Department of State Bulletin, March 23, 1947, p. 554.
3. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, Documents 345 and 346.
4. The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines was signed on August 30, 1951. (3 UST 3947; TIAS 2529)
5. PRM 10, Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture Review, February 18, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IV, National Security Policy.
6. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, Documents 361 and 362.
7. For the text of the joint communiqué, see Public Papers: Ford, 1975, Book II, pp. 713–714.
8. For an overview of the unresolved issues, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, Documents 351 and 353.
9. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, Document 354.
10. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, Document 360.
11. Annex A, an undated paper entitled “Unresolved Base Rights Issues,” is attached but not printed.
12. The Military Assistance Agreement revised in 1952 was finalized in an exchange of notes on June 26, 1953. (4 UST 1682; TIAS 2834)
13. On September 21, 1972, Marcos imposed martial law on the Philippines.
14. Reference is to the armed insurgency against the Philippine Government waged by the Moro National Liberation Front beginning in 1973. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, Documents 321, 323, and 328.
15. The Laurel-Langley trade agreement, signed on September 6, 1955, granted the Philippines preferential U.S. tariff treatment for sugar and other exports. (6.3 UST 2981 (1955); TIAS 3348) The agreement expired in 1974.
16. Carter first announced his intention of moving ground troops out of South Korea when he spoke to the Foreign Policy Association, June 23, 1976. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 6.
17. For the text of the Shanghai Communiqué, which provided the framework for normalization of U.S.-PRC relations, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 376–379.
18. Annex B, an undated paper entitled “Summary of Study on Alternatives to U.S. Bases in the Philippines,” is attached but not printed.
19. Reference is to Kissinger’s proposal during a December 1, 1976, meeting with Romulo. For a summary, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, Document 358.