Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

351. Memorandum From William Gleysteen of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, September 2, 1976.¹ ²

Washington, September 2, 1976

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

September 2, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: WILLIAM GLEYSTEEN [WG initialed]

SUBJECT: Next Steps in the Philippine Base Negotiations

Marcos may have thrown a monkey wrench into our plans for high-level talks in search of a breakthrough in the Philippine base negotiations. After proposing that Foreign Secretary Romulo visit Washington to see if a Kissinger/Clements visit to Manila would be worthwhile, he has subsequently told us that he would not authorize a Romulo/Kissinger meeting until first receiving our answer to the Philippines aide memoire concerning applicability of the Defense treaty to the Spratley Island and Reed Bank areas.

Marcos’ maneuver underscores the extent to which he has cooled about the idea of trying to reach an agreement this year. We had intelligence reports to this effect some time ago, and rumors have been planted in Manila that Marcos thinks the Philippines could get better terms from a Carter Administration. Given his willingness to wait until next year, Marcos undoubtedly sees his negotiating tactics as a no-lose proposition if he can stimulate U.S. impatience and extract extra concessions, he will consider himself very successful; if we fail to satisfy him, he will place the onus for delay on us.

Although the prospects of reaching a quick settlement with the Philippines are even worse than when we talked on Tuesday at Staff Meeting, I still believe we should get in position so that we could promptly convene an NSC meeting to obtain inter-agency positions and a Presidential decision on certain basic issues.

Issues

Ambassador Sullivan has identified the following nine issues as closest to Philippine hearts:

— Terms of use

[text not declassified]

— Takeover of national security tactics

[text not declassified]

• — Authority of Philippine base commander
• — Criminal jurisdiction
• — Defense support or compensation
• — Conversion of bases to civilian uses
• — Term of agreement

However, high-level discussions will probably focus more narrowly on what we are prepared to pay for the use of bases and how we interpret our treaty obligations in terms of the Reed Bank and Spratley Islands. Our position on these two issues will probably determine the extent to which Marcos will soften the tough positions his negotiators have adopted on most other matters, including our need for unfettered operational control over our facilities and our forces.

Agency Positions

At the working level, there appears to be no fundamental difference within the government on the key issues. Both State and Defense seem to favor a cautious position regarding applicability of our treaty responsibilities in the Spratley and Reed Bank areas, although there may be differences about how we might offset this unpleasant news for Marcos. On the question of compensation, State and Defense recommendations differ only marginally, but OMB, and to a lesser extent Defense, are concerned that we will be forced to raise the ante beyond our high position to the point where the base agreement might be highly controversial in Congress and establish an unfortunate precedent. There is general agreement that our present proposals regarding operational and jurisdictional matters are very close to our final fallback position. The general assumption is that Marcos is less concerned to achieve further concessions in this area than to exploit these issues for bargaining purposes.

Despite this general agreement on substantive positions, there has been considerable skepticism about our ability to satisfy Marcos. The latest ploy will certainly intensify this feeling. In any case, careful consideration of our negotiating strategy may well be as important as our substantive positions.

State has held the view that, while a recess in the negotiations until after our elections would probably not be harmful, early and successful conclusion of the base agreement would offer the best protection for our interests. I agree but believe nevertheless that the prospect of an early agreement is unpromising and that we could seriously damage ourselves if we display impatience. Consequently, I recommend that we continue to prepare for an NSC meeting but hold off any specific action until we see the results of Sullivan’s next round with Marcos.

APPROVE [WAH initialed]
DISAPPROVE

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Convenience File, Box 31, Next Steps in the Philippine Base Negotiations. Secret. Hyland initialed the approve option on behalf of Scowcroft. At the end of the document, after the phrase “hold off any specific,” Hyland wrote, “or a memo to President first.” An NSC meeting to discuss both the Philippine base negotiations and assistance to Zaire was scheduled, but then cancelled and not rescheduled. (Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–25, NSC Meetings)
2. Gleysteen gave Scowcroft an account of the Philippine base negotiations