294. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
MARCOS, THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE BASE NEGOTIATIONS2
KEY JUDGMENTS
—In the years since independence, Philippine economic and cultural links to the United States have remained strong and Filipinos have relied on the United States as the ultimate guarantor of their security. But the pressures of nationalism, the desire to achieve Asian identity, and the perceived humiliations of client status have interacted to trouble the relationship, causing intermittent pressures for new and more equal terms.
[Page 977]—These pressures are currently focussed on the security tie, particularly on the US base presence. This presence is now widely seen as more advantageous for the United States than for the Philippines; President Ferdinand Marcos is speaking for most concerned Filipinos when he demands a higher price for continued tenure. Money is an important part of this price. But it does not outweigh the demand for some genuine concessions to Philippine sovereignty.
—Marcos exercises final authority over negotiating terms and tactics as he does over all other aspects of Filipino political life. For the military leaders—who play a major part in administering the government and the economy—he is the venerated patron; he, in turn, is responsive to their wishes but not necessarily governed by them. He has accorded his wife, Imelda, a prominent role in domestic affairs and foreign policy. However, the extent of her influence over him is uncertain, she is disliked and distrusted by the military, and she has no constituency of her own.
—Marcos’ negotiating style conforms to Philippine patterns for extracting maximum concessions from the United States without either sundering basic ties or precluding further alterations at some future date. Nevertheless, there are important elements in the military and economic power structure who, if they saw acrimony over the base issue beginning to pose a major threat to the fundamental relationship with the United States, would try to hold Marcos back or—if this proved impossible—to remove him. Their tricky problem would be to know when the moment had come. If, in resumed negotiations, it begins to appear that Marcos is on the verge of painting himself into a corner from which self-esteem will not permit him to escape, perceptions of probable US reactions will play an important part in shaping the behavior of Filipino interest groups.
[Omitted here is the Discussion portion of the memorandum.]
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–80–0017, 78, Philippines 323.3 (Jan–Jun) 1977. Secret.↩
- Produced in connection with the preparation of the response to Presidential Review Memorandum 14, Philippine Base Negotiations, under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and the Pacific and coordinated at the working level by representatives of CIA, DIA, NSA, and State/INR. [Footnote in the original.]↩