354. Telegram 250861 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines, October 8, 1976, 1609Z.1 2

TELEGRAM

Department of State

250861

R 3315292 OCT 76

FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE

STATE 250861

E.O. 11652:GDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, RP

SUBJECT: SECRETARY’S MEETING WITH PHILIPPINE FOREIGN SECRETARY

1.
THE SECRETARY MET WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY ROMULO FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF IN THE AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 6 IN NEW YORK. ROMULO OPENED DISCUSSION BY READING STATEMENT SEEKING AUTHORITATIVE CLARIFICATION OF USG INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY, NOTING THAT PHILIPPINES IS NOT IN IMMINENT DANGER OF EXTERNAL ATTACK AND THAT GOP HAS RESOLVED TO SETTLE ANY DISPUTES WITH ASIAN NEIGHBORS THROUGH PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS. ROMULO SAID SERIOUS DOUBTS HAVE ARISEN WITH REGARD TO ASSURANCES PREVIOUSLY GIVEN BY USG THAT AN ATTACK ON THE PHILIPPINES FROM ANY QUARTER WOULD BE INSTANTLY REPELLED BY THE U.S. FILIPINOS HAVE GRAVE MISGIVINGS THAT THE TREATY EXISTS SOLELY FOR DEFENSE OF THE [Page 2] U.S. BASES IN THE PHILIPPINES, BASIC CONSIDERATION, ROMULO CONTINUED, IS THAT PHILIPPINE SELF-DEFENSE PROGRAM MUST PROGRESS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE AND THAT CREDIBILITY OF THE PROGRAM WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY ENHANCED BY A FIRM COMMITMENT BY USG TO DEFEND THE PHILIPPINES AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION,
2.
WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF THE SPRATLY ISLANDS, ROMULO SAID HE WAS AWARE THIS WOULD HAVE SOME BEARING ON USG CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETING THE TREATY, HE WISHED TO ASSURE THE SECRETARY ON THE AUTHORITY OF PRESIDENT MARCOS, THAT THE GOP HAS NO INTENTION OF INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE SPRATLYS QUESTION BECAUSE THE GOP FEELS IT CAN RESOLVE THE ISSUE ON THE BASIS OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE PARTIES INVOLVED, WITHOUT THE NEED OF U.S. ASSISTANCE.
3.
THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT WE WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM IN MAKING CLEAR THAT THE TREATY APPLIES NOT JUST FOR THE DEFENSE OF U.S. BASES BUT FOR DEFENSE OF THE METROPOLITAN AREA OF THE PHILIPPINES. OUR CONCERN HAS SEEN THAT WE MIGHT BE DRAWN INTO MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS RESULTING FROM PHILIPPINE ACTIVITIES IN THE REED SANK AND THE SPRATLYS, AND THEREFORE ANY USG STATEMENT ON THOSE OUTLYING AREAS WOULD HAVE TO BE SO QUALIFIED AS TO BE NEARLY UNSATISFACTORY FROM GOP POINT OF VIEWS. ROMULO RESPONDED BY REITERATING THAT THE GOP DOES NOT WANT TO INVOLVE THE USG IN THOSE AREAS.
4.
WITH REGARD TO THE REFERENCE IN THE TREATY TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES, THE SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT ANY ATTACK ON THE PHILIPPINES WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE OF GREAT MAGNITUDE AND THAT WE HAVE THE SAME PROBLEM OF OBTAINING CONGRESSIONAL ASSENT RELATED TO ATTACKS ON ANY OF OUR ALLIES, HE SAID HE COULD NOT IMAGINE HAVING ANY PROBLEM OBTAINING CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES, IN VIEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE TREATY AND OUR BASES THERE.
5.
THE SECRETARY STATED THAT ROMULO’S OPENING STATEMENT [Page 3] GIVES THE USG A BASIS ON WHICH TO GIVE THE GOP A CLEAR-CUT ASSURANCE THAT THE TREATY APPLIES TO THE METROPOLITAN AREA OF THE PHILIPPINES. IF, HOWEVER, THE GOP INSISTED ON DRAGGING IN THE SPRATLYS, WE WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE COMPLICATED FORMULATIONS AND ESCAPE CLAUSES WHICH WOULD CAUSE MORE PROBLEMS THAN THEY SETTLED. ROMULO RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT CONTROVERSIAL AREAS COULD BE EXCLUDED.
6.
ROMULO TURNED TO THE QUESTION OF MODERNIZING THE PHILIPPINE ARMED FORCES, NOTING THAT THE GOP WISHED TO BE SELF-RELIANT SO AS NOT TO INVOLVE THE U.S. IN ITS QUARRELS, HE SAID A SHOPPING LIST OF DESIRED EQUIPMENT HAD ALREADY BEEN SUPPLIED TO THE USG, THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE STRONGER THE PHILIPPINES, THE FEWER HARD CHOICES THE USG HAS TO MAKE, BUT HE CAUTIONED THAT CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES REQUIRE THAT WE BE REALISTIC IN OFFERING ASSISTANCE. HE ASKED ABOUT THE MAGNITUDE OF PHILIPPINE DESIRES. DEFENSE SECRETARY ENRILE REPLIED THAT THEY DESIRE A FIVE-YEAR ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, OF WHICH THE FIRST YEAR’S PRICE TAG WOULD BE ABOUT HALF A BILLION DOLLARS. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THIS WAS TOTALLY UNREALISTIC AND SUGGESTED THAT AS AN ALTERNATIVE THE GOP SHOULD ATTEMPT TO DEFINE ITS PRIORITIES IN TERMS OF EQUIPMENT, WHICH HE WOULD THEN TRY TO SUPPLY, ROMULO RESPONDED THAT ANOTHER WAY OF APPROACHING THE PROBLEM WOULD BE IN TERMS OF HOW IMPORTANT THE BASES REALLY ARE TO THE U.S. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT IN AN ALL-OUT WAR WE COULD DO WITHOUT THE BASES, BUT THAT WE CONSIDER THEM TO BE QUITE IMPORTANT IN PERIPHERAL ENCOUNTERS INVOLVING THE INDIAN OCEAN, SOUTHEAST ASIA, OR PRC ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA.
7.
ROMULO SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WAS AFRAID OF BEING SUBJECTED TO NUCLEAR ATTACK [text not declassified] AT THIS POINT, THE SECRETARY, DEPUTY DEFENSE SECRETARY CLEMENTS, AND AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN LEFT ROOM FOR A SHORT CONSULTATION, UPON [Page 4] RETURN, THE SECRETARY STATED THAT THIS WAS A COMPLICATED ISSUE TO WHICH IN HIS OPINION THERE WAS A PRACTICAL SOLUTION BUT HE BELIEVED IT HAS A MATTER FOR DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT MARCOS. ENRILE AGREED THAT ONLY PRESIDENT MARCOS COULD DECIDE FOR THE GOP.
8.
THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO CONCLUDE THE BASES AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ELECTION AND INAUGURATION OF THE NEW PRESIDENT IF PRESIDENT FORD LOST THE ELECTION, WHICH WAS UNLIKELY, AND AGREEMENT ON THE TREATY ISSUE AND THE FINANCIAL PACKAGE HAD NOT BEEN REACHED PRIOR TO THE ELECTION. HOWEVER, IF THE LEGAL AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS COULD BE SETTLED BEFORE NOVEMBER 2, THEN THE AGREEMENT COULD BE CONCLUDED, EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT LOST THE ELECTION. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE USG WAS NOT PRESSING FOR AN EARLY AGREEMENT AND WAS WILLING TO WAIT IF THAT WAS WHAT THE GOP WANTED TO DO. HE STRESSED THAT THE GOP SHOULD DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO PRESS FOR AN EARLY AGREEMENT.
9.
ENRILE ASKED FOR SOME INDICATION OF HOW MUCH OF THE FINANCIAL PACKAGE WOULD BE IN GRANTS, CREDITS, OR LOANS, HE INDICATED HIS PREFERENCE FOR AGREEMENT ON A TOTAL SUM RATHER THAN AGREEMENT ON EQUIPMENT PRIORITIES. THE SECRETARY ACCEPTED THIS SUGGESTION AND SAID HE PREFERRED TO AVOID HAGGLING OVER FIGURES, THEREFORE HE PROPOSED TO GIVE THE GOP A TOTAL FIGURE, FOLLOWING A MEETING NEXT WEEK WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE NSC, WHICH WOULD BE OUR BEST ESTIMATE OF WHAT THE CONGRESS WILL APPROVE AND WHICH THE GOP WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT AS OUR FINAL OFFER. THEN WE COULD ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, WITH THE REMAINING ISSUES TO BE SETTLED BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND PRESIDENT MARCOS AT A MEETING IN MANILA AFTER THE U.S. ELECTIONS. ROMULO AGREED AND INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR ROMUALDEZ TO REPORT THE SECRETARY’S PROPOSAL TO PRESIDENT MARCOS IMMEDIATELY UPON ROMUALDEZ’ ARRIVAL IN MANILA ON OCTOBER 10.
10.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HUMMEL NOTED THE NEED FOR PRESS GUIDANCE AND IT WAS AGREED THAT THE PRESS WOULD BE TOLD [Page 5] THAT THE TWO SECRETARIES HAD MADE GOOD PROGRESS IN DISCUSSING THE BASE NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL CONTINUE. ROBINSON
  1. Source: Library of Congress, Henry Kissinger Papers, CL 205, Philippines, 1974–76. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Fleck drafted, David Passage of S cleared, and Hummel approved the telegram.
  2. The Department reported on Kissinger’s discussion with Romulo.