Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

143. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 21, 1979

SUBJECT

• Possible Use of a Pacific Island for Indochinese Refugees

There have been earlier proposals to use a South Pacific island (in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands or elsewhere) as a transshipment point or for resettlement of Indochina refugees. Although the idea of using a tropical island for these purposes is appealing at first glance there are a number of factors which make these proposals impractical.

TTPI

Although the population of the Trust Territory is relatively small (approx 120,000) the total land area is also very small as are the individual islands. With a very weak resource base and declining U.S. subsidies after the Trusteeship ends it will be difficult for the area to support its own population which is growing very rapidly. Permanent resettlement of any significant number of refugees would magnify these problems. The use of one or more of the islands for temporary refuge at international or U.S. expense would be more practical in principle but would confront important political obstacles.

The United States administers the Trust Territory under the UN Trusteeship Agreement.² Our current negotiations with the Micronesians have as their goal termination of the UN Trusteeship by 1981. The principles governing the negotiations call for a status of free association under which the Micronesians will be fully self-governing and in control of foreign policy subject only to their defense relationship with the U.S. Meanwhile, any decision to use the territory of any of the four Micronesian political entities for refugees (temporarily or permanently) would require the approval of their elected legislatures. Such approval would almost certainly not be granted for permanent resettlement and is very unlikely for temporary refugee camps.

To act without such approval, or in the face of explicit disapproval, would lay the United States open to the charge of acting contrary to the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement which includes an obligation for the United States to promote the welfare of the native population and to promote self-determination. It would also have an unfavorable impact on the political status negotiations which would not be in keeping with our general strategic interests in that area. In light of the seriousness of the refugee situation, the Department of State will approach the Micronesian governments through the High Commissioner to see if any of the four political entities would be agreeable to providing an island site to be used as a temporary refugee processing center.

We must of course recognize that if we accepted refugees into territory under U.S. jurisdiction, even on a transient basis, many countries would assume that these refugees would in the end be admitted into the United States, and would not themselves accept them.

The U.S. Territories

The U.S. territories in the Pacific (Guam and American Samoa) have population problems and would also find it extremely difficult to absorb permanent resettlement of refugees.

In recent years political discontent has grown because of what many Guamanians feel is a high-handed attitude of the Federal Government in making decisions which impact directly upon the Guamanians without prior consultations or approval. Although Guam has been used as a temporary holding center for Vietnamese refugees it is almost certain that the Guam Government would reject any proposal to hold refugees on the island for an extended period or to permanently resettle Indochinese refugees on Guam. Because of the limited land available there has been considerable pressure on the U.S. military to reduce land-use requirements.

The geography of American Samoa (most of the land-area is mountainous) has forced the concentration of the population onto the limited amount of flat inhabitable land between the mountains and the sea. There is little room available for an even moderately large refugee camp.

Again, if we accepted refugees even as transients in Guam or Samoa, other governments would probably lose any interest in receiving them.

Independent Pacific Nations

The independent island nations of the South Pacific are developing countries and require outside financial assistance in order to survive. An exception is Nauru which is self-sufficient because of phosphate mining. However, Nauru will in the future be forced to resettle its own population as a result of extensive mining operations which are rendering the island uninhabitable.

The smaller Pacific Island nations all have real development problems (e.g., small land mass, inadequate infrastructure, subsistence economies, and the threat of over-population, etc.). In the countries with larger land areas (Fiji, PNG, New Hebrides, Solomons, and New Caledonia) there is a delicate political balance among ethnic groups, rival tribal and regional groups, white settlers and indigenous population. The introduction into these societies of a potentially destabilizing element in the form of another ethnic group would be seen by the local governments as likely to upset the fragile balance.

The Deputy Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea (PNG) voiced the concerns of many of the Pacific nations when he discussed the refugee problem with Secretary Vance on September 25.³ In explaining why PNG agreed to make a financial contribution but not to accept any refugees, he explained that the Government of Papua New Guinea did not want to create for itself a Fiji-like problem—that is, a situation in which people (in this case Indians) whose skills were greater than those of the local population were brought in from the outside by Fiji’s then colonial rulers and took over the country’s economy.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Bloomfield Subject File, Box 19, Indochinese, 7–12/79. No classification marking.
2. See Chapter XII, Articles 75–85 of the United Nations Charter. U.S. trusteeship of the TTPI ended in 1986.
3. A summary of the meeting between Vance and Foreign Minister Olewale in New York during the UN General Assembly session is in telegram Secto 8018 to Port Moresby, October 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790441–0448)