221. Telegram From Secretary of State Muskie’s Delegation to the Department of State1
Secto 4078. Subj: Secretary Muskie’s Meeting With Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar.
1. Confidential–Entire text.
2. Secretary Muskie on June 27 met with Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar.
3. Minister Mochtar began the discussion by noting that neither side in the Thai/Vietnamese conflict seemed completely dedicated to a settlement. This was especially true for the Vietnamese. When the the Vietnamese Foreign Minister recently visited Jakarta, Mochtar met him in order to keep the dialogue with the Vietnamese open. When Mochtar asked if Thach could make any positive statement which Mochtar could bring to his ASEAN colleagues, Thach responded that Vietnam would be willing to reconsider its position when the Thais “mend their ways.” Mochtar said he “ended up with a zero,” that Thach was unyielding.
4. The Minister noted that the question of timing of the recent Vietnamese attack against Thailand2 was interesting. He said one the[Page 732]ory was Vietnam attacked before the ASEAN meeting3 to test the group. Mochtar thinks this is far-fetched. His personal theory is that the Vietnamese were concerned about indications that India and ASEAN were moving closer together. Not only would this pose strategic difficulties for the Vietnamese, but it could also impede Indian movement toward recognition of the Heng Samrin government.
5. A Vietnamese aggression against Thailand caused ASEAN to toughen its stand against the Vietnamese and the Soviets. The Indians preferred not to be seen as working closely with a staunchly anti-Soviet group, and consequently the Indian Foreign Minister cancelled his visit to the ASEAN meeting. If his theory is correct, Mochtar added, then the Vietnamese succeeded. Mr. Holbrooke noted that another possibility was that the timing of the attack was tied to Thai actions to repatriate Kampuchean refugees. Mochtar agreed this was possible.
6. The Secretary said he had three issues he wanted to raise with Mochtar. First, he had been asked by Senator Inouye to raise the sea oil issue. The Senator was a strong supporter of foreign assistance, a widely respected and admired Senator, and Indonesia should see if it can find a way to be responsive to his concerns. Although the Secretary did not want to get into a detailed discussion of the specifics of the case, he did want the Minister to know of his concern about the issue.
7. The second issue discussed was rice sales. The Secretary and the Minister agreed the issue had a strong political content in both countries and had to be treated with great sensitivity. Ambassador Masters said we are now able to provide $50 million in PL–480 for Indonesia in FY–81, that we will not interfere with any previous price arrangements between Japan and Indonesia for 150,000 tons of rice in 1980, that we will seriously consider later this year Indonesian rice needs in light of Indonesia’s supply situation, and we agree to hold annual consultations with the Indonesians to see if we can develop orderly arrangements to avoid similar difficulties in the future.
8. The third issue was how we handle the transit of US warships through straits adjacent to Indonesia. The Secretary said we are willing to initiate a series of periodic briefings at the military level to provide information on military activities and plans in the region. While we cannot provide specific transit notifications, we can provide periodic general information on naval deployments. Mochtar responded that this seemed a good arrangement and he appreciated our help on this issue.
[Page 733]9. Minister Mochtar closed the conversation by noting that the Soviet Union has goals beyond Vietnam. Its ultimate aim is to gain control of the sea lanes and the natural wealth of Southeast Asia. He had discussed this with Foreign Minister Okita and had pointed out that the Japanese will not, for their own reasons, build a strong navy which could help thwart Soviet ambitions in the region. He had therefore suggested that if the Japanese and the Americans made the necessary naval hardware available to Indonesia, the Indonesians will defend the region themselves.
10. Accompanying Secretary Muskie were Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, DAS Negroponte, Ambassador Masters, Special Assistant Raphel (note taker), and Executive Assistant Billings. Minister Mochtar was accompanied by MFA Director General for Political Affairs Sani, MFA Director General for Economic Affairs Noor and a notetaker.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Edmund Muskie, 1980–1981, Lot 83D66, Box 2, Memoranda 1980–1981. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Bangkok, Beijing, Jakarta, Manila, Moscow, New Delhi, Singapore, and Tokyo. Muskie met with ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Kuala Lumpur June 27–28. See Document 146.↩
- See Document 187.↩
- Reference is to the Thirteenth ASEAN Ministerial meeting that took place June 25–26 in Kuala Lumpur.↩