222. Telegram From Secretary of State Muskie’s Delegation to the Department of State1
Secto 4079. Subj: Secretary Muskie’s Meeting With Singapore’s Rajaratnam and Dhanabalan.
1. Confidential–Entire text.
2. Secretary Muskie on June 27 met with Singapore Deputy Prime Minister Rajaratnam and Foreign Minister Dhanabalan.
3. Minister Rajaratnam opened the discussion by noting that he and his ASEAN colleages have one major preoccupation at the moment—Vietnamese aggression against Thailand. He believed that the Vietnamese had hoped that disarray would spread among the ASEAN partners. Rajaratnam said this almost happened; the Vietnamese action in Thailand, however, has coalesced ASEAN as never before.
4. The Minister noted that ASEAN had taken three new and important steps. It had, for the first time, “named the culprit—Vietnam.” It [Page 734] has begun to call Vietnamese action in Kampuchea “aggression” rather than an “incident”, and had made an important moral judgment by condeming Vietnamese actions in Thailand.
5. Rajaratnam added that the next important question we face is the Kampuchean seat at the UN. Vietnam wants at least to have the seat declared vacant. The great majority of UN members do not understand the issue and consequently there is a chance that a number who voted with us last year may abstain this year. The other side will remain solid.
6. ASEAN looks to the United States to play a leading role in this question at the UN. A good tactic would be to link Afghanistan and Kampuchea, pointing out that both are the result of Soviet aggression: the former direct, the latter indirect. This tactic should enable us to get the support of Arab states which abstained last year. Also, since ASEAN was now supporting the Islamic position on Afghanistan, the Islamic states should reciprocate.
7. Rajaratnam concluded that the situation will continue unresolved in Kampuchea for at least the next ten years, and the United States must take the lead in helping to thwart Vietnamese ambitions in the area. The Soviet objective is not Indochina, but rather the strategic and economically more important area of the straits.
8. Secretary Muskie responded that we shared the Minister’s view of Soviet intentions. The President has recently spoken publicly about Soviet aspirations in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia.
9. Concerning the regional issues mentioned by the Minister, the Secretary said his visit was very useful since it would give him a feel for the situation in the area. He also must keep in mind how these issues are perceived politically in the United States. On Kampuchea representation, the decision last year was made only days before the vote. Consequently, there was no major public debate on the issue, even though feelings are high in the United States about the brutality of the Pol Pot regime. To make a decision now on how we will vote could cause political difficulties in the States and may even be counter-productive.
10. The Secretary noted he would report back to the President. He reiterated that it was important that ASEAN realize we are not indecisive on this issue. The vote will take place in September, and it would be premature to determine now how we will vote.
11. On the specific issue of Thailand, the Secretary said he told Minister Sitthi today that we will respond to the Vietnamese challenge to Thailand.2 We will make $2 million in grant money immediately [Page 735] available for Thailand. We will accelerate the delivery of previously ordered arms to Thailand and will try to airlift as much as possible. The Secretary also noted he had suggested to the Malaysian Foreign Minister that the five visiting Foreign Ministers consider joining with their ASEAN colleagues in a public statement calling on Waldheim to visit the region as a way of increasing pressure on the Vietnamese.3
12. Rajaratnam said he thought a joint statement was a good idea. On Kampuchean representation, he said it was very important that we focus on the question of Vietnamese aggression, not the question of Pol Pot. The Secretary responded that our concern for the security of the area has been shown by the fact of his visit, our assistance to Thailand, his statement on Vietnamese aggression4 and the suggestion of a joint statement on Waldheim.
13. Accompanying Secretary Muskie were Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, DAS Negroponte, Ambassador Kneip and Special Assistant Raphel. Accompanying Rajaratnam and Dhanabalan were MFA Permanent Secretary Nathan, Political Affairs Director See, ASEAN Affairs Director Aziz, International Affairs Deputy Director Kishore, and Singaporean Ambassador to Manila Baker.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Edmund Muskie, 1980–1981, Lot 83D66, Box 2, Memoranda 1980–1981. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Bangkok, Beijing, Canberra, Jakarta, Manila, Moscow, Singapore, and Tokyo.↩
- See Document 188.↩
- No record of the meeting with Rithauddeen has been found. In addition to Muskie, the Foreign Ministers of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada were in Kuala Lumpur.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 146.↩