Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

14. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, June 3, 1977, 0621Z

16317. Subj: US/VN Talks: Summary of June 2 Meeting. Ref: Paris 16225.²

1. Vietnamese delegation was greeted by small 25-person demonstration upon arrival at Embassy. Ethnic Vietnamese demonstrators were peaceful and had already handed petition to Embassy representative demanding that Vietnamese Government abide by UN human rights charter³ and free religious figures allegedly held in prison. Press coverage of above as well as Vietnamese entry into Embassy was extensive and early wire service stories highlighted the demonstration.

2. Holbrooke began formal session by inviting Phan Hien to speak first. Latter began with pointed remarks regarding “unhelpful” public statements by US officials following first round of talks. Citing Holbrooke pledge not to let anything occur publicly which would unfavorably impact on the talks, Hien singled out Secretary Vance’s May 4 statement as particularly unhelpful.⁴ Arguing that such statements by administration officials tend to harden opposition to aid within the Congress, Hien hinted that administration might be actively working to create unfavorable conditions. He cited our release of Nixon-Pham Van Dong letter⁵ in close conjunction with Lester Wolff’s statement and Nixon letter to Wolff⁶ as further indications of this problem. He added that Hanoi’s making public of additional documents was merely in reply to our release of the Nixon message and warned that Vietnamese still have a number of other documents which they will make public “when necessary”. Examples are Kissinger-Le Duc Tho communications on aid.

3. Hien then turned to lengthy discussion of validity of Nixon letter in rebuttal to US public statements that it is now only a historical curiosity. He stressed that the message was from the highest ranking representative of the USG to the highest ranking Vietnamese official and, therefore, a commitment of the greatest importance which cannot be simply ignored by succeeding administrations. Turning to the question of requirement of legislative action to implement “commitments” in the Nixon message, Hien indicated this is exclusively internal US problem in which the Vietnamese have no interest.

4. Turning next to normalization of relations, Hien reiterated Vietnamese readiness to have a new long-term relationship with US but restated their position that outstanding problems must be resolved first. Without directly acknowledging our original proposals to establish relations, Hien stated that the Vietnamese people could not understand presence of American Ambassador and diplomats in Hanoi if US had not yet made a contribution to post-war reconstruction. He then made somewhat impassioned statement regarding continued existence of destruction and personal tragedies left over from the war, adding that if we don’t do anything to heal these wounds, it would be very hard to do anything else. In his view “sooner or later there will be assistance;” and, therefore, “it would be more beneficial to do it now.” Alluding to our often-stated problem of popular and congressional opposition to aid, Hien said that if there are people who do not understand this obligation, we must explain it to them. He also indirectly dismissed the problem of US acknowledging war guilt by providing aid by saying that we should allow each individual to have his own view regarding this and “let history be the judge.”

5. Having outlined need for further progress in resolving overall problem, Hien then stated that he would provide US with a draft of a joint communique or agreement embodying the following points:

1) Vietnamese side would provide information on 20 additional cases of American MIA’s and redouble its efforts to gather additional information;

2) The US would contribute to healing the wounds of war and post-war reconstruction in the following amounts—$3.25 billion over the next five years and $1–1.5 billion in other forms of aid. Of this the US would immediately provide $500 million of goods to Vietnam on an emergency basis;

3) The two countries would agree to establish diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level.

6. Hien explained that their proposal made no reference to Article 21 of the Paris Accord or Nixon letter because “they understood” our difficulty regarding an aid demand based specifically on them. He then argued that the amount requested is actually small when compared to the huge amounts spent by the US in “devastating and destroying Vietnam and in supporting the Saigon administration.” He indicated that the communique or agreement could be signed in Paris or, if we preferred, any other place including Hanoi or Washington. Hien ended his presentation by handing over an aide memoire⁷ embodying the main points of his statement along with a copy of the aide memoire provided to the Woodcock Commission March 18 on economic questions.⁸

7. Holbrooke’s response began by addressing events which occurred between the two meetings. He countered Vietnamese charge that US “propaganda” is unhelpful by stating we were disturbed by some of the comments and commentaries carried in Vietnamese media during the same period. He noted that these propaganda statements have produced a wave of indignation, concern and opposition in Congress which has made it more difficult for us to realize our mutual goals. Stressing that we read very carefully what Radio Hanoi and Nhan Dan say, Holbrooke then showed Hien a list of 14 major Hanoi commentaries made over the last month which carried adverse comments about the US position. Holbrooke noted that he was called on the telephone by Members of Congress or called up to testify before committees of the Congress on the meaning of these verbal attacks.

8. Turning to the Nixon letter, Holbrooke noted that we had not discussed it in the conference room but that Hanoi was the one who had chosen to make it public initially and Hien raised it in his press conference May 4. Holbrooke stressed that we had released full text of letter in order to clear up misunderstandings which had arisen and to end unhelpful speculations which otherwise would have increased and adversely affected our negotiations. Rejecting Hien’s charge that administration had possibly colluded with Nixon and Members of the Congress to undercut talks, Holbrooke remarked that Nixon and Kissinger now speak only for themselves and that individual members of the Congress speak only for their constituencies and not for the administration. He added that administration has no control whatsoever over the statements of any member of Congress and obviously not over Nixon or Kissinger.

9. Holbrooke then noted the difference between the copies of the Nixon message which we had released and Vietnamese copy which did not include addendum regarding necessity to adhere to constitutional processes while fulfilling the agreement. Holbrooke asked Hien for explanation and latter replied that Vietnamese considered this note to be merely a unilateral expression of American understanding and therefore not something to which they need reply. Since no reply was necessary, they felt it acceptable to leave it out when publishing the letter. Hien explained further that in 1973 the two sides had discussed the Nixon message in draft and that the Vietnamese had objected to inclusion of the paragraph on adherence to constitutional processes. As a result, he said, the US transmitted it to the Vietnamese as a unilateral understanding. He explained further that Dong had replied to the Nixon message as well as to the “note” containing the “pledge” of 1–1.5 billion dollars of additional aid. He did not, however, refer to the US understanding and therefore the Vietnamese concluded that they need only make public those parts of the message to which a reply was sent.

10. Holbrooke replied that all of the discussions in the newspapers and Congress regarding the Nixon message have made it more difficult for us to move forward and make progress in healing wounds of war. Holbrooke then noted that Congressman Wolff plans hearings on events surrounding the letter and will call US officials like George Aldrich to address the problem of the two versions of the letter not being identical. Stressing that our release of the Nixon/Dong letter was not intentionally linked to other publicity surrounding it, Holbrooke stressed that the Carter administration had no choice but to make it public since SRV had already referred to it and Nixon had posed no objections to its release.

11. Holbrooke reiterated the point that Congress speaks with an independent voice but emphasized that in our current negotiations we must agree to things which the Congress will support. Otherwise the administration will be repudiated by the American people. Holbrooke then noted this is time for special leadership and courage such as that displayed by President Carter on changing US position on Vietnamese UN membership⁹ and removing other restrictions on our relationship. He then turned to Vietnam proposal that US provide almost $5 billion of aid, terming it unrealistic “since neither American people nor the new President nor Congress are willing to accept such a request as basis for new relationship with your country.”

12. Alluding to Vietnamese provision of new MIA information, Holbrooke labeled it encouraging and expressed US appreciation for those additional concrete results. He then asked Phan Hien his understanding that this information will be transmitted to us right away. Phan Hien nodded yes and shortly thereafter member of SRV delegation Vu Hoang presented list of names and other information to us.

13. Holbrooke then enumerated various steps US has taken to express new and positive attitude towards Vietnam, such as UN admission, abolition of travel restrictions to Vietnam,¹⁰ and different approach toward SRV participation in various international organizations. He reiterated US readiness to remove US restrictions on trade as soon as Embassies are established. He cautioned that if we do not take this opportunity now to move ahead, it may be lost for sometime to come.

14. Hien made short rejoinder emphasizing that Hanoi had made numerous public statements only in reply to US propaganda initiative. He again argued that unhelpful statements by administration spokesmen had been largely responsible for adverse reaction House of Representatives. Citing the ⅔s vote against Vietnam on the Ashbrook amendment,¹¹ Hien argued that if the administration would make strong statements in support of aid to Vietnam, then outcome would be much different. Holbrooke replied by emphasizing that administration officials had told Members of the Congress that some present resolutions are not helpful.

15. Turning to US references to Hanoi media blasts, Hien stated that we should only consider official statements issued by the Foreign Ministry as being definitive SRV position. He added that on the matter of publication of various Nixon documents, this was to show the American public that there is a legal commitment which cannot be ignored.

16. Holbrooke urged Hien to recognize that Nixon communication to Dong must be considered in context of the way commitments are made in the US. If Congress does not provide the money then aid does not exist. Turning to the present, Holbrooke stressed that Congress has said clearly that they will not give the kind of money mentioned in the Nixon letter. He urged that they recognize this reality and take it into account as we continue to talk.

17. Hien said that in 1973 Kissinger had told Le Duc Tho that he would seek opinion of Chairman and members of House Appropriations Committee regarding the “commitments” in the Nixon letter. Hien again noted SRV view that question of congressional/executive relations is essentially internal matter of concern only to the US. Hien said present problem is that US must honor commitment to make a contribution. As to the forms and measures, Hanoi is prepared to be flexible and help solve US difficulties. He described problem facing SRV if no contribution is forthcoming. He alleged that upon his recent trip to Hanoi he had urged SRV MIA office to increase its efforts with the result that information on 20 new cases is available today. He stressed, however, that given statements and actions in the US during this period, it was not easy to achieve these results and it will be very hard to push these people again if no contribution is forthcoming.

18. Holbrooke then suggested break during which he took Hien aside to emphasize the necessity to understand the US position on aid and to urge that he communicate this clearly to his government. Holbrooke also explained how public statements by Hanoi regarding a US “obligation” to provide aid only serves to inflame feelings and worsen the prospects for successful talks.

19. Hien used tea break to probe further on possible indirect ways of providing US aid to Vietnam. He asked specifically whether it was possible for US to provide significant additional assistance through international organizations and also inquired about food aid on “emergency” basis. Legal obstacles to such aid were explained to him. Amounts of aid already going to Vietnam via international agencies and financial institutions were also discussed.

20. Formal meeting did not resume after break. Both sides agreed to meet again at US Embassy on June 3rd at 0930.

Gammon

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850071–1788, N770003–0637. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. In telegram 16225, from Paris, June 2, the Embassy provided a summary of the June 2 meeting with the Vietnamese. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850071–1763 and N770003–0630)
3. Reference is to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948–1949, pp. 524–553.
4. See “Secretary Vance’s News Conference of May 4,” Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1977, pp. 515–516.
5. The Department released Nixon’s February 1, 1973, letter on May 19. See “Former President Nixon’s Message to Prime Minister Pham Van Dong,” Department of State Bulletin, June 27, 1977, pp. 674–675. See also footnote 15, Document 8.
6. Nixon’s letter to Wolff is dated May 14, 1977. See “Text of Announcement by State Department and Two Nixon Letters,” New York Times, May 20, 1977, p. 17. For Wolff’s statement, see Graham Hovey, “He Calls ’73 Pledge of Aid to Hanoi Invalid,” New York Times, May 20, 1977, p. A1.
7. Not found.
8. See footnote 14, Document 8.
9. Vietnam became a member of the United Nations on September 20. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1977, pp. 370–371.
10. See Congress and the Nation, vol. 5, 1977–1980, p. 57.
11. The amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Bill banned the use of funds for reparations to Vietnam.