Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

10. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, April 27, 1977

SUBJECT

• US-Vietnamese Talks in Paris

Dick Holbrooke will be leaving Sunday² to start talks with the Vietnamese in Paris May 3. Arrangements have proceeded smoothly so far.

Our objective will be to establish relations as soon as possible, leaving certain other issues for later resolution once we have embassies operating. We do not wish to see this become another drawn-out “Paris round” such as the one I lived through in 1968–69.³

There are a number of major issues which we will have to discuss during this first session. Subject to your confirmation, I believe we should adopt positions on them along the following lines, as consistent with your views and our overall foreign policy interests.

—Basic Position: Our position, in essence, would be to remove at the outset our objections to UN membership (Andy Young agrees); to continue our quest for MIA information; to offer to establish diplomatic relations and embassies as soon as possible; and to lift the trade embargo once embassies are in place. (This will preserve leverage for what other countries establishing relations with Hanoi have found can be a long and difficult wrangle, following agreement in principle to establish relations.)⁴

—Aid: We will not offer aid. We will point out legislative restrictions on such aid, note your own public statements that we owe no debt or “reparations” to the Vietnamese and, if necessary, reiterate our view that we have no further obligations under the Paris Accord. Without making any commitment, we will note if pressed the possibility of eventual unspecified humanitarian assistance if and as relations develop satisfactorily (and Congressional attitudes improve).⁵

—Claims and Assets: We will say that agreement on U.S. private and official claims on Vietnam and unfreezing Vietnamese assets in the U.S. will be a time-consuming process which should follow rather than precede the establishment of embassies.⁶

—SRV Actions in Southeast Asia: We will make clear that we consider Vietnamese behavior toward their non-communist neighbors a matter of continuing concern in our relations with Hanoi.⁷

—Human Rights: While we do not intend to raise this formally in our initial presentation, we will find the opportunity either informally or in response to Vietnamese remarks to make known the Administration’s position on human rights and indicate that this will have to be taken into account as our relations proceed.

This approach may not be accepted by the Vietnamese, who will probably still link diplomatic relations and aid. In such a case we would have established a strong and plausible public position on which we can stand comfortably. In time, the Vietnamese may decide that the tangible benefits of trade warrant reconsideration of their position.

Recommendation:

That you approve the policy positions set forth above.⁸

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 85, Vietnam, 1/77–12/78. Secret; Nodis.
2. May 1.
3. For documentation on these Paris negotiations, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969.
4. Carter wrote “OK” in the left-hand margin adjacent to this paragraph.
5. Carter wrote “OK” in the left-hand margin adjacent to this paragraph.
6. Carter wrote “OK” in the left-hand margin adjacent to this paragraph.
7. Carter wrote “OK” in the left-hand margin adjacent to this paragraph.
8. Carter checked the approve option. Next to the other option, he wrote, “Minimize press statements—avoid excessive expectations.” He initialed “J.C.” below the options.