9. Memorandum From Michael Armacost of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- U.S.-SRV Negotiations in Paris
We have been talking with the people at State in recent days about the strategy we should adopt in the Paris negotiations with the Vietnamese. As you know, we have proposed that these talks resume on May 3 with Dick Holbrooke as our representative.
Our objective in the discussions will be to seek the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with Vietnam, together with continuing movement on the MIA issue. Diplomatic relations would include an exchange of embassies and normal trade, travel, and exchange between the two countries.
In talks with the Vietnamese, we believe establishment of relations should not carry the U.S. obligation or promise of economic aid. Therefore, a negotiating objective will be to separate the aid question from that of normalizing relations and to place it in the category of a long-term issue to be discussed after relations are established.
Our negotiating approach will therefore be to:
—Begin the talks with an offer to establish diplomatic relations without pre-conditions;
[Page 42]—Combine the offer with the removal of our objection to Vietnamese membership in the U.N.;
—Indicate that we intend to lift our trade embargo as soon as embassies are established in both capitals (this latter point is designed to avoid a repetition of Japan’s experience of having Vietnam frustrate its desire to open an embassy until it had signed a forthcoming aid agreement).
The Vietnamese will surely raise the issue of aid at the outset. I expect they will insist that some action on aid precede full normalization. I think we should respond to this by reiterating the President’s stated desire to look ahead and his rejection of U.S. responsibilities for reparations or a U.S. apology. We would also emphasize that the Congressional restrictions on aid cannot be realistically removed unless normal diplomatic relations have been established. Privately, we would presumably indicate to the Vietnamese that they would never have a better chance to normalize with us, considering the current open attitude of the Administration toward them.
Our current thinking is that if the Vietnamese reject this proposal after one-or-two additional meetings, we might wish to leave further sessions in abeyance while both sides reconsider. We would then be in a positive public position of having offered full diplomatic trade relations and withdrawn our objection to U.N. membership, and could afford to wait Hanoi out a while to see if they would adopt a more reasonable position.
While we want to establish diplomatic relations, we have no serious need for rapid movement. A measured pace would probably best suit our interests at home and in Southeast Asia. Eventually Hanoi may come to see its interests in trade and other interests as outweighing its ideological needs.
There are two possible drawbacks. Unless we receive other additional MIA information, this could be interpreted as going somewhat farther than the President’s public position—namely, that if the Vietnamese show good faith in the negotiations and try to help us on the MIAs, then we would move to normalize. Second, it leaves us nothing to offer except aid, should the Vietnamese refuse our proposal.
If you have any serious misgivings about this approach, I will be happy to raise them with State before they send over a formal proposal.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 85, Vietnam, 1/77–12/78. Top Secret. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote, “Fine. ZB,” at the top of the first page.↩