[Page 290]

89. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1

TDFIR DB–315/02408–77

204690. Country: Turkey/Cyprus/Greece. DOI: 22 February 1977. Subject: 1. Negative reaction of senior Turkish General Staff (TGS) officers to Clifford Mission. 2. Preparation of TGS option paper on reaction to possible abandonment by the U.S. of the Turkish-American Defense Cooperation Agreement. Source: [5 lines not declassified].

(Summary: Following the Turkish General Staff (TGS) briefing of U.S. Special Envoy Clark Clifford and his delegation at the TGS on 22 February, TGS Chief General, Semth Sancar and other senior TGS officers met [text not declassified] to discuss the results and impressions of the meeting. Joining in this informal discussion were the TGS participants at the briefing, including Lt. General Haydar Altik, TGS Chief of Operations; Rear Admiral Zahit Atakan, TGS Chief of Intelligence (J–2); Lt. General Ilsam Soydan, TGS Chief of Logistics and Plans (J–4); and Lt. General Necdet Ozturun, TGS Chief of Strategic Plans (J–5). The thrust of their remarks was that although Clifford claimed he came to hear the Turkish point of view and learn the facts of the situation in the area, instead he presented an “ultimatum” that Turkey must choose between Cyprus and the Turkish American Defense Coordination Agreement (DCA).2 A few days after this meeting, TGS Chief General Sancar ordered the TGS to prepare a draft plan of what steps the TGS should take if, as a result of the Clifford Mission, the U.S. announces that the DCA is to be abandoned or if no agreement on Cyprus is possible. The TGS report has to be completed by 4 March, and serve as the basis for [Page 291]discussion of options by the National Security Council (NSC). End summary.)

[Omitted here is the body of the cable.]

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 1, Chron: 3/77. Secret; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals; Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants; Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator. In a March 4 covering memorandum to Brzezinski and Treverton, Henze commented: “It appears that [Clifford’s] impact on the Turkish General Staff may have been more negative than he realized. While I do not doubt that these initial reactions are correctly reported, I am not sure they will persist . . . The conclusion I would draw from this report is that it will be important over the next few weeks to do nothing to bruise Turkish military sensitivities further while at the same time keeping up the dialogue and pressure with the Turkish political leaders. The Turkish military will accept the views and initiative of their political leaders on these questions during the foreseeable future.” (Ibid.)
  2. Reactions to the Clifford Mission elsewhere in the Turkish Government did not necessarily reflect those reported in this cable. For example, CIA Intelligence Information Cable [text not declassified], March 2, reported that Prime Minister Demirel felt that Clifford’s mission to Turkey was “basically positive in outcome” and that one outcome was that the Carter administration “came away with a better understanding of Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Greece and Cyprus.” (Ibid.)