8. Report by the President’s Personal Emissary to Greece, Turkey, and
Cyprus (Clifford) to President
Carter1
Washington, March 1, 1977
The mission you assigned to me and my associates has proved to be a
fascinating one and we are gratified that progress was made in the
various areas of concern that the United States has felt over
developments in the Eastern Mediterranean.
There was assigned to me an unusually able and experienced staff. Messrs.
Nimetz, Ledsky, Treverton and Hopper made an invaluable contribution to the mission.
We had team strategy sessions before going to each country and reached
agreement as to the proper approach to be employed. The United States
Ambassadors and their staffs in the countries we visited also made
important contributions to our efforts and fully participated in our
discussions.
In analyzing the conversation that you and I had, plus the briefings that
I received at the State Department and from the National Security
Council, I felt that you had given me four assignments:
1. Gather the facts regarding the problems of the Eastern Mediterranean
and get the attitudes of the various leaders of Greece, Turkey and
Cyprus.
2. Begin making a preliminary effort to lessen tensions that exist
between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean.
3. Search for ways to improve the bilateral relationships that exist
between the United States and Greece and the United States and
Turkey.
4. Ascertain what contribution, if any, the United States could make
toward obtaining progress in the solution of the bitter dispute in
Cyprus.
In an assignment of this kind, my experience leads me to believe that one
of the first orders of business is to ascertain where the pressure
points are. What leverage do we have on the various parties that we can
properly utilize to pursuade them to make a contribution toward peace in
the area? To illustrate: it was already clear before we left Washington
that if the question of the settlement of the Cyprus question were left
solely to the two Cypriot communities, there was virtually no chance
[Page 25]
that progress would be made. For
two and a half years the parties have scarcely been talking. United
Nations machinery has been ineffective in getting the parties to
negotiate seriously. Some new effort was clearly needed.
I shall now address myself to the four assignments that you gave us.
1. Gather the facts and obtain the attitudes of the
leaders. We have learned a great deal about the area. Our
meetings in the various countries were with the heads of government and
their senior advisers, as well as with Secretary General Waldheim. In each country we visited,
I held several private conversations with the national leader, and as a
team we held lengthy substantive discussions on major issues of concern
with the foreign ministers, defense ministers and senior officials. As
personal relationships were developed, the talks became franker and more
forthright. By the time we left each country we had a clear picture of
the attitude of each government and the personalities of the men who
were involved. We not only directed our inquiries to the governments now
in office, but in each instance had excellent meetings with opposition
leaders. This resulted in the acquisition of much valuable information
that will be useful to us in the future. Appended to this report is a
chronology of our meetings and general summary reports of our
discussions in each country we visited. We have also attached memoranda
of conversations prepared with respect to certain particularly important
meetings.
2. Make an effort to lessen the tension in the
Aegean. I believe we all received the clear impression that the
dispute between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean could result in an
incident leading to confrontation or even war. Prime Minister Caramanlis lectured us with intense
feeling on his perception of Turkish expansionism in the Aegean. The
controversies between Greece and Turkey center upon the following: (a)
questions regarding the continental shelf in the Aegean; (b) the air
control zone over the Aegean; (c) the boundaries of territorial waters;
(d) militarization of certain Greek islands contrary to treaty
obligations; and (e) the creation of a Turkish amphibious military force
along the Aegean coast.
We noted with care Prime Minister Caramanlis’ points and presented them to the Turkish
Government. Turkish officials went to great length to explain the
Turkish position in each instance and argued vehemently that Turkey was
not expansionist.
I believe that this discussion had a number of benefits. It acquainted
Turkey with the intensity of Caramanlis’ feeling about these Aegean problems. It may
persuade both sides to negotiate more seriously during the forthcoming
round of continental shelf talks in Paris. The expression of our deep
concern about possible incidents may re
[Page 26]
duce the risk of unilateral research operations by
Turkey in sensitive disputed areas of the Aegean, but it should be noted
that we received no assurance in this regard. Turkey has been made aware
of our deep concern about difficulties in the Aegean and of our opinion
that hostilities between the two countries would mean an immediate
cessation of US arms flow to the area. We should build upon this
understanding in Turkey to discuss the Aegean issues more forthrightly
with the Greek Government with a view to encouraging substantive
negotiations and avoiding unfortunate incidents.
3. Improve bilateral relationships between United
States and Greece and United States and Turkey. The delivery of
personal letters from you to the leaders of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus
was well received and provided an opening toward better relations.2 The appointment of Secretary
Vance was particularly well
received in the area, as was the knowledge that the new United States
Administration was reviewing its policies in the Eastern
Mediterranean.
Lengthy and valuable conversations were held on a range of bilateral
issues. Both Greece and Turkey are dissatisfied with their relationships
with the United States and we gave them full opportunity to air all
their grievances. There is now a better understanding on the part of
these nations regarding the attitude of the United States.
For a considerable period of time the Greeks have taken a relaxed
attitude toward resuming negotiations regarding the US-Greek Defense
Cooperation Agreement. During our discussions we pressed them to set a
date for resumption of the talks. On the last day of our stay in Athens,
the Foreign Minister informed us that he had been instructed by
Caramanlis to say that by the
middle of March the Greeks would have a team ready to negotiate. In our
discussions with the Greeks about their NATO relationship, we obtained their fundamental support
for a gradual reintegration in NATO’s
military wing, but we believe this will proceed slowly until the Cyprus
and Aegean issues are closer to solution.
We discussed United States-Turkish bilateral relations at some length in
Ankara, and we believe the Turkish leaders now understand as never
before that improved relations depend on movement in Cyprus. However, we
emphasized, publicly and privately, our desire
[Page 27]
to restore close relations and the importance we
attach to Turkey’s contribution to NATO. We were heartened that these feelings were
reciprocated, and that we did not hear any threats that Turkey was
considering leaving NATO or taking an
anti-Western attitude.
4. Ascertain what contribution, if any, the United
States could make to getting progress in the solution of the bitter
dispute in Cyprus. This is the toughest nut of them all to
crack. The parties operate within a framework of a long history of
bitterness, recrimination and intercommunal violence. We all recognized
that this was the problem that would take the greatest efforts if any
concrete commitments were to be obtained.
Our strategy began in Turkey. We informed the Turks flatly that there was
no chance that the United States Congress would pass a Defense
Cooperation Agreement with the Turkish Government until substantial
continuing progress was made in Cyprus. The Turks repeated their
long-standing objection to linking the defense agreement with Cyprus and
said that they felt they had been treated very unfairly by the United
States Congress and in fact had been humiliated by the imposition of the
embargo. They believe they have a strong legal case and a strong moral
case for their intervention in Cyprus. As the talks progressed, however,
they became more realistic. The Turks were finally convinced that it did
them no good to rail at the Congress, but that if they wished to improve
their position with the United States in the defense field, they would
have to make a substantial contribution to the solution of the Cyprus
question.
Late on the last day of our visit in Ankara, the Foreign Minister
informed us that, after intense deliberations, his government would give
us its commitment that the Turkish Cypriot negotiator would place upon
the table, at the March 31 Vienna intercommunal talks, a concrete and
reasonable proposal for the constitutional structure of a new government
in Cyprus. They also agreed to serious and sustained negotiations in the
future.
We consider this Turkish commitment to be an important step forward. The
parties have talked intermittently at each other for some time but each
has refused to make written proposals or to talk seriously about
substance. We made no reciprocal United States commitment in response to
this decision other than to say that the Turkish action would have a
favorable impact upon our policy review, and that we would seek to
obtain a reciprocal territorial proposal from Archbishop Makarios.
After this forward step in Ankara, we proceeded to Cyprus for conferences
with Archbishop Makarios and the
Turkish leader, Mr. Denktash. I
had two lengthy visits with Archbishop Makarios. Our team decided on the strategy that
Makarios must be told that
United States interest in Cyprus, while at the present time at a high
level, is
[Page 28]
fairly certain to
decline. Makarios was told that
if a settlement in Cyprus was not reached during this year, he could
expect the United States interest to decline to the point where his
bargaining posture would deteriorate substantially. In addition, we told
Makarios that our concern
over our bilateral relationship with Turkey and the condition of the
NATO alliance was such that we
could not endanger those relationships much longer by using whatever
leverage we had to obtain the cooperation of other nations in working
toward a settlement in Cyprus. Noting the great importance of the
territorial issue to the Greek Cypriots, we suggested that the most
valuable contribution that Makarios could make would be for him to agree to place
upon the table a specific proposal covering the division of
territory.
The impact of this argument on Makarios was profound. At our second meeting, he was
more forthcoming and stated that he had reached the decision to place
upon the table in Vienna on March 31 a map which would recognize the
principle of bizonality (a concession he has never before made directly
to the Turks), and would provide for a 20% Turkish zone. Such a proposal
would form the basis of the negotiations over the territorial division
in a federal state between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.
Furthermore, Makarios and his
Foreign Minister promised to engage in sustained negotiations and
indicated they would welcome continued help from the United States.
The conference with the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Denktash, was the most difficult of all
because he resented the pressure toward a settlement he was receiving
from the Turks and further resented the fact that there was nothing he
could do about it. However, Denktash and his Turkish Cypriot associates did confirm
that they would present a written constitutional proposal in Vienna. In
addition, Denktash did agree that
serious and sustained negotiations would be undertaken.
The negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots will continue to take
place under United Nations auspices, and we assured Secretary General
Waldheim that our
involvement was in no way in competition with his prominent role.
Waldheim, however, is eager
for our assistance and support. Now that the parties are committed to
submit concrete, responsible proposals (the Turks on constitutional
arrangements and the Greeks on territorial division) and to negotiate
responsibly, a supportive role in encouraging further progress seems
appropriate for the United States.
A supportive role for the British and perhaps other European powers may
also be helpful at an appropriate time. We discussed the Cyprus part of
our mission in detail with Foreign Minister Owen in London at the conclusion of our travels. The
British are guarantors, along with Greece and Turkey, of the 1960 Cyprus
constitution and also retain two sovereign base areas on the island
which we believe to be of
[Page 29]
great
value to the United States and Western Europe and to the present
delicate stability of Cyprus.3 The British may discuss these base areas with you
during Prime Minister Callaghan’s
visit next week, for they have been seeking to reduce their commitments
on Cyprus. This concerns us. Both the Turkish leaders and Makarios explicitly requested that the
other Europeans not be brought into the detailed Cyprus negotiations at
this time, and we have honored their request in our discussions with the
British.
No one can guarantee that once the negotiations between Greek and Turkish
Cypriots actually begin in Vienna, the parties will act in good faith.
Each has, however, been given the clear impression that if the proposal
each presents is merely formal, or is plainly unreasonable, and if
substantive negotiations do not ensue, that fact will not be lost upon
us.
The only way that Makarios and
Denktash can reach agreement
will be under the continued leverage that has now been introduced and
that must be continued, certainly during the balance of this year. We
believe that this leverage can be successful because both the Turkish
and the Cypriot leaders now understand that they have more to gain from
making a serious effort to seek a solution through the creation of a
unitary, bizonal, federal state on Cyprus then to remain intransigent
and inflexible and risk United States displeasure.
The interest displayed by the President of the United States in the
Eastern Mediterranean, in itself, has had a profound impact upon the
area. Everyone took note of the fact that you chose in the first month
of your new term to give such important attention to the problems of
that area and that you were seriously reviewing United States policies
in the region. The nations involved would like to establish a good
working relationship with the new Administration, and we emphasized the
fact that the next eight-year period of the Carter Administration would be extremely critical for
their political, military and economic interests.
We have a delicate task in the future to relax certain restrictions
regarding Turkey, to strengthen relationships with Greece without
incurring Turkish displeasure, and at the same time to maintain
sufficient leverage to obtain their continued interest in assisting in
the settlement of the Cyprus question. We believe that this task is well
worth undertaking to further the important interests of the United
States in strengthening the southern flank of NATO, in restoring solid relation
[Page 30]
ships with two old friends and in resolving a
problem of great humanitarian concern on Cyprus.
Recommendations
On the basis of the facts we have gathered, the efforts we have made, and
the progress already achieved in improving United States relations with
the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, we believe that our policies
in the months ahead should be directed toward the following ends:
1. Given the importance we attach to NATO, the rebuilding of its Southeastern flank, and our own
bilateral security relationship with Turkey, as well as the positive
attitude we encountered in Ankara, we recommend that at an early date
the Administration endorse in principle the United States-Turkish
Defense Cooperation Agreement which has already been submitted to
Congress. This endorsement should be coupled, however, with an
indication that the Administration will not press for Congressional
approval of this agreement at this time. It would be understood that the
Administration would take an active role in seeking enactment of the
DCA only after substantial progress
has been made toward achieving a Cyprus settlement, which we believe can
occur in 1977.
2. We recommend, as an interim measure, that you request Congress to
enact legislation for FY 1978 that will
permit foreign military sales to Turkey, as well as FMS financing of $175 million, through
credits or guaranties. This recommendation to Congress could be coupled
with a request to selected NATO allies
that they provide additional military equipment which Turkey needs to
fulfill NATO commitments. We believe
this positive approach to Turkish military needs would be appreciated in
Ankara, but would not be seen in Greece or Cyprus as inimical to their
interests.
3. We strongly believe that the United States must continue to play an
active role in the Cyprus negotiating process. This role should be
supportive of United Nations Secretary General Waldheim, and closely coordinated with
our principal European allies.
4. Especially with respect to Cyprus, we consider it important that
between now and the resumption of intercommunal negotiations in Vienna
on March 31, our efforts be directed to ensuring that Greek Cypriot
proposals on territory, and Turkish Cypriot proposals on a future Cyprus
constitution, be sufficiently realistic and constructive as to form the
basis for sustained negotiations. Assistance to the parties might also
be necessary in connection with the meetings, so as to avoid the
procedural breakdowns that have occurred in the past. We should maintain
a supportive role with the parties to the intercommunal talks, to
encourage a sustained negotiating tempo. This will probably entail
[Page 31]
maintaining effective leverage
on Turkey, Cyprus and Greece to make the reasonable concessions and
accommodations that will be essential.
5. Further with respect to Cyprus, we recommend that you ask the Congress
to appropriate assistance funds to be made available once the two
Cypriot communities reach a settlement. The funds would be designed for
reconstruction and development of the island and would be apportioned on
a fair basis so that both the Greek and Turkish zones would benefit.
6. A strong effort should be made to persuade the British to retain their
two important sovereign base areas on Cyprus. As a last resort, some
United States financial support for these bases may be necessary, but we
need not decide upon any such arrangement before consultations with the
British on this subject are held. Prime Minister Callaghan will very likely have a
request in this regard when he talks with you in Washington next
week.
7. With respect to Greece, we believe it is important to resume talks as
soon as possible to conclude a United States-Greek Defense Cooperation
Agreement. We must anticipate, however, that the Greek Government may
move slowly since it has little incentive to conclude the agreement
until it is convinced that your Administration will recommend
Congressional approval of the United States-Turkish Defense Cooperation
Agreement.
8. To preserve and rebuild the Southeastern flank of NATO, we recommend continuing to work for
the reintroduction of Greece into the military wing of NATO as early as possible. We should
pursue this goal through the alliance structure and with our individual
NATO partners.
9. The Aegean controversy between Greece and Turkey is potentially the
most explosive dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean. We do not believe
that our Government’s own views on the complex underlying issues are as
yet clearly formed. Accordingly, we propose that a comprehensive study
of Aegean issues be undertaken under the leadership of the Secretary of
State and that once firm conclusions are rendered, both Greece and
Turkey be counseled as to our conclusions and asked whether we might be
of further assistance in resolving Aegean difficulties. Until this study
is completed, we recommend that the United States steer an even-handed
course and refrain from giving the Greek Government the type of written
security guarantee that it is seeking from us. Instead, we should
continue to tell both the Greeks and the Turks of our strong desire that
these complex issues be resolved by substantive negotiation between them
or by mutually agreed upon third-party procedures.
I wish to express my gratitude to the President for this opportunity to
serve in this important area of international concern.
[Page 32]
We remain available to be of assistance in any manner in which the
President should desire.
Respectfully submitted,
Attachment
Record of Meeting With Secretary-General Waldheim
5
Meeting with Waldheim
Clifford met for two hours
over breakfast February 17 with UN
Secretary General Waldheim
in Vienna to review the results of Waldheim’s meeting in Nicosia the weekend of
February 12–13 with Cypriot President Makarios and Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash.
Clifford thanked the
Secretary General for making time available on his busy schedule,
and noted how valuable Waldheim’s personal views would be to the US team
which was just beginning a trip to the Eastern Mediterranean.
Nuances which Waldheim could
provide of the meeting last weekend in Nicosia would be of great
value.
Waldheim described the
meeting in Nicosia in a positive fashion. While noting that no
solution could be expected soon, he said he was pleased that things
were moving again. A new spirit was visible in Cyprus. Both
Makarios and Denktash seemed interested in
making progress and were now prepared to discuss substantive issues
in a way that had been impossible before. Waldheim said Makarios in particular appeared
anxious to negotiate, and while the verbal exchange between
Denktash and Makarios had been extremely tough,
the atmosphere between the two was friendly throughout most of their
long four-hour meeting together.
Waldheim then reviewed in
some detail the background of each of the four principles which had
been agreed upon, principles which he described as “sufficiently
clear” to offer a basis for subsequent negotiations. The key word in
the first principle, according to Waldheim, was “bicommunal”. Use of this word allowed
Makarios to keep his
options open, although Waldheim conceded that Denktash had made it adamantly clear that no
solution other than a bi-zonal one was possible.
[Page 33]
Waldheim said that there had
been an endless discussion of the second principle which dealt with
territory. The Turks had repeated their earlier figure of 32.8 or 20
percent. Waldheim said it
was his personal feeling on the basis of this and earlier
discussions that an eventual settlement somewhere between 25 and 27
percent was obtainable. As for the third point, Waldheim said that Denktash had made it clear that
“freedom of settlement” could be no more than a statement of
principle. The phrase “certain practical difficulties” in this
principle was shorthand for Turkish security considerations.
Waldheim said there had
been general agreement in discussion of the fourth principle that
foreign affairs, defense and finance would be among those powers
reserved to the central government.
Waldheim said that with
respect to subsequent negotiations, he had in mind convening
intercommunal talks in Vienna on March 30, or March 31. Waldheim would stay in Vienna only
for the first four or five days, and then turn the negotiations over
to Ambassador De Cuellar.
Waldheim said he hoped
this next round would last four to five weeks, and that a final
solution to the Cyprus problem could be achieved before the end of
1977. Waldheim cited two
reasons for the “breakthrough” which resulted in agreement to resume
the intercommunal talks. The first was Greek understanding that
support by the international community, as expressed through a
succession of US [
UN] resolutions, had
provided no real basis for movement toward a Cyprus settlement. The
second reason was Turkish recognition that despite their power on
the ground, no international recognition for the new Turkish status
on Cyprus was possible without a negotiated settlement. Waldheim said he had no doubt also
that Turkish desire to have the United States approve the US-Turkish
base agreement also had played an important role in getting Ankara
to be more flexible.
Clifford expressed his
appreciation to Waldheim for
his description and analysis. He explained briefly the nature of his
own mission to the area, putting emphasis on the US desire to begin
a resolution of the bilateral difficulties we faced in both Greece
and Turkey. He noted that our real interest centered on these
bilateral security questions though we recognize that continuing
difficulties in Cyprus prevented early progress in solving them.
With respect to Cyprus, Clifford emphasized US interest in having the UN play a leading role. We wanted to
contribute in any way we could to this UN effort. Our preference was to adopt and maintain a
low profile. We felt this was not only in our interest, but also
better for the UN as well. In this
regard, Clifford said we
would be interested in Waldheim’s judgment as to what we could do to be of
help in assisting the Cyprus negotiating process.
[Page 34]
Waldheim expressed
appreciation for this offer of US assistance. He agreed that the US
had a vital role to play, particularly through the contacts we have
and the influence we can exert in Ankara and Athens. Waldheim noted that US and UN efforts could and should be
complementary. The key to movement on Cyprus lay in Ankara, and it
was here that Waldheim
thought we could be of most assistance. The territorial issue was
central for the Greek Cypriots, and US influence would be most
welcome in getting the Turks to show flexibility in this area.
Waldheim noted at the
same time that this could not come from direct US pressure, since
the Turks resisted any form of direct linkage of their DCA to Cyprus.
Clifford thanked Waldheim for his comments and
noted again that we did not wish to take a leading role in Cyprus
ourselves, but to contribute to maintaining the momentum which had
been established through the initiative of UN Secretary General Waldheim. We wanted to help in any way we could. In
this regard, Clifford
suggested that Waldheim pass
to the US any request he had for our assistance in moving the
parties closer to an agreement.
Waldheim thanked Secretary
Clifford for this frank
exchange of views, and the offer of future US assistance. A solution
to the Cyprus problem could only come about through the kind of
complementary action by the US and the UN which had been discussed. It was agreed that we
would work together in the months ahead, in an effort to move the
Cyprus negotiations as quickly and constructively as possible toward
a successful solution.
Attachment
Report by the President’s Personal Emissary to
Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (Clifford) to President Carter
6
Vienna/Athens Report
Clifford had a good meeting
in Vienna on February 17 with United Nations Secretary General
Waldheim. Waldheim gave a full report on the
Makarios-Denktash meeting, expressing
cautious optimism based on the apparent willingness of the parties
to discuss issues. Waldheim
welcomed U.S. help, noting U.S. influence in Ankara. Clifford stressed
[Page 35]
the U.N. lead in this matter and the
willingness of the U.S. to support
his efforts.
Clifford met with Chancellor
Kreisky and conveyed the
President’s personal regards and thanks for Austria’s bicentennial
gift to the U.S. (Professorships in
Austrian History at Stanford University and the University of
Minnesota). Kreisky spoke
mostly about the Middle East, where he believes the time is right
for a settlement; otherwise, less moderate Arab leaders will emerge
in the PLO and in Arab nations.
In Athens, Clifford first
paid courtesy calls on President Tsatsos and Prime Minister Karamanlis, delivering President
Carter’s letters, which
were very much appreciated. Press coverage has been particularly
positive, given the great unpopularity of the U.S. in Greece during the last few
years. Long substantive meetings with the Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister and other top officials went extremely well.7
The Greeks presented their positions clearly and with great force.
These positions were not unlike those expressed in the past, but
there was a new sense of urgency and pessimism, especially in the
way Prime Minister Karamanlis
outlined his current problems. Greek leaders clearly appreciated the
chance to present their views to the President’s personal
emissary.
The major impression the Greeks wanted us to have was that Turkey had
become over the past two years a fundamentally expansionist power,
and that Turkish expansionism was aimed directly at Greece. The
Greeks cited as evidence of this:
A. Turkey’s second offensive in Cyprus in August 1974, and Turkish
failure to negotiate in Cyprus in good faith on the territorial
issue.
B. Disputes relating to the air zone over the Aegean.
C. Disputes over the Aegean continental shelf.
D. Other so-called Turkish provocative acts and statements.
In all their presentations, the Greeks stressed that the fault for
all their current problems lay with Turkey. The Greeks insisted they
were moderate and conciliatory, ready for negotiations and
compromise. All progress, however, was blocked because of Turkey’s
basically expansionist orientation. Thus, there was an air of
pessimism in every position. The Prime Minister stated with the
utmost seriousness that he would no longer be able to follow a
policy of moderation regarding Turkish provocations. He stated that
Greece could be humiliated no longer because the Greek people would
not stand for it. As an illustration, he stated flatly that if the
Turks sent out an exploratory ship again,
[Page 36]
Greece could no longer rely on diplomacy. With
considerable emotion he informed us that the continuance of the
present Turkish attitude, in his opinion, would lead to war between
the two countries.
With reference to individual issues, the Greek positions can be
summarized as follows:
A. We requested the Greeks to set a date for resumption of base
negotiations. At formal meetings they were evasive. However, at our
final lunch, the Foreign Minister stated that the Prime Minister had
agreed to our request. He indicated an announcement to this effect
will not be made until after the Clifford party leaves, ostensibly because of Greek
domestic sensitivities, but also possibly because the Greeks are
waiting to see what position the Clifford party will take with respect to the Turkish
Defense Cooperation Agreement. We agreed to a delay in the Greek
announcement, and we expect the negotiations to resume either in
Washington or Athens on or about March 15.
B. While Greek officials acknowledged that the position on the
Turkish DCA was fully a matter
solely for the U.S. to decide, both
Karamanlis and Bitsios expressed a “private” view
that U.S. military aid to Turkey
should not be resumed until after a settlement of both the Cyprus
issue and Greek-Turkish difficulties in the Aegean. This latter
condition, which would link the resumption of Turkish military aid
to resolution of the Aegean problem, constitutes a new and more
rigid Greek position. The Greeks did suggest that both base
agreements might be completed and ratified, but that the respective
aid packages should be separated from the general documents.
C. With respect to NATO, the Greeks
indicated they were in favor of the Alliance and wanted to move back
towards full membership. But until there was progress on Cyprus and
the Aegean, this re-entry would have to take a slow and measured
pace, and therefore had to be organized on the basis of a special
relationship.
D. The Greeks refrained from giving an indication of how the U.S. might be of assistance in
facilitating a Cyprus settlement, although we put the question
directly several times. The Greeks made clear that they themselves
could not adopt an active role at present, but would continue to be
helpful behind the scenes. The Greeks maintained that Makarios was now reasonable and
wanted to negotiate and that therefore our most important service
would be to press the Turks to make a reasonable territorial
proposal. The Greeks, however, were not optimistic about the
prospects for forthcoming intercommunal talks in Vienna in
March.
The Greek Foreign Minister asked that the Kissinger letter of April 10,
1976, which the Greeks see as a mild form of security guarantee
against Turkish actions in the Aegean, be reissued by Secretary
Vance
[Page 37]
and, if possible,
strengthened to provide assurances against provocations by either
side.8
Clifford and party listened
to the Greek presentation, asked questions but made no commitments,
except to take back their views to Washington, and to consider them
carefully in the Government’s review of policies in this area.
Clifford expressed the
view that the U.S. wishes to promote
a strong NATO, to restore good
U.S. relations with both Greece
and Turkey, and to help Greece and Turkey resolve their
differences.
Greek leaders expressed throughout their presentations their strong
fears of Turkish intentions, including possible ultimate threats
against the Greek islands in the Aegean. At the same time the
Greeks, while insisting they were moderate, seemed to have no idea
as to how they might resolve their problems with Turkey themselves.
While talking of further negotiations they appeared to have no plan
as to how to proceed, and they seem to have prepared no substantive
proposals of their own, particularly with respect to the Aegean
question which they claim is the most dangerous.
Greek moderation indeed appears based on a realization of Greece’s
fundamental weaknesses vis-a-vis Turkey. Nonetheless, the Prime
Minister emphasized that hostilities between the two countries might
occur and that he might not be able to restrain the Greek military
and populace if what Greeks fear is Turkish provocation continues
(such as seismic research operations by the Turks in the Aegean this
spring and summer).
Attachment
Report by the President’s Personal Emissary to
Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (Clifford) to President Carter
9
Ankara Report
Clifford met on February 21
and 22 with the top officials of the Turkish Government, including
the President of the Republic, the
[Page 38]
Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Chief
of the General Staff and other military leaders, the Defense
Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Ecevit, and other officials.
These meetings were long, intensive and frank. Throughout Clifford received the most
courteous reception and evidence of a strong desire of Turkish
leaders to improve the present relationship. More important,
although his message was tough, Clifford believes he received, somewhat
unexpectedly, a positive, constructive response that may lead to
movement in the Cyprus negotiations.
Basic Message.
Clifford told the Turkish
leaders the following: Our Government believed in a strong
US-Turkish relationship; we believed it to be in our interest and in
Turkey’s interest to maintain and strengthen the NATO relationship; it was the basic
desire of the United States Government to promote the defense
cooperation agreement that had been signed; the attitude of our
Congress was largely unchanged; and discernible improvement in the
Cyprus situation was necessary if the DCA was to be pushed to enactment by the
Administration. The United States and Turkey should be partners in a
process of strengthening our relationship and getting the DCA enacted. Turkey’s role in the
partnership must be to encourage substantial progress in the Cyprus
negotiations. We recognized Turkish sensitivities about linking
Cyprus to the DCA and also the
potential impact of this issue in their forthcoming election.
Clifford made no public
mention of any Cyprus/DCA link, and seldom referred publicly to
Cyprus at all.
Turkish Response. The Turkish leaders
expressed great concern about the arms embargo and the need for
Congressional approval of the DCA.
They described their long association as a trusted NATO ally; the long history of Cyprus
which has no clear rights or wrongs; and emphasized that an arms
embargo was not a proper way to treat an ally. This presentation of
the Turkish position was generally mild and was not coupled with any
threat to pull out of NATO or to
permit the US-Turkish relationship to deteriorate. On the contrary,
the Turks seemed—in private, of course—to accept the fact that
Cyprus and the DCA are in reality
linked at least in the eyes of the Congress. With respect to Cyprus,
the Turks go back to 1959 and present a long list of grievances,
including use by the Greeks of US arms in Cyprus, which they point
out did not result in a US embargo of Greece. They are convinced,
furthermore, that they made a major contribution by getting the
recent round of Makarios/Denktash meetings started.
The Aegean.
Clifford stated that he had
found a fear in Greece of possible expansionist intentions on the
part of Turkey, particularly with reference to the Aegean. This was
evidenced, in Greek eyes, by the occupation of Cyprus, the dispute
over air space, the continental shelf
[Page 39]
and territorial waters, and the Sismik voyages.10
Clifford indicated that the
United States took no position on the Aegean issues and had no
desire to interfere between the two nations, but that the United
States was always concerned when two of its allies had disputes
between them.
Turkish Response on the Aegean. In response,
the Turks argued that they had good historical, equitable and legal
arguments with respect to the complex Aegean issues and noted that
Greece was turned down by both the Security Council and the World
Court. To them, Greece appears now to be raising procedural issues
to impede and delay substantive talks. The Turks further noted that
Greece has militarized islands off their coast in clear
contravention of provisions of the treaties by which Greece acquired
the islands, including the Treaty of Paris to which the United
States is a signatory. They asked why the United States does not
embargo arms to Greece in response to this treaty violation. The
Turks categorically reject the idea that they are an expansionist
power. They disclaim any hostile intentions against Greece and any
desire to take any of the Greek Aegean islands. This view was
especially eloquently presented by Opposition Leader Ecevit who insisted that he and the
present Turkish Government stood together in this matter. They view
the Aegean problems as similar to those of other countries over
difficult maritime resource issues, and believe they can be resolved
by the two countries themselves through substantive negotiations.
They believe that Greece takes an unreasonable position in viewing
the Aegean as an exclusive Greek sea.
The Positive Response. During the course of
his presentation to the Turkish officials, Clifford stated the need for
movement on Cyprus in the strongest possible way. He told the Turks
that he hoped they would actively consider their discussions and
that he did not expect an immediate response. The message clearly
registered upon the Turkish leaders. At the final meeting with the
Foreign Minister and his top aides, Clifford did receive a response. The Foreign
Minister, in a carefully worded statement, first repeated the basic
Turkish position, but then went on to say that Turkey wished to be
cooperative in this matter, and that the Turkish Cypriots would
present a concrete proposal at the March 31 intercommunal meeting in
Vienna, which we agreed to hold in the closest confidence. The
Foreign Minister proposed further that it would be helpful if the
Greek side would present a concrete territorial proposal, and
implied that the United States might be helpful in Athens and
Nicosia in obtaining such a step by the Greek Cypriot
negotiator.
[Page 40]
Clifford responded to the
Turks, after a caucus with Ambassador Macomber and the members of his mission, as
follows:
(a) We were gratified by the serious thought they had given these
matters and the promptness and constructive nature of their
response;
(b) Their commitment to make such a concrete proposal in the Vienna
meeting could help lead to progress;
(c) We assumed this proposal would be reasonable, for obviously a
polemical proposal would be counter-productive;
(d) We agreed that it would be useful if serious territorial
proposals could also be on the table;
(e) We should obviously not disclose their proposed initiative, but
would discuss the possibilities of a territorial proposal in
Nicosia, London and Washington, and would keep the Government of
Turkey informed, and they should do the same with us.
Clifford did not, however,
give them much reason for optimism in expecting Archbishop Makarios to table such a proposal.
He reiterated that this would be one of the matters we would discuss
in London and in Washington and would remain in touch with both
Ankara and Athens. Clifford
suggested the possibility of one or more third parties presenting a
territorial proposal through Waldheim if for political reasons Makarios would not.
Clifford also made the point
that the negotiators in Vienna should work on a sustained and
serious basis rather than have a mere pro forma meeting. The Turks
said they agreed with this and would do their best to assure Turkish
Cypriot cooperation.
Clifford promised the
Turkish leaders that their proposed initiative would not be
disclosed by him. Because the initiative might be imperiled if it
were publicly associated with his visit to Ankara, Clifford has requested that the
greatest confidentiality be accorded this information until such
time as it is made public by the parties themselves.
Clifford is not certain this
commitment by the Turkish Government will lead to real progress, but
it does constitute a concrete commitment. He was pleased with the
attitude of the Turkish leaders.
[Page 41]
Attachment
Report by the President’s Personal Emissary to
Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (Clifford) to President Carter
11
Nicosia Report
The Clifford Mission met on
February 23, 24 and 25 with the leading officials of the Cypriot
Government, including President Makarios, the Foreign Minister, the leader of the
opposition party, Mr. Clerides, the Greek Cypriot negotiators in the
Cyprus talks and other officials. The Mission also visited the
Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot negotiator and most of
the members of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Mr. Clifford’s two private meetings
with Archbishop Makarios were
extremely productive, leading to a concrete response. The Archbishop
agreed, after a long and frank discussion, to accept the principle
of bizonality and to present a bizonal map with a 20 per cent
Turkish zone at Vienna to serve as the basis for negotiation of the
territorial issue.
Basic Message: Clifford’s approach to President Makarios and to all of the Greek
Cypriots was that he brought a message of friendship and concern
from our new President. He alluded to the Administration’s deep
humanitarian concern and its desire to assist in a just resolution
of the Cyprus problem. Clifford indicated to President Makarios and the Foreign Minister
that this was the best possible time to reach a settlement because
United States and world opinion was presently sympathetic to the
problem of Cyprus. However, he stated quite frankly that this
sympathetic attitude would change if the Cypriots did not make
progress in their discussions. He noted that the U.S.-Turkish rift over Cyprus had
impaired our defense relationships and that a time would come when
we would have to remedy that situation. Clifford implied that if the negotiations were
prolonged, especially by unrealistic Greek Cypriot demands, our
sympathy might dissipate.
Cypriot Response: Archbishop Makarios understood Clifford’s message. We believe he
has decided to make a real attempt to reach a solution this year.
His agreement to table a bizonal map, referred to above, is an
important step. The Turks in Ankara had suggested that he try to get
Archbishop Makarios to table
such a proposal. Clifford
had expressed pessimism about getting him to do so. The Greek
Cypriots also agreed with Clifford’s suggestion that the forthcoming Vienna
negotia
[Page 42]
tions be sustained
and serious. They indicated their interest in finding a procedural
approach that would be mutually satisfactory and would permit
substantive discussion.
Discussions with the Turkish Cypriots: The
Turkish Cypriots were unhappy about U.S. involvement. Mr. Denktash explained at great length the history of
Turkish grievances at the hands of the Greek majority between 1960
and 1974. He expressed his belief that a solution could be reached
if the United States and the European nations left the Turkish
Cypriots (and the mainland Turks) alone to deal with the Greek
Cypriots. Western intervention, he argued, is always manipulated by
Makarios. However,
Denktash did clearly
state that his negotiators would present a written memorandum about
the allocation of authority between the central government and the
two bizonal states at the March 31 Vienna meetings, and that they
would negotiate in good faith. Clifford believes that Mr. Denktash’s negative attitude is
primarily a result of his aggravation over being pressed from
Ankara. His associates were considerably more forthcoming and
positively inclined than Mr. Denktash himself.
Visits to Refugee Camps: On both the Greek
side and the Turkish side, the mission visited refugee areas as well
as new housing projects built with U.S. assistance. The mission heard testimonials from
both Greeks and Turks to the tragic circumstances of men still
missing and unaccounted for. Clifford received delegations of homeless people. He
also received many words of praise for the considerable refugee
assistance that the U.S. has
provided.
London Consultations: Both Turkish and
Cypriot officials have requested that Clifford not draw the European Community (or the
British) into the negotiations because both sides feel such a step
would overly complicate these sensitive negotiations. Clifford did not intend at this
stage to disclose the specific proposals that each side will
make.
In summary, except for Mr. Denktash’s unhappiness at being pushed into a
constructive step by Ankara, Clifford believes his mission to Cyprus to have been
successful beyond expectations. The leaders of both sides, for
domestic political reasons, have requested the highest level of
confidentiality to these commitments, and Clifford gave assurances that
these requests would be honored.
