62. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1

TDFIR DB–315/15822–78

15947690. Exclusive dissemination to addressee named in final paragraph. Country: Cyprus. Subject: Comments of Cypriot President on U.S. Cyprus Initiative. (DOI: Mid-November 1978). Source: [3½ lines not declassified]

Summary: Cypriot President Spyros Kyprianou believes that the U.S. Government is making a sincere effort to assist in resolving the Cyprus problem. Nonetheless, his initial view, following receipt of the U.S. Government suggestions for a settlement, is that he cannot accept [Page 221]the proposal in its present form as a basis for resumption of intercommunal talks.2 Pending the outcome of discussions with Cypriot ministers and party leaders, he intends to prepare a series of counterproposals to the American paper in order to attempt to identify and correct those elements in the paper which are unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots. End summary.

1. [less than 1 line not declassified] in mid-November 1978, Cypriot President Spyros Kyprianou gave his views on the paper presented to the GOC by the American Government containing a suggested framework for a settlement to the Cyprus problem. Kyprianou said that based on his initial reading and study of the paper, he believed that the American Government was serious in attempting to bring about a settlement to the Cyprus problem. He said, however, that he could not accept the paper in its present form as a basis on which to resume intercommunal negotiations. Kyprianou added that, pending discussion of the paper with the government ministers and with party leaders in the National Council, his present intention is to prepare a set of “counterproposals” which would address those issues in the present paper which are unacceptable to the GOC.

2. Kyprianou identified as follows those areas of the paper which troubled him:

A. While the GOC accepts the principle that “the northern region of Cyprus” will be predominantly Turkish, Kyprianou said that this conflicts with later provisions in the paper dealing with the return of refugees to their homes. Kyprianou said that the GOC must be in a position to state unequivocally that “all” refugees will be “allowed” to return. The implication in the paper that some refugees may be “unable” to return (i.e., not permitted to return) is unacceptable as a basic element in any proposal which could lead to the resumption of intercommunal talks. Kyprianou accepts that many refugees indeed may choose not to return to their former homes and properties, but stated that the present paper must be clarified to eliminate the implication that some would not be permitted to return. Kyprianou said that he accepted fully the concept that those Cypriots who chose to return to the Turkish area would fall under local Turkish administration. This concept would remain valid even should a sizable number of Greek Cypriots choose to return to a given area. Should this happen in the north, the effective result would be, in such areas, a Greek Cypriot majority living under the administration of a Turkish minority. This particular area then would not technically be “predominantly Turkish.” Kyprianou acknowledged that this would undoubtedly inhibit many Greek Cypriots from exer[Page 222]cising their right to return. Kyprianou also said that Turkish Cypriots currently living in Greek Cypriot properties in the north to which Greek Cypriots wanted to return should be resettled at government expense on government lands closely adjacent to the locations they presently inhabit.

B. Kyprianou said that he accepted the American paper’s formulation that the Makarios/Denktash Guidelines, the 1960 Cyprus Constitution and relevant United Nations’ resolutions should provide the framework for a negotiated settlement. He said, however, that he could not accept the order and emphasis given these elements in the present paper. Consequently, he tentatively plans to suggest that this portion of the paper be restructed to give primary emphasis to the United Nations’ resolutions.

C. Kyprianou said that while he would not object to the bicameral proposals in the U.S. paper, he felt that as currently formulated they would not provide sufficient importance and weight to the role of the Greek Cypriot community. For instance, the provision that three eighths of the Turkish Cypriot members of the lower House must participate in a vote to make it binding left open a very real possibility of deadlock in the deliberations of legislature. Kyprianou said he plans to ask that these points be clarified and that the Greek Cypriot role be strengthened.

D. Regarding the provisions for President and Vice President of the Republic, Kyprianou said he felt that, under present formulation, the Turkish side would insist that the Presidency alternate between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot incumbents. Kyprianou described this as a most important point because the Greek Cypriots could never accept a Turkish Cypriot president. Kyprianou said that he would seek to have this point explicitly clarified.

E. Kyprianou said that he had some problems with the concept of a thirty percent proportional representation for Turkish Cypriots in the assignment of Ministerial portfolios in the Federal Government, but felt these problems could be resolved through negotiations. Ratification of Ministerial appointments by the upper House was satisfactory to Kyprianou as long as the correct proportional balance is maintained.

F. With regard to the proposed Agency for Reconstruction, Kyprianou said that it would be difficult for him to accept equal representation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in this body.

G. Kyprianou said that he felt strongly about the issue of Famagusta and intended to hold out for the return to Greek Cypriot control of the entire area populated by the Greek Cypriots prior to 1974. Kyprianou said that this specifically included the rural areas west of Varosha and its suburbs.

[Page 223]

3. Kyprianou said that he intends to begin work on formulating clarification and counterproposals to the American paper as soon as the senior Cypriot officials and party leaders now in New York had returned to Nicosia. Kyprianou said that the public U.S. role in these proposals must be minimized and the U.N., specifically Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, should be directly and actively involved.

4. Kyprianou said that he is considering three separate approaches to the situation. One is a public call for the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides to submit new, concrete proposals for the resumption of the talks. The second alternative would be a meeting between himself and the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash to submit their own clarifications and counterproposals to the American framework. The third alternative being considered by Kyprianou would be to initiate a series of contacts with the Turkish Cypriot side on a level lower than that of President. Specifically, he has considered delegating this task to Minister to the President Georgios Ioannidis. Kyprianou said that, at present, he tends to favor the latter approach, but might revise his views in light of upcoming consultations with government and party leaders.

5. In conclusion, Kyprianou said that he has no intention of rejecting the American paper. On the other hand, the GOC will not accept the paper without reservations because, in his view, acceptance of the plan in its present form would lead to partition of the island.

6. ACQ: [1 line not declassified]

7. Field dissem: [1½ lines not declassified]

8. Washington dissem

State: Exclusive for the Director, INR

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Brement Subject File, Box 64, Cyprus: 2/77–12/78. Secret; Wnintel; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon.
  2. See footnote 2, Document 61.