Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

462. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, September 30, 1980

SUBJECT

• Daily Report

Information

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

NSC Activities

Visit of Pakistani President

The PRC met yesterday afternoon to discuss the talking points that will be submitted for use in your meeting with Pakistani President Zia, taking into account your desire to make a “preemptive offer.”² The principal outcome was agreement to recommend that you offer to sell about 40 F–16s to Pakistan.³ Several of us were concerned that Zia might add this to the already long list of U.S. offers he has rejected. State will attempt to sound him out before the meeting,⁴ and we will prepare language for you to use that does not put you too far out front. The need to turn to F–16s resulted from the absence of anything useful that we can say on the economic front. FY 82 assistance will depend on our addressing Symington next year, we are not ready to do anything more with regard to PL–480, and refugee needs are still not clear. (S)

There was considerable discussion of the exact wording that you might want to use in discussing security assurances as well as various other topics that may arise. You will be getting the talking points well before the visit; I will highlight any particular issues that you need focus on in them. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily CIA Brief File, Box 31, 9/28/80–10/3/80. Top Secret; Sensitive; Contains Codeword. Carter wrote: “Zbig, C” in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.
2. See Document 460.
3. Carter underlined: “principal outcome was agreement to recommend that you offer to sell about 40 F–16s to Pakistan.”
4. Carter underlined: “State will attempt to sound him out before the meeting.” In the left-hand margin next to this phrase, Carter wrote: “Do not sound him out on this. I do not approve. Defensive air and ground to deal with Afghanistan-Soviet threat—not to threaten India. Let me have minutes before any action.” Brzezinski informed Muskie and Brown of Carter’s instructions in a September 30 memorandum. See footnote 3, Document 460.