461. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Relations with Pakistan: [less than 1 line not declassified]
We have an unusual two-tiered relationship with Pakistan—overt [less than 1 line not declassified]. On the overt level, we have a number of differences and Pakistan seeks to keep some distance between us in order to sustain its non-aligned and Islamic credentials. As you know, however, we cooperate closely in [less than 1 line not declassified] covert activities, including [less than 1 line not declassified] the program to assist [Page 1053] the Afghan insurgents. Pakistan is absolutely key to our ability to keep pressure on the Soviets through the insurgents since it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to channel arms and supplies through any other route. Without Pakistan’s support, the insurgents probably could not continue for long.
President Zia has been very supportive and personally keeps a close eye on the covert programs through direct supervision of the responsible agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID). He has also carefully kept the covert program quite separate from most other aspects of our relations, never linking [less than 1 line not declassified] cooperation to military sales, economic aid, etc. However, some months ago he did choose to use the ISID chief as a channel to express his uncertainty about the nature of the American security commitment to Pakistan.
In discussions in late August with [less than 1 line not declassified] Ambassador Hummel, Zia reaffirmed his intention to continue cooperation in assisting the insurgents, despite fairly heavy Soviet pressures.2 He indicated that he thought the current level of support to the insurgents was about right, implying that substantial increases could provoke serious Soviet reaction.
Zia has rigorously limited knowledge in his own government of our covert programs. He has made clear, for example, that the subject should not be raised with Foreign Minister Agha Shahi. Zia is extremely sensitive to leaks in Washington and has threatened to cease cooperation if these recur.3 In public comment, the Pakistan Government officially denies that it is arming or assisting insurgents in Afghanistan, although it acknowledges that it cannot effectively control movement across the border by Afghan tribals.
Zia has asked our Station Chief in Islamabad to inform Washington that he does not intend to raise “sensitive intelligence cooperation projects” during his visit. We suggest that during your private meeting with Zia, you simply indicate your admiration for his willingness to support the Afghan insurgents and our intention to continue cooperation in ways and at a level agreeable to him and that you not go into details. Stan Turner’s people will be standing by in the event that any detailed discussions are necessary.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 11, Pakistan: President Zia-ul-Haq, 10/3/80: Briefing Book. Top Secret; Sensitive.↩
- See Document 456.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 428.↩