Office of the Historian

460. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting1

Washington, September 29, 1980, 2–3 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Pakistan

PARTICIPANTS

  • State

    • Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher (Chairman)
    • Mr. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
    • Ambassador Arthur Hummel—Pakistan
    • Mr. Reginald Bartholomew, Director, Politico-Military Affairs

  • Defense

    • Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor
    • Mr. David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs

  • JCS

    • Lt. General John Pustay

  • DCI

    • Admiral Stansfield Turner
    • Mr. Robert Ames, NIO for Near East and South Asia

  • Treasury

    • Deputy Secretary Robert Carswell
    • Mr. Harvey Shapiro, Deputy Director, East-West Economic Policy

  • Agriculture

    • Secretary Bob Bergland
    • Mr. Thomas Hughes, Administrator, Foreign Agriculture Service

  • OMB

    • Dr. John White
    • Mr. Edward Sanders, Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs

  • ACDA

    • Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, Acting Director
    • Mr. Charles Van Doren, Director, Bureau of Non-Proliferation

  • IDCA

    • Mr. Guy Erb, Deputy
    • Mr. Fred Schieck, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Asia—AID

  • White House

    • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
    • Mr. David Aaron
    • Ambassador Henry Owen

  • NSC

    • Mr. Thomas Thornton
    • General William Odom
    • Ms. Hazel Denton

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The PRC met to discuss the forthcoming visit of Pakistani President Zia and reviewed the talking points that will be offered to the President.2 A number of textual changes were adopted and will be included in the revised talking points to be submitted by the State Department. (S)

On specific substantive points the PRC agreed:

—The President should offer to sell F–16 aircraft to Pakistan if we can avoid a situation in which Zia would turn down the offer and publicize the fact. To that end, Ambassador Hummel would sound out Zia’s reaction before the two presidents meet.3 The PRC carefully weighed the reaction in India and recognized the importance of maintaining the best possible relationship with India, but it concluded that India is unlikely to join in a strategy of resistance to Soviet aggression. On balance, the PRC felt that our Southwest Asia strategy would be incomplete without an active U.S. involvement in providing Pakistan with the means to defend itself. (Given India’s acquisition of the Jaguar and the prospect of a MIG–23 and MIG–25 purchase, a modest number [Page 1052] of F–16’s in Pakistani hands would not upset the military balance.) An offer to sell the F–16 would probably have more impact with Zia than anything else we can do. (S)

—The question of economic assistance for FY–82 should not be discussed in detail with President Zia until we can reassess our position on revision or waiver of the Symington and Glenn Amendments. The President could tell Zia that we are serious about our desire to be helpful, as part of a broad international effort, in increasing support to Pakistan, and we will look at the situation again after our election. (S)

—The President should be cautious in discussing anything more than a one-year debt rescheduling exercise for Pakistan. (S)

—The President should be given talking points that will convey to Zia the full range of actions we are taking in support of the Southwest Asian security framework. (S)

—Other countries should be urged to do more to meet the food needs of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. (There is likely to be an unmet gap of at least $27 million next year.) (S)

—Material should also be included on Pakistan’s assistance on the narcotics front. (S)

—The possibility of a Title III, PL–480 program in the amount of $30 million will be examined further. (S)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 25, (Meetings—PRC 152: 9/29/80). Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. In the upper right-hand corner of the first page, Carter wrote: “Zbig, See note, J.” In the upper right-hand corner of the second page, after the list of the meeting’s participants and before the beginning of the summary, Carter wrote: “Let me be the one to open the discussion with the Paks. I’ll get together with you all beforehand—J.” The minutes of the meeting are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 37, Pakistan: 6–12/80.↩
  2. Tarnoff sent the draft talking points to be considered at the meeting to Brzezinski under a September 28 memorandum. An undated note attached to the talking points reads in part: “Points for discussion and decision by the PRC have been set off in brackets.” These points were: the U.S. response if Soviet forces invaded Pakistan; various joint U.S.-Pakistani actions that would “demonstrate to the Soviets that we are cooperating closely together,” as well as discussion of sales of U.S. equipment to improve Pakistani air defense; the possible sale of F–16s to Pakistan; and the fact that more economic aid would be complicated by budgetary problems and the nuclear issue. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800169–0175)↩
  3. In a September 30 memorandum, Brzezinski informed Muskie and Brown: “The President read a brief summary of yesterday’s PRC meeting on Pakistan which noted agreement to offer F–16’s to Pakistan and that State would attempt to sound Zia out on this issue before his meeting with the President. In response, the President noted, ‛Do not sound him out on this. I do not approve. Defensive air and ground to deal with Afghan-Soviet threat—not to threaten India. Let me have minutes before any action.” (Department of State, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom Subject Files, Lot 81D154, Box 10, Unlabeled Misc)↩