415. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1

14110. Subject: Pakistani Criticism of US Assistance Package. Ref: 80 Islamabad 448 (Notal).2

1. Confidential–Entire text.

2. Deputy Secretary Christopher called in Pakistani Ambassador Sultan Khan January 18 to discuss recent disparaging comments to the press by President Zia and Agha Shahi regarding the size of the US [Page 939] assistance package for Pakistan. Khan was accompanied by DCM Najmuddin Shaikh, while Ambassador Hummel, DAS Constable and PAB Director Peck sat in on US side.

3. The Deputy Secretary made the following points:

—Secretary Vance has decided to go ahead with his scheduled appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 21 in support of our legislative package to Pakistan. The legislation will concurrently be formally submitted to the Congress.

—We have taken note of the criticism by President Zia and Agha Shahi of the amount of our assistance. Public ridicule of our efforts will not be helpful and does not serve Pakistan’s interests or ours.

—This criticism tends to undermine the support we need in Congress. It also complicates our efforts with our allies, and may send the wrong signal to the Soviets. Our allies are prepared to be helpful, but they look to us to take the first step.

—The amount of our assistance was decided by the President and his top advisers after very careful consideration. It represents in our judgment a substantial contribution to Pakistan’s needs. In addition, we are providing PL–480 assistance, aid for Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and will be reviewing Pakistan’s debt situation.

—As we made clear in our discussions on January 12,3 our assistance will be part of a larger multinational effort. The US should not be the sole supplier of Pakistan’s needs. We felt that by taking the lead we could stimulate others to provide substantial help to Pakistan.

—We are anxious to develop closer relations with Pakistan in this difficult period. It is not helpful for our efforts to be denigrated publicly in colorful and colloquial terms.

—Pakistan’s needs and the importance of increased assistance is well understood. We expect that the Secretary’s testimony before the SFRC will find a good deal of resonance and support.

—Nonetheless, no one should underestimate the difficulties before this legislation. Its sweeping provisions will be questioned by those in the Congress who have an interest in nonproliferation and human rights. We need Pakistan’s cooperation in avoiding statements which could be picked up by opponents of the legislation.

4. In reply, Sultan Khan said that Pakistan deeply appreciates the concern shown at the highest levels of the USG and the efforts in Pakistan’s behalf demonstrated at the January 12 discussions. Khan noted that we had reached full agreement at that time on the magnitude of the threat facing Pakistan, and indicated that the response to this [Page 940] threat represented by the US assistance package was not commensurate. Pakistan had respected the secrecy of the figures discussed at that meeting, but had to consider the impact on Pakistani public opinion when these figures leaked out. The US assistance would irritate the USSR and India without having an appropriate compensating effect in helping Pakistan. He stressed that there was no intention to ridicule, since that would be inconsistent with the confidence on both sides which characterized the Washington talks.

5. Khan pressed for specific figures as to what the allies might provide Pakistan. Christopher said he had not gotten into precise figures during his recent European consultations since he had also been heavily engaged with Iran and Soviet-related matters. We were now prepared to begin precise consultations, and our intention was to start with a narrow group, then to broaden it. We were prepared to go beyond NATO and, without creating any tight-knit group, to increase the size of the assistance as much as possible. With assistance coming from many different sources, the sums could add up to a very considerable amount. In closing, Christopher urged that we work quietly and effectively together to move down the path agreed upon during the Washington talks.4

6. For Islamabad: In lieu of State 13950,5 you should draw on above points in informing MFA that we have decided to move forward with our legislation despite Pakistani criticism.

Vance
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097–0690, N800002–0112. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to New Delhi, Beijing, and Jidda. Sent for information to Bonn, London, Ottawa, Paris, Tokyo, and the White House. Drafted by Peck; cleared in S/S–O and by Constable; approved by Christopher.
  2. In telegram 448 from Islamabad, January 18, the Embassy reported a Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs request to delay the submission of the proposed aid package for Pakistan to Congress pending Shahi’s consultation with Zia on the issue over the next day or two. The Embassy noted: “There is, no doubt, a certain amount of bargaining in GOP position, as well as real divisions within government. In addition Pakistanis may be maneuvering in relation to upcoming Islamic Conference here, with thought of showing their independence from alliances as well as demonstrating that American aid must be supplemented by rich Muslim states. Finally, on basis of tape of Zia’s meeting with US newsmen, there is a certain amount of confusion on Pak side.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097–0694)
  3. See Document 410.
  4. In a January 19 memorandum, Vance informed Carter of Christopher’s meeting with Sultan Khan. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 1/80)
  5. In telegram 13950 to Islamabad, January 18, the Department informed the Embassy that Carter had decided to submit the legislative package for Pakistan to Congress on January 18 “despite the public criticism of our program from President Zia and Agha Shahi.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800031–0321)