414. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
449. Department also for Ambassador Hummel (NEA). Subject: (C) Zia’s Remarks to US Newsmen on US Aid Offer, Bilateral Agreement, Nuclear Issue. Ref: Islamabad 0443.2
1. (C) Entire text.
2. The following are excerpts of the statements President Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq made to US reporters Jan. 17 (reftel). We transcribed the material from the tape recording made by William Borders of the New York Times (please protect).
3. US aid offer:
—Q. You said that without Pakistan the US has no direct influence in this arc from Turkey to Vietnam. Would Pakistani security be strengthened if there was an American military base of some sort in Pakistan and would you welcome it?
—A. No. Because bases of countries particularly of the rival powers in another country are always a source of trouble for those who have those bases inside that country and for those against whom those bases are utilized. We still haven’t forgotten the lesson we learned of the U–2 bases when Khrushchev drew his dagger and said “this is Pakistan and I’m going to sort them out” or words to that effect. So it will not be possible for Pakistan to increase, to earn the animosity of the Soviet Union at the cost of earning bases, because then we are in direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. But it is the influence in the area you do not gain by acquiring bases only, you acquire by having friends in the region.
—Q. Could you be specific about exactly what it is you want?
—A. Pakistan does not want any weapons which could create a scare in our neighbors, particularly India, that Pakistan is arming itself for aggressive designs against any one of her neighbors, no. All we want is a good defensive capability . . . we should have modern airplanes, ground-to-air missiles, . . . anti-tank weapons, . . . better communications facilities. In the worst [west] we are devoid of total infrastruc [Page 936] ture. There are no good roads, no communications, no wireless coverage, no radar coverage. We are blind on our west, totally.
—Q. How much money would all of this cost?
—A. Oh, it’s a matter of calculation . . . it’s difficult to say.
—Q. The US is talking of a $400 million program over two years of civilian and military . . .
—A. If that is true, that is peanuts. (Laughs.) And that is terrible, if this is true, as I said, I’ve not learned it officially, if this is true what has been coming out in certain quarters in the press then I say that it is terribly disappointing. And Pakistan will not buy its security with $400 million. It will buy greater animosity from the Soviet Union, which is now much more influential in this region than the US.
—Q. Is there enough aid that would buy Pakistan’s security while not incensing the Soviet Union?
—A. It is not only the equipment, . . . the money that will buy Pakistan’s security. It is the plane of morality and the plane of world conscience to which I am appealing.
4. Bilateral agreement:
—Q. You mean a moral commitment? . . . What form would it take?
—A. We have a 1959 agreement with the US. We would like to turn it into a treaty, where the US has a commitment, and then whether you have or not . . . President Carter, I’m glad to say, has come out in the last two days or so very openly that the expansionism or expansionist designs would be thwarted, if possible, by the Soviet Union, and Pakistan’s integrity or any other country’s freedom is guaranteed.3 But we are living in the twentieth century and 1980. People want more fundamental sureties rather than words alone.
—Q. What kind of treaty are you referring to?
—A. We have a bilateral agreement, the clauses of which are subject to interpretation. One, it is an agreement, it is not a treaty. It’s an agreement which is liable to be accepted or rejected by the executive alone. The Congress or the Senate has no say bearing into this. In 1971 it was put to test and if you have read . . . memoirs, it very clearly spells out as to what are the difficulties and what were the interpretations to that agreement. We want to remove those anomalies.
—Q. Are you talking about a mutual defense treaty?
[Page 937]—A. No. It can be . . . what’s wrong with a defense treaty? A friendship treaty, yes . . . we are looking for a bilateral treaty in which the integrity and the freedom of Pakistan is guaranteed.
—Q. Would the Soviet-Indian model be acceptable?4
—A. Yes, sir. Not only acceptable, but . . . there are many models today which can be examined and the Soviet-Indian model, the Afghanistan-Soviet model, [garble—or any?] other model you can think of.
—Q. Could you spell out what kind of a defense treaty you have in mind? You want a treaty under which the US would what?
—A. I do not expect that the US would send its troops to Pakistan or, it would be foolish on my part to expect that the American or Chinese will come and fight for the freedom of Pakistan. Pakistan will have to fight for its own freedom . . . but human beings as we are, we want occasionally a hand on our back, and it is that hand that I am looking for, because we are in confrontation with a super power. We can’t by ourselves or even with the assistance, we cannot and we should not challenge a super power. So . . . if you can think that there is a case, there are instances, and whether it’s US or its allies or joined together with the Western countries, think that Pakistan’s integrity or security can be guaranteed by certain measures, by bilateral treaty, by a defense pact, then Pakistan will certainly welcome it.
—Q. But the CENTO model is obviously not . . .?
—A. We are now and for the next, quite some time, we are a Non-Aligned Movement [member] and we do not want to get involved in multinational agreements, treaties or pacts.
—Q. What kind of commitment are you looking for from the US? In real terms, what would you like to see on paper?
—A. A good treaty of friendship, in conjunction with others, economic and military assistance, in that order of priority.
5. Nuclear issue:
—Q. Would you consider allowing some sort of American inspection of the nuclear program to satisfy itself as to Pakistan’s intentions as to nuclear weapons?
—A. No, not on a unilateral basis. But we have offered inspection of non-discriminatory nature. But if other countries can be treated like this and I won’t go further, I will say just take next-door India. If the US can get an agreement of inspection of nuclear facilities of India I would go out of my way not only to have those nuclear facilities inspected by the US or by an international agency, but before anybody else . . . the US and myself we are in an argument on technical grounds [Page 938] because the US Government is following a policy of non-proliferation of weapons to which we fully, wholeheartedly support. But the US is not providing us any facilities.
—Q. But the whole situation has changed in the last few weeks . . .
—A. The point is, first of all, is Pakistan making a bomb. And I tell you now with all the emphasis at my command that Pakistan is not making a bomb. Where lies the question of the nuclear facility, yes we are enriching uranium. I’ve said so at top of my voice. But it is a very humble, modest experiment . . . and for the . . . last three weeks, this question has not appeared in our talks and our considerations and I hope that with the situation that we are faced today we can keep this problem aside for the time being until we have resolved greater issues. And then you can come across on the nuclear issue.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800030–0861. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information to Moscow and New Dehli.↩
- In telegram 443 from Islamabad, January 18, the Embassy warned of impending press reports of Zia’s critical remarks regarding the U.S. assistance offer. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800030–0405)↩
- In a January 15 interview with news editors and directors, Carter spoke of the need to bolster Pakistan’s defensive capability and to stop further Soviet expansion. See Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 102–109.↩
- Reference is to the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.↩