Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

413. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, January 17, 1980, 1415Z

438. Also for Ambassador Hummel (NEA). Subject: Agha Shahi Gives Preliminary Views of Pakistan Government on Aid Package.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. I was called in this evening (Jan 17) by Foreign Advisor Agha Shahi to receive what he described as preliminary reaction of Pakistan Government to U.S. aid offer. Agha Shahi prefaced remarks by saying U.S. should understand that GOP appreciates firm stand by President Carter over Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and his offer to come to Pakistan’s assistance. However, he would like Washington to have his “informal and preliminary” assessment of initial GOP reaction to aid package. Fuller and more formal GOP reaction would be forthcoming.

3. Agha Shahi said that initial reaction of government leaders was one of disappointment. Considering the immensity of the threat, U.S. offer of $400 million viewed as inadequate to meet the situation in terms of the kinds of military equipment that Pakistan required, $200 million would not go very far, particularly if one took into account requirements such as high performance aircraft. He had also discussed offer of $200 million in economic assistance with Economics Minister Ghulam Ishaq, who felt that this amount would not go very far in meeting Pakistan’s needs, particularly with questions of debt rescheduling still hanging over their heads. However, Agha Shahi added, aid package more inadequate in regard to military needs.²

4. GOP also concerned about degree of American resolve, since already the “liberal” press in U.S. is attacking provision of assistance to “undemocratic” government in Pakistan. Certainly Pakistan did not enjoy an ideally democratic government and martial law prevailed, but such a reaction was disappointing in view of the critical threat posed by Soviet aggression.

5. A further concern, said Agha Shahi, is fear of Indo-Soviet alliance against Pakistan. He had learned on good authority that visit to Moscow by Indian defense team (sent by caretaker government) had resulted in firm Soviet offer of $2 billion in arms.³ Pakistan wanted to reach an understanding with Indira Gandhi on response to Soviet expansion, and GOP had authorized Lord Carrington to convey this view to Indian Government. He felt Soviet military aid offer could go a long way to explain pro-Soviet statement made prior to UN General Assembly vote on Afghanistan⁴ which should have dictated a negative Indian vote on resolution. Indian Government now backing down somewhat only because of massive UN vote against Soviets.⁵ In any case, overtures to India had been made. Ambassador Bajpai had brought message from Indira Gandhi accepting President Zia’s congratulations on her election and proposing visit to Islamabad by Indian Foreign Secretary early in February. Proposal had been accepted.

6. In response, I said that “preliminary reaction” would be immediately transmitted to Washington. In regard to doubts that Foreign Advisor expressed there would be ample opportunity to discuss matters further. Ambassador Hummel would be returning to Islamabad around Jan 21 and as he was aware, Deputy Secretary Christopher would be paying a visit in very near future.⁶ There should be no doubt at all regarding American resolve in face of Soviet aggression. Pakistan should not expect unanimity of views in American press on situation. There would, of course, be comments critical of Pakistan Government among reports of huge number of journalists already assembled in Islamabad. More could be expected out of Tehran and we had just had report foreign journalists in Kabul being expelled and many of those would no doubt come here. In long run however, Pakistan should expect to benefit from world attention being focussed on Soviet aggression, and I thought it would be particularly beneficial to have plight of Afghan refugees given full publicity. In any case, there should be no confusion over what free press may or may not say and U.S. Government position. I had provided Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz with full texts of Hodding Carter’s press briefings, which I thought spoke for themselves.⁷

7. Comment: Agha Shahi’s expression of disappointment over aid package came as no surprise. In backgrounder yesterday to several American journalists, he was even more critical of U.S. $400 million aid package (Islamabad 437).⁸ From our contacts we believe there is a continuing debate on this question within the GOP. While Agha Shahi and others may be taking negative view, which we must remember may be largely for bargaining purposes, there seems to be much more positive attitude on part of Pakistani military. We will have better idea of whether President Zia will now modify his original positive public reaction to aid offer after press briefing he quite willingly gave to several American journalists, which will take place this evening.

8. Department may wish pass this message to New Delhi and Moscow.

King

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097–0698, N800002–0047. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.
2. A January 16 intelligence memorandum prepared for the Secretary of Defense reported one Pakistani reaction to the U.S. aid offer. The memorandum included comments by Pakistani Air Chief Marshal Shamim, a “Zia protégé and supporter,” who “welcomed the prospect of US military aid for Pakistan, but cautioned that such assistance would be perceived by the population as a show of support for Zia and the Martial Law Administration (MLA). Since Pakistanis, including the all-powerful army officer corps are ‛fed up’ with the MLA, Shamim acknowledged that US aid could have a negative impact and would inhibit the emergence of a democratic political system in Pakistan for another 5 to 10 years by bolstering Zia’s position.” (Washington National Records Center, Office of the Secretary of Defense Files, Accession No. 330–82–03217B, Box 14, Pakistan, 1 Jan–16 Apr 1980)
3. See footnote 4, Document 186.
4. See footnote 1, Document 166.
5. On January 14, an emergency special session of the UNGA adopted Resolution ES–6/2 by a vote of 104 to 18, with 18 abstentions. The resolution, introduced by Pakistan on behalf of 24 sponsors, “strongly deplored the armed intervention in Afghanistan, which was inconsistent with the principle of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State, and appealed to all States to respect that principle and non-aligned character of Afghanistan and to refrain from any interference in its internal affairs.” (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980, pp. 300–302, 307–308)
6. See Document 423.
7. In telegram 12097 to multiple posts, January 15, the Department reported one such press briefing. At one point in the January 15 briefing, a reporter asked: “Hodding, Pakistan is yet another military dictatorship, also an Islamic country in which just a few short weeks ago the U.S. Embassy was sacked and burned apparently beyond the control of the government, the military government. Is there any concern in the Carter administration about handing over arms to possibly restive people who might in some way use these arms, or be ungrateful in receipt of these arms and use them in some anti-American way?” Hodding Carter replied: “I think that Pakistan fully understands where the threat to its security lies. I think that it fully knows and has indicated publicly in statements by President Zia and others what its requirements are to meet that threat.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800026–1055)
8. In telegram 437 from Islamabad, January 17, the Embassy reported comments several U.S. journalists in Pakistan attributed to Shahi. According to the telegram, “Freely using $400 million figure for U.S. assistance in talking to the reporters, Agha Shahi said (and the quotes are from the reporters’ notes): it is ‛not meaningful at all.’ ‛The U.S. suffers from Hamlet-like indecision every time the subject of assistance to Pakistan comes up.’ ‛The offer was received with profound disappointment.’ ‛Some Cabinet Ministers had glowered’ when the terms were revealed to them. He referred to relations between the U.S. and Pakistan as ‛ambiguous, uncertain’ and troubled by ‛a sense of impermanence.’” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800029–0032) See also Document 414.