403. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1
7608. Following Repeat State 07608 Action Dacca 11 Jan 80. Qte Secret State 007608. Subject: Zbigniew Brzezinski’s Meeting With Ambassador Sultan Khan on January 4.
1. (S–Entire text)
2. Text of MemCon follows:2
Ambassador Sultan Khan called on Dr. Brzezinski on January 4th, 1980. Shaikh and Thornton sat in. Sultan opened with an expression of gratitude for Brzezinski’s public reaffirmation of the 1959 agreement. Brzezinski noted that this had been done at the instruction of the President.3 Sultan went on to stress Pakistan’s sense of isolation and the questions that Pakistan had about whether the level of interest now visible in Washington will be durable.
[Page 899]Brzezinski confirmed our view of the Soviet action in Afghanistan as one of major and lasting importance, carrying with it a threat to Iran and Pakistan. He emphasized that the Soviet action should not be cost-free and that the Afghan resistance should get widespread support. He reassured Sultan that he will act, preferably in concert with other countries, to meet Pakistan’s security needs and we will consult with Congress to reduce impediments to security assistance. Secretary Brown will be discussing the situation fully in Beijing.4
Brzezinski stressed that continuation of Pakistan “ambiguity” about its nuclear intentions poses a difficult problem. While we are not making any specific linkage at this point, the Pakistanis must understand that cooperation, especially for the long haul, once the drama of the moment subsides, will be much easier if the “ambiguity” is resolved. The situation has changed in South Asia, and Pakistan should rethink its position just as we have rethought ours. Sultan reiterated Pak positions and said that Pakistan could not abandon its nuclear efforts. Brzezinski responded that we are not asking abandonment, but a greater Pakistani realization that we must minimize all problems between us.
On the problem of assistance to the Afghan insurgents, which Brzezinski again emphasized, Sultan said that Pakistani actions would depend on their perceptions of US assistance and reliability. Brzezinski said that we are considering what we can do in military and economic terms, in addition to public statements. He said that the President would be stating our initial action soon.
Sultan recalled that the Pakistanis had asked Ambassador Hummel whether the US was prepared to talk in specifics, and what the extent and nature of US aid would be.5 Pakistan needs an answer. Brzezinski [Page 900] agreed that the US and Pakistan should discuss this as well as the multilateral support that could be generated, and what could jointly be done for the Afghan rebels. The USG would also continue to consult with other governments and with Congress, and would fashion a tangible response to Pakistan’s needs.
Both sides noted that each seemed to be waiting for the other to take the next step. Thornton stressed that in order to make a realistic presentation, we need a better general idea of what Pakistan thinks it needs, even if Pakistan is not ready to make specific requests. Sultan agreed that a US response that fell far short of Pakistani hopes would be counterproductive. Brzezinski pointed out that we cannot generate a massive package instantly, and we will need to talk to others. Sultan hoped that this process would not take months. End text. Vance
Unqte
- Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Tin: 980643000018, Box 3, Islamabad 1980–1983. Secret; Immediate; Roger Channel. Drafted by John J. Kelly (INR/WO); approved by Benedict.↩
- The January 4 memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 144.↩
- According to Don Oberdorfer of the Washington Post, on December 30, 1979, Brzezinski, “speaking on ‛Issues and Answers’ (ABC, WJLA), read portions of the 1959 U.S.-Pakistan agreement, as a public message to Pakistan and the world that ‛it is an important commitment and the United States will stand by it.’ Brzezinski said he had been specifically authorized to reaffirm the U.S. commitment, presumably by President Carter.” (Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. Affirms Commitment to Pakistan, New Soviet Moves Into Neighboring Afghanistan Noted,” Washington Post, December 31, 1979, p. A1) No official record of Carter’s instructions to Brzezinski was found.↩
- The portions of the memoranda of conversation of Brown’s meetings in Beijing that deal with Pakistan and Afghanistan are printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Documents 149 and 150.↩
- In telegram 1 from Islamabad, January 1, Hummel informed the Department: “I expect to be called in to MFA tomorrow Jan. 2, if indeed I am not summoned during today’s holiday, and questioned about recent substantive policy decision by USG. So far, I lack any official information on which to base reply.” Hummel added: “To put it politely as possible, how about remedying this strange deficiency?” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097–0758, D800005–0126) When Shahnawaz sought information during his January 2 meeting with Hummel about possible U.S. aid to Pakistan, Hummel explained that he “expected instructions shortly.” (Telegram 54 from Islamabad, January 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800007–0838) On January 5, after summarizing a meeting he had with Zia that day, Hummel again urged that he be given instructions on what aid the United States would offer Pakistan. He concluded: “There should be no doubt in Washington that in order to remain credible with the Pakistanis and to overcome their resistance to too close a reidentification with us, what we will propose will have to be substantial in volume and composition.” (Telegram 79 from Islamabad, January 5; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily CIA Brief File, Box 24, 1/1/80–1/6/80) Telegram 79 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 145.↩