Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

150. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, January 8, 1980, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting between Secretary of Defense Brown and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping

PARTICIPANTS

• US Side

  • Secretary Brown
  • Ambassador Woodcock
  • Ambassador Komer
  • Assistant Secretary McGiffert
  • Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary Armacost
  • Brigadier General Smith
  • NSC Staff Member Oksenberg
  • NSC Staff Member Platt
  • Colonel Gilliland, Defense Attache to Beijing

• Chinese Side:

  • Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping
  • Geng Biac
  • Wu Xiuchen
  • Zhang Wenjin
  • Lie Huaching
  • Chai Chenwen
  • Han Xu
  • Ji Chiaozhu
  • Huang Zhenji

DR. BROWN: That is what we intend to do, but we must keep our intentions confidential. With regard to Pakistan, aid will be given much more publicly. We are beginning consultations with the Pakistanis about this. We will ask Congress to amend the law concerning military assistance to Pakistan, and we expect Congress to be cooperative. As soon as we have an agreement with President Zia on the amount of assistance, we will start our deliveries. [Omission is in the original.] US and Western Europe countries and how to increase the strength with Western European countries.² I also talked about the need to increase the defense capabilities of the Japanese. On that occasion, I also said that increasing Chinese defense capability will help maintain peace and resist Soviet hegemony. I even went to the point of saying to one American friend there are one million Soviet troops in the east which we don’t think are directed solely against China. But, if they were solely directed against China and if we could pin down two million Soviet troops, what harm would that do? You must be aware of my thoughts.

DR. BROWN: Yes. The question you have raised is in the midst of being implemented. The United States and Europe are each improving their strengths and increasing their cooperation. Japan is increasing its defense expenditure and closely cooperating with the United States. US/Chinese cooperation is also increasing.

DENG: We, on our part, are satisfied with what Japan, Europe, and the United States have done—that this is the correct line of action. If I may say, it would have been better if this could have been done even earlier. If so, some events could have been avoided. Please don’t regard this as a critical comment; it is just my analysis.

DR. BROWN: We just should learn from the past to coordinate our actions now and take visible parallel actions. Regarding Afghanistan, we have agreed to follow-on talks and parallel actions. For example, we’ve agreed to aid the Afghanistan rebels whom the Soviets hope to crush because of their religion and we are also going to help Pakistan.

DENG: As far as Afghanistan is concerned, the only correct approach to Afghanistan is to give aid to the resistance forces, and we should work together on this. But, I’d emphasize that this kind of aid must be more than symbolic. I must note the fact that Soviet aggression involves the fate of the whole nation. Facts in Afghanistan prove that most of the Afghan troops have leaned toward the resistance forces, although some have been disarmed. The Afghan people have been fighting fiercely against Soviet aggression. We must turn Afghanistan into a quagmire in which the Soviet Union is bogged down for a long time in a guerrilla warfare.

Vice Premier Geng earlier assured me that provided aid to Pakistan was more than symbolic, there would be no difficulty in using Chinese overflight as one way of delivering supplies.³ It is also important that the PRC supply the Afghanistan freedom fighters with arms. We would like to know your plans in that regard.

DENG: Since the southward drive strategy of the Soviet Union is to seize warm water ports along the Indian Ocean, Pakistan inevitably becomes the next target on the Soviet list. Personally, I must have said on no less than ten occasions to my American friends that the United States should aid Pakistan.⁴ With regard to question of South Asia, there is no other way except giving aid to Pakistan. As you know, it has always been our view that the US policy giving more attention to India than Pakistan is not an appropriate policy. Regarding India, we have always felt that the United States should try to cultivate good relations, and this has had a good effect. But India is not a stabilizing factor. Perhaps you already know the general election results.

DR. BROWN: I do not know, but in any case, if no Party gains a majority, it will take some time to settle. Perhaps you can say how that will come out.

DENG: Indira Gandhi has gotten 70% of the vote. It is very difficult to judge at this time how India will go. Even if Indira Gandhi should follow India’s previous policy; still India is not the most reliable and stabilizing factor in southern Asia. Let’s not talk about Indira Gandhi. The present government is thinking of recognizing the Heng Samrin Regime. Perhaps after Pakistan has been strengthened, India will become a more stabilizing factor. What one should try to achieve is to make Pakistan a genuine stabilizing factor in South Asia. We hope the United States will give earnest and sincere thought to this question. If one does not keep this clear in one’s mind, then one’s attitude toward India will make one vacillate in one’s position toward Pakistan. In the past the United States has refrained from aiding Pakistan. I think in part this is the work of India, probably because of a fear of offending India. Since you now have decided to aid Pakistan, I am sure India will send you one note after another, strongly objecting.

DR. BROWN: There are limits on our ability to aid Pakistan because of their nuclear explosive program. Although we still object to their doing so, we will now set that aside for the time being, to facilitate strengthening Pakistan against potential Soviet action.

DENG: That is a very good approach. Pakistan has its own reasons for developing a nuclear program. We ourselves oppose the Pakistan effort on nuclear weapons because we believe it meaningless to spend money on such a program. Pakistan has its own arguments, i.e., India has exploded a nuclear device but the world has not seemed to complain about this. So now you have decided to put this aside and solve the question of military and economic aid to Pakistan. We applaud this decision. We give large amounts of assistance to Pakistan. One can say that great amounts of military equipment now in the hands of Pakistani troops come from China. In order to strengthen our links with Pakistan, we have built a highway in the most difficult terrain through the mountains. The question of continuing Chinese aid to Pakistan does not exist. Moreover, Chinese armaments are rather poor in quality. While the United States has decided to give aid to Pakistan, you must now convince Pakistan this is a sincere and genuine US effort and make them believe that they will benefit from modern US weapons. I know that the Pakistanis have many grievances against the United States. This developed to the point that Pakistan withdrew from CENTO. Have you approached Pakistan on the aid question?

DR. BROWN: We have given them some information and will give them more. Pakistan has indicated that they did not wish to have a visit from a survey team until they have received answers to their questions on the magnitude and type of supplies we have in mind.

DENG: You should directly approach Pakistan to raise this question. I would like to cite an episode. It was through the work of Pakistan that Henry Kissinger came to China to talk about normalization and to set the trip of President Nixon.⁵ Since you were able to talk with them about this, you should be able to talk to them now.

DR. BROWN: I am aware of this Pakistani help, and this will help put aside some of our reservations.

DENG: You may recall that I raised the question of aid to Pakistan with President Carter.⁶ He said the US will give aid in proportion to the population of the two countries. I said this was not feasible. The Pakistanis and Indians are afraid of each other. If the population ratio formula should be used, Pakistan will be in an increasingly inferior position. We hope that since the United States decided to give aid to Pakistan, it will really satisfy Pakistan’s requirements. We hope your aid to Pakistan will not be affected too much by India’s reaction. This is especially important since Indira Gandhi has come into office. We hope the US will not mention the Pakistani nuclear program because India has already said that the United States has supplied them with enriched uranium.

DR. BROWN: We will continue to maintain our opposition against Pakistani nuclear development, but we nonetheless will also provide aid to Pakistan. But we must also remember that Soviet actions are directed not only at Pakistan but also at Iran. The United States is in a very difficult position vis-a-vis Iran. Iran is a very complicated question. So long as the hostages are held, we cannot have good relations. We need Chinese support on the United Nations sanctions because if there is no vote for sanctions there will be increasing pressure on the United States to take unilateral action against Iran. That could be damaging but necessary. In that event US-Sino relations would be strained. We were grateful for Chinese cooperation in December in the United Nations Security Council and I hope this will continue. We need an affirmative Chinese vote in the UN Security Council.

DENG: May I return to Pakistan? I believe it is better if US would enter direct discussions with Pakistan. Chinese policy with regard to aid to Pakistan has been consistent for the past twenty years. Regarding Chinese aid to Afghanistan resistance forces, we are supporting the refugees through Pakistan. Regarding how the US feels about giving aid to resistance forces in Afghanistan, you may wish to discuss this with the Pakistanis. There are perhaps already 400,000 Afghan refugees living in Pakistan.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 95, Pakistan: 1/79–1/80. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Great Hall of the People. An alternate version of this memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Vol. XIII, China, Document 292.
2. Printed as in the original.
3. See Document 149.
4. In a cabled message from Brown to Vance (with the request that Vance pass the message on to Carter, Brzezinski, and Claytor), January 8, Brown noted: “The Chinese are obviously pleased at the change in direction that they feel we are embarking on with regard to Pakistan, although Deng could not resist this morning telling me he had urged such steps on us for a long time.” (Telegram 207 from Beijing, January 8; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 3, Afghanistan: 1/8/80)
5. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 90.
6. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Document 204.