391. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
13275. Subj: (S) Contacts With Paks—GOP Attitudes. Ref: Islamabad 13255.2
1. (S) Entire text. Protect FGI.
2. We are seeing evidence of genuine Pak fears for future, domestically within Pakistan and in the region. Strangely and disappointingly, I have not been offered substantive contacts with high MFA officials for a week, except for numerous contacts by phone and meetings relating to security of Americans. However, these and other contacts clearly indicate great uncertainty on Pak side.
(A) Paks are worried that despite U.S. protestation of desire to continue full relations, in fact Americans are steadily pulling out and reducing both presence and programs. When further reductions take place, as I shall suggest to Dept tomorrow, this fear will be strengthened and will add to Pak concerns in next para.
(B) As Agha Shahi clearly foreshadowed to me (reftel)3 Paks are preeminently concerned that US military action against Iran, or even [Page 879] imminent threat of same, will place GOP in position of being forced to line up with Islamic world against USG. What we hear of internal debates at highest levels of GOP highlight urgent need to solve Tehran hostage problem so Paks are not forced in Islamic direction this leadership does not want. Following quote contains near-verbatim text of appeal from ISID (Milit Intell) Chief LGen. Akhtar, through Chief of Station, to me and to USG. It is not clear to what extent Akhtar speaks for others; he did not say he spoke for President Zia, and my surmise is that he represents other high-ranking generals without direct order from Zia. Begin quote—Lt. General Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan, Director of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) and a close confidant of President Zia ul-Haq, made the following comments to a senior American Embassy officer on 2 December, just after returning from a meeting with President Zia and his senior advisors.
—The Government of Pakistan (GOP) is deeply concerned at the present crisis between Iran and the U.S. over the hostage situation. Recent U.S. moves such as bringing a third aircraft carrier into the area and the U.S. threat to use force are contributing to increased tension. Pakistan is deeply concerned because the use of force will have a disastrous effect on GOP efforts to maintain internal stability and control divisive elements in Pakistan. Also, because the use of force will cause an irrevocable break between Iran and the U.S., destabilize the whole area and create opportunities for the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the area—all of which are contrary to Pakistan’s security and national interest.
—The GOP is fully committed to protect U.S. diplomats in Pakistan and is determined to do all possible to maintain a U.S. presence. The use of force by the U.S. against Iran will cause reactions in Pakistan which will be difficult to control.
—Pakistan is willing to do anything to defuse the present tense situation. President Zia is prepared to take any action which will assist the U.S., including a visit to Iran to talk to Khomeini to seek some face saving situation for both sides. Zia realizes Khomeini may not accept him but Zia’s senior advisors believe something must be done and are willing to consider any move which will assist. End quote.
(C) Almost equally strong is GOP’s feeling that further disorders, if they come, will in fact be attacks on Zia’s govt as much as on foreign targets. Failures of security Nov 21 and to some extent since have shaken GOP’s confidence that it can survive widespread disorders, whether triggered by external events or by domestic unrest.
3. This complex of worries is causing considerable paralysis within GOP. Zia has so far not responded to urgent request of Dean of Diplomatic Corps a week ago for meeting to discuss past GOP failures Nov. [Page 880] 21 and future security measures.4 I have waited in vain for any Cabinet-level officer to come to view the destruction of Chancery compound. This morning, I gave direct suggestion that in Paks’ own interests a very high level visitor, perhaps Pres. Zia himself, should make such a visit (unpublicized if they wish) so as to avoid inevitable future criticism of Pak Govt inattention (start of cleanup of compound begins tomorrow or Tuesday).5 Result is that Minister of Interior Haroon, a holdover from early cabinets [less than 1 line not declassified] will visit, which is hardly satisfactory. As Chief of Protocol observed to me when I suggested Zia visit, Zia did visit burnt-out Catholic convent school in Rawalpindi, and he should also visit U.S. Embassy.
4. I have very little to say to Zia at this point and would like guidance about requesting appointment with him. I doubt that there is anything useful I can say about possible U.S. military actions west of Pakistan but perhaps Dept can formulate something. I do not know either whether we want to see if Zia is willing, as Lt. Gen. Akhtar claims he is, to go to see Khomeini to urge release of hostages and rational discussion of US-Iranian differences. I could of course probe Zia about domestic tensions he is worried about, but that should not be sole purpose of such a meeting. Phil Habib should be prepared to say what can be said about all these subjects, but I want to try for earlier meeting than Dec 9, when Phil arrives,6 or later, providing there is enough substance for my discussion.
5. If we have anything to say to Zia and the Pak Govt on these related issues, now may well be the right time to do so.
6. FYI. I still need accurate, legal language from Dept. to use with GOP, representing USG understanding of Zia’s offer of “full compensation” for damage.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790571–0297, D790555–0738. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.↩
- See Document 390.↩
- The reference telegram (see footnote 2 above) does not indicate any communication between Hummel and Shahi.↩
- See Document 389.↩
- December 4.↩
- Habib’s proposed trip was postponed.↩