390. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
13255. Subject: (C) Political Implications of Mob Attack on US Embassy.
1. (C) Entire text.
2. Summary: Ripples of 21 Nov mob madness at USEmb Islamabad are spreading widely. Various inquiries are underway in GOP, heads will roll in Army and police, and fair number of student demonstrators already ‛helping police with their enquiries.’ We attempt in this report to make preliminary assessment of implications of events of 21st on political standing of Zia regime. End summary.
3. Mob destruction of USEmb compound in Islamabad on 21 Nov with neither warning nor conspicuous GOP quelling success, has important political implications for Martial Law Administration (MLA) of Pres./Gen/Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) Zia ul-Haq. While there have been disturbances at times during nearly 30 months of Zia govt., at no time since July 1977—even during final days of Bhutto saga—have martial law proscriptions against demonstrations so thoroughly broken down. This has to be ominous for any regime which rests on martial law, all more so when it is obvious that effectiveness at the center, i.e. in Rawalpindi/Islamabad area, was noticeably less than at province level where attempts to attack Consulates were firmly blunted. Reluctance of regime to fire on student demonstrators at USEmb—however understandable in terms of disparity in numbers, etc.—adds to picture of MLA which in this instance demonstrated [garble] and inefficiency and which has left some doubt about its willingness to face down students if necessary.
4. Difficulty for Zia in coming to grips with implications of 21 Nov. events is that two of his most important constituencies—the Army and the “Islamics”—are involved.
5. Neither the Army nor the police had a plan for dealing with an unprecedented mob scene like the 21st in Pakistan’s normally bucolic capital city. College students here number in hundreds, not thousands, bazaars are not mass dwelling and working areas they are in other South Asian cities, and Rawalpindi, a typical Punjabi cantonment town of more than one-half million, is insulated from capital by several miles of open country. Although highest levels of govt. and military were [Page 877] repeatedly made aware throughout afternoon of dimensions of mob action and precise danger facing trapped Americans in Chancery and in compound, both police and Army were too little and too late, behind the power curve all day long.
6. We now know that responsibility for capital area was with Punjab, not federal, govt. We understand that will change—a sub-MLA for Islamabad has been named—but efficiency of Army remains suspect. This brings home suggestion from some that not only has Martial Law period sapped Army’s energies in terms of traditional Army role but—combined with serious equipment shortages—it has badly affected Army’s ability to do anything very well. As Army Chief, Zia must deal directly with this by demonstrating efficiency and retaining Army support (it cannot be made scapegoat) while nonetheless punishing those found wanting; and he must do this with due regard for views of his senior colleagues, some of whom reportedly lay lack of reaction to 21 Nov events at his door.
7. With ‛Islamics’ Zia task is equally tricky. Conservative Islamic organizations, like the highly disciplined Jamaat-i-Islami and its military student wing, the Islami Jamiat-i-Tulaba, provided the shock troops which eventually brought Bhutto’s government to its knees in spring of 1977. They endorsed military takeover in July 1977 and have been in the vanguard of public support for MLA since then, including even willingness to serve as Ministers in Zia government. ‛Islamics’ support Zia’s dedication to process of Islamization of Pakistani society and legal system, and they were not unhappy with Zia’s decision, in mid-October 1979, to postpone elections and toughen up martial law.2
8. Although strongly Sunni in their approach, home-grown ‛Islamics’ are alive to the pan-Islamic currents sweeping out from Iran, among other places, and are determined to keep Pakistan apace with trends. Islami Jamiat-i-Tulaba took a prominent, even leading role—with Iranian and Palestinian students and other not-so-academic organizations—in whipping up student fervor on morning of 21st. Jamaat-i-Islami leadership will be very sensitive to actions Zia might take to punish those whose guilt and complicity are proved. They have potential for organizing public backlash against Zia regime itself.
9. Attention will no doubt focus on prospects for renewed demonstrations in next few weeks. Iran-US confrontation will keep sensitivities aroused at least through end of Muharram in mid-December, if Tehran hostages are not released by then. Regime’s ability to keep order may well be tested anew, and disorder could focus more directly [Page 878] on MLA, especially if police and Army are forced to kill some demonstrators or security forces are again found wanting.
10. In the longer run, attention appears to focus, for Zia, on period beginning March 1980, when the long-awaited, big decisions on governance, MLA re-organization, and the [garble] are promised. Zia himself will be tested in the coming months, and come March—if not before—it could well be his own future as CMLA and head of state which will be up for decision.
11. Department pls repeat to New Delhi, Karachi, and other possible addressees.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–0783, D790550–1133. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis.↩
- See Document 367.↩