364. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1
255653. Subject: Secretary’s Bilateral With Pakistani Foreign Advisor Shahi.
1. Secret–Entire text.
2. Summary. Secretary Vance and Agha Shahi agreed to announce following their meeting that US-Pak bilateral talks would be held October 16–17 in Washington (State 247873).2 The Secretary noted that the recent assurances provided by President Zia covered nuclear weapons development, and hoped these would be extended to include no-test and non-transfer assurances. Shahi said this could be discussed at next month’s talks; he added that Pakistan did not presently have the capability to test and that this would be a question for future government to decide. The Secretary categorically denied we were linking [Page 836] debt rescheduling with the nuclear issue. Shahi was pessimistic about the significance of the recent Afghan leadership change3 and unsure of Soviet intentions. Shahi said the number of Afghan refugees could grow to 500,000, and the Secretary said the US was prepared to help. Discussion of narcotics covered septel.4 End summary.
3. Secretary Vance held a cordial 40 minute meeting with Pakistani Foreign Advisor Agha Shahi in New York September 25. Shahi was accompanied by Ambassador Sultan Khan, Pakistani Perm Rep Niaz Naik and Head of Chancery Shamshad Ahmad. Sitting in on the US side were Under Secretary Newsom, Asst. Secretary Saunders, and NEA/PAB Director Peck.
4. Bilateral talks: The Secretary said he was looking forward to next month’s bilateral talks. He and Shahi agreed that they would make a short public announcement following the meeting to the effect that the talks would be part of the continuing dialogue between the two countries on matters of bilateral interest. Shahi asked that there be no reference to the 1959 US-Pak bilateral agreement or to “differences” between the two sides. Shahi also noted that he was waiting for a formal invitation to visit Afghanistan in the near future, and therefore suggested that the announcement not refer to a discussion of regional issues.
5. The Secretary expressed the hope that during the talks we would reach an understanding on Pakistan’s security needs and on US security concerns. He wanted these issues to be “thrashed out” in a thorough way. Shahi agreed, and added his appreciation for the Secretary’s understanding during their last meeting in May5 in not pressing for convening these bilateral talks before the Non-Aligned Summit.
6. Nuclear issue: The Secretary noted we had received President Zia’s letter to President Carter,6 were studying it and would be replying in the near future. Shahi said Zia had sent a similar letter to Indian PriMin Charan Singh. At Havana Zia had told Indian FonMin Mishra that, if India was concerned about reports that Pakistan was developing nuclear weapons, Pakistan was ready to enter into talks on mutual [Page 837] reassurance. Zia complained to Mishra that despite Pakistani denials these reports continued to be spread. (Shahi commented that it would be a tragedy if, on the basis of baseless reports, India would conduct further nuclear tests and go on to develop nuclear weapons.) Mishra had reportedly replied to Zia that Charan Singh’s Red Fort statement7 had been “hypothetical.” Since Pakistan was not engaged in a weapons program, this would “fall by the wayside,” and there would be no change in Indian nuclear policy.
7. Returning to the Zia-Carter letter, the Secretary noted it had contained assurances on nuclear weapons development; he hoped these would be extended to include assurances that there would be no nuclear test at all and that there would be no transfer of material or technology to others. Shahi replied that the question of transfer of technology could be discussed in next month’s bilateral talks. As for the question of a nuclear explosion, Pakistan did not have this capability at this stage. This would be a question for a future government to decide. Of course, that government would have to take into account the climate of public opinion at that time. Shahi concluded that we could also discuss this question at the bilateral talks. The Secretary agreed, noting that he wanted to assure that it was on the agenda. The Secretary added that we were sympathetic to Pakistan’s needs for nuclear power and understood the problems Pakistan faced in this area.
8. Afghanistan: Asked for his assessment of the Afghan situation, Shahi suggested that the recent leadership change was “not for the better”. Amin was more dogmatic than Taraki and has the reputation of being much tougher and more ruthless. He expected internal repression would be stepped up. The rebellion was continuing, but the intensity might be abated somewhat when winter weather set in. The rebels were determined to continue the struggle, but were not in a position to bring down Amin because of the overwhelming firepower put at the disposal of the regime by the Soviet Union. Shahi predicted that the internal struggle within the Khalq Party would continue. The real question was to what extent the Soviets would become involved and whether they would intervene massively if the regime was in danger of being toppled. Shahi was not sure how the Soviets might react. The Soviet stake in Iran was very great and a massive military move in Afghanistan would unite all elements in Iran against them. The Soviets also had to consider the reaction in the Moslem world in general, as well as the need to stay on good terms with “certain countries”.
9. Regarding Pakistani policy, Shahi said Pakistan had been approached by various Afghan elements, but rejected these overtures. [Page 838] Pakistan did not want to be in a position of long-term hostility with the Soviet Union, especially with the Soviets now “just across the border”. Pakistan did not know what the situation in the region would be like in the future. With instability in Iran, Yemen and other places, Pakistan was in a very uncomfortable situation. Asked if there was any move toward coalescence among the various rebel groups, Shahi said that the tribal groups were very “hard-headed”. Even though they felt they were in a position to overthrow the regime, they wanted to know what the GOP would do before committing themselves. Shahi described a recent visit to him of a large delegation of tribal leaders from both sides of the border. The delegation argued that the GOP should either go all out to topple the Khalqi regime (by providing arms to the rebels) or, if it felt it could not do this or was intimidated by the USSR, the GOP should come to some agreement with the USSR. Shahi concluded vaguely that this was “not our policy”.
10. Debt rescheduling: The Secretary raised the issue of debt rescheduling, noting that there were public claims that the US was impeding Pakistan’s request for rescheduling and was organizing the donors against Pakistan. He categorically denied that we were doing anything of the sort. Obviously Pakistan would have to work something out with the IMF. We would then be prepared to do what we could to help. Our approach, however, was not linked in any way to political questions or the nuclear issue. Shahi replied that his government would be very pleased to hear this reassurance. He argued, however, that the IMF wanted Pakistan to adopt extremely tough measures of a political nature, including devaluation. Pakistan had imposed heavy taxes, but was not at this time in a position to comply with further IMF demands. Shahi said Pakistan would like some indication to others that the US was not linking the debt question to the nuclear issue. The Secretary said Pakistan could say the US had given this assurance, and offered to so inform other Foreign Ministers with whom he would be meeting, mentioning specifically the West German and Japanese. Shahi asked if he would include the Canadian, and the Secretary agreed. Shahi thanked the Secretary. He said this would be very helpful and that he was sure President Zia would be grateful.
11. Afghan refugees: The Secretary expressed understanding of Pakistan’s growing problem with Afghan refugees and said the US was prepared to help. Shahi noted Pakistan had asked for international assistance. The burden was quite heavy. The number could grow to half a million refugees. Pakistan was concerned their presence could generate internal tensions. They had to be fed, housed and their flocks given grazing space; they could become a permanent liability. Taraki and Zia had disagreed on the subject at Havana, with Taraki insisting they were criminals and should be returned to Afghanistan. Zia coun [Page 839] tered that Afghanistan could not accommodate so many criminals in its jails, so that Pakistan had little choice but to provide them refuge. Taraki had not really made a big issue of the refugees and had admitted that perhaps only the “ring-leaders” were criminals. Taraki had given the impression that Afghanistan didn’t mind what Pakistan was doing, but Shahi added that Amin might take a tougher line. Saunders noted that the issue would be getting some publicity in the US in the next few days because of the Wolff Subcommittee hearings September 26 on Afghanistan and the refugee situation. We would indicate our willingness to contribute to the UNHCR, but the High Commissioner had not yet stated the exact amount of money required. The USG wanted to keep the High Commissioner “out front” on this issue.
12. Report of discussion on narcotics follows septel.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2166. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to New Delhi. Drafted by Peck, cleared in S/S and by Saunders and Newsom; approved by Vance.↩
- In telegram 247873 to Islamabad, September 21, the Department directed the Embassy to propose to the Pakistanis the dates of October 16 and 17 for bilateral discussions, as well as a general outline of topics to be discussed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2046)↩
- On September 14, Afghan President Nur Mohammad Taraki was ousted as President of Afghanistan. Hafizullah Amin assumed the Presidency that same day. Documentation is in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan.↩
- In telegram 255601 to Islamabad, September 28, the Department reported Vance and Shahi’s discussion regarding the prevention of narcotics trafficking. After Vance expressed the hope that the United States and Pakistan could work together to eradicate the problem, Shahi said that “the GOP had no reservations at all on this issue. He noted the poppy growing districts were in tribal areas which complicated efforts to control the problem.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790444–0943)↩
- See Document 342.↩
- See Document 357.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 153.↩