Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

342. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 4, 1979

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Agha Shahi, Pakistani Adviser to the President for Foreign Affairs
• Ambassador Gerard Smith, S/AS

After the “security” discussion² the Secretary asked Agha Shahi to join him in his office. Smith was present. The Secretary said that the U.S. was deeply concerned over the Pak nuclear program but wanted to be of help if possible. We made a proposal that the Paks limit it to R&D in the enrichment field. He stressed that we made no demands. We wanted to work with the Pakistanis. We were quite serious about trying to put a South Asian weapons free zone into effect. We discussed this with the Indians and thought we detected some flexibility. The Pakistanis will be kept informed. He asked if the Pakistanis had any thoughts as to a possible compromise. Agha Shahi had none.

Smith stressed the importance of sticking to the facts in any public discussion. He said that the two sides seemed to be taking a different view of the facts.

Agha Shahi said the Pakistanis did not want controversy with the United States. They had had to say something publicly after the stories started to leak. They do not want to go for nuclear weapons. In fact they cannot. They do not have the technology. The Indians, on the other hand, can develop nuclear weapons in six months. It is true that the Paks are doing some work on enrichment but they have in mind going to light water power reactors.

The Pakistan program that we had referred to is a “bargaining chip.” They have real concern for world opinion. They know what the impact of their going for a nuclear weapon program would be. There is no imminent danger of that, but the morale of their people would collapse if they stopped their present program. He discounted the notion of an Islamic bomb, saying that they would not transfer technology to another country. They were a responsible nation. They had received no foreign aid for their nuclear program. They had had discussions with Libya about a submarine and a factory (not in the military field). The Saudis had offered to assist them in building the reprocessing plant but they turned that offer down. They had shown their good faith by proposing to France that the plutonium from the reprocessing plant be put into an international plutonium storage regime.

Smith pointed out the weakness of the “bargaining chip.” If necessary, the Indians could outbuild the Pakistanis ten to one in nuclear weapons and he also suggested some possibility that the Indians or the Soviets might be inclined to preemptively take care of Pakistani weapons plants.

Agha Shahi said in the light of the excellence of the U.S. intelligence we should tell the Pakistanis if they were about to explode a nuclear weapon, implying that that was not a near-term possibility.

The Secretary denied the claim that Agha Shahi made that the U.S. policy was tilting towards India. He said the law had compelled the aid cutoff. He again asked if a regional solution was not possible. Agha Shahi said they would be open to any kind of regional solution—even a multilateral declaration but India had said no to that. Pakistan then tried “confidence building” measures without success.³

Smith wondered if the alleged “bargaining chip” was anywhere near as valuable to Pakistan as its whole relationship with the United States.

The Secretary closed the meeting saying he hoped the discussion could be continued at a later date.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 5–12/79. Secret. Drafted on May 7 by Smith. The meeting took place in Vance’s office.
2. In a May 4 memorandum to Carter, Vance summarized his meeting with Shahi. Regarding the discussion on security, Vance noted that Shahi “spent considerable time highlighting the Soviet threat from Afghanistan and Pakistan’s perception of its own precarious geopolitical situation. I reiterated our support for Pakistan’s security and stability, and our willingness to have expert-level discussions on our 1959 defense cooperation agreement. Shahi said he appreciated the offers, but the timing was not right; he tentatively suggested discussions on the 1959 agreement in early fall. I took Shahi on about his perception of our unwillingness to come to the aid of our friends, and he backed down.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State): 5/79)
3. In his May 4 memorandum to Carter, Vance remarked: “In response to my question as to how far Pakistan is prepared to go on a regional or Pak-Indian basis, he said Pakistan would agree to any regional ban on the development of nuclear weapons and was also prepared to enter into a similar agreement with India alone. We will pursue this opening.” See footnote 3 above.