Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

358. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, August 27, 1979, 1100Z

9734. For UnderSecy Newsom and NEA Constable from Hummel. Subject: (S) GOP Pres. Zia’s Stopover in New York: Discussions With U.S. Officials. Ref: State 221085² (Notal).

1. (S–Entire text)

2. I am pleased to hear that you intend to see Pres. Zia in NY Sept 1.

3. I think you will find Zia in a rather glum and not particularly outgoing mood, in contrast to his usual friendly and courteous manner. I believe he is genuinely worried about what kinds of harsh and punitive actions the USG is planning in order to have our way with the Pak nuclear program.

4. As we have reported, even before the Burt article in the Times,³ we had been hearing of Pakistani worries that the USG might be planning drastic steps. SecDef Brown’s statements about a 110,000 man task force for possible use in the Middle East⁴ triggered some highly imaginative Pak speculations. These included concerns that the USG might stimulate the Israelis to do an Entebbe-type raid on Pak nuclear facilities and/or that the USG was trying to stimulate the Indians to destroy the facilities. Ludicrous as that may sound to us, we have to remember that Gerry Smith, on May 4th had given what Paks considered to be an official U.S. warning or threat of military attack on the installations.⁵

5. In this already existing atmosphere, the Burt article in the Times was accepted as gospel; media and GOP homed in on prospect of unilateral U.S. military action and related this to SecDef’s ME task force remarks. In addition, the GOP had “evidence” that some unnamed USG official had allegedly encouraged the Indians to attack, and also the alleged statements by Sen. Percy⁶ that were read in similar vein.

6. Now the tough USG attitude on debt rescheduling⁷ (including a new Burt article)⁸ will also cause the Paks to speculate that USG is acting out the earlier “Burt option” of economic strangulation and that the USG may try to stimulate other donors to withhold aid.

7. I think Zia and others actually believe that USG is engaging in calculated leaks to the media in “campaign of international vilification.” Given likelihood of continued US press coverage and speculation about Pak nuclear problem, I cannot think of much that can be said to convince Paks otherwise, beyond reiterating our denial and our desire to keep as good relations with Paks as possible.

8. In this atmosphere, and given present state of paralysis (or perhaps I should say re-examination) of U.S. policies toward Pakistan, you will be better able than I to formulate what can be said to Zia about U.S. policy and attitudes. I hope you will be able to get guidance from Secy Vance and that you can cite him as authority for your statements to Zia.

9. From where I sit, however, several things are clear at this point. We are not, by our variety of actions, deterring the Pakistanis from proceeding with their nuclear enrichment program and the related efforts in the field of weapons research. We are, however, eroding badly our relationship with a nearly broke, badly shaken, and potentially very unstable “former ally”—to the detriment of our broader interests in Pakistan, in South Asia, and in this region as a whole. We must find a way soon to address these broader politico-military/strategic interests in this part of the world in addition to (or at least parallel to) our search for ways of heading off proliferation of nuclear weapons. If not, we run the risk of so badly stressing our bilateral relationship with Pakistan as to reduce our ability to carry on in pursuit of our regional and bilateral goals after the nuclear issue is behind us—when this could be an even more difficult and unstable region than it is now.

Hummel

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2092. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to New Delhi
2. In telegram 221085 to Islamabad, August 23, the Department notified the Embassy that Newsom and Constable planned to meet with Zia during his stopover in New York en route to the September summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2035)
3. See Richard Burt, “U.S. Aides Say Pakistan Is Reported to Be Building an A-Bomb Site,” New York Times, August 17, 1979, p. A6.
4. The statement was made by the Army Chief of Staff General Bernard Rogers. Telegram 160530 to multiple posts, June 22, reported that Rogers, at a press conference on June 21, “made a statement to the effect that the USG is working to come up with a ‛unilateral corps’ quick reaction force of 110,000 men which could be sent to the Persian Gulf or other critical spots.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790282–0098)
5. In telegram 9257 from Islamabad, August 14, the Embassy reported an August 14 meeting between Hummel and Shahnawaz, during which Shahnawaz argued that during the May 4 meeting between Vance and Shahi, “Smith pointed out to Shahi that the Soviets seriously planned a preemptive strike against PRC nuclear facilities at the time the Chinese developed a weapons program. This, Shahnawaz said, was the first official hint that such a strike could be planned against Pakistan.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N790007–0026) Smith’s comment does not appear in the U.S. record of the meeting; see Document 342.
6. During their August 14 meeting (see footnote 5 above), Shahnawaz discussed with Hummel comments that an Indian newspaper attributed to Senator Percy on August 11 in New Delhi. According to the article, Percy “said in Delhi that the nuclear weapons development process in Pakistan has started and that ‛it is horrible to think of the close range of Indian cities to Pakistan’s potential for destruction.’ At the same time, there was surprise expressed by Percy at the apparent disregard within the GOI for the potential for disaster represented in Pakistan’s nuclear program.” In telegram 1542 from Calcutta, August 17, the Consulate claimed that the report in the Indian press of Percy’s comments was inaccurate: “Strictly speaking, in a rambling and impromptu interview at the Calcutta airport, Senator Percy made no comments on Pakistan’s nuclear intentions or capabilities.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790373–1126)
7. In telegram 208884 to Islamabad, August 10, the Department directed the Embassy to inform the Pakistani Government that the United States would not support debt rescheduling without an IMF stabilization program, thus leaving the question up to the IMF. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790364–0273)
8. Reference is presumably to Richard Burt, “Fears Rising in Washington That an India-Pakistan Nuclear Race Is Inevitable,” New York Times, August 24, 1979, p. A4.