Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

327. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, March 9, 1979, 2–3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Minutes: PRC Meeting on Pakistan

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary
  • David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
  • Lucy Benson, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science & Technology
  • Thomas Pickering, Ass’t. Secretary of State, Bureau of Oceans & Internat. Environmental and Scientific Affairs
  • George Rathjens, Deputy to Ambassador Smith

• Defense

  • Charles Duncan, Deputy Secretary
  • David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary for Developing Nations

• Energy

  • John Deutsch, Acting Ass’t. Secretary for Energy/Technology

• Office of Management and Budget

  • Randy Jayne, Assoc. Director for Security and Internat. Affairs
• • Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
  • Spurgeon Keeny, Acting Director

• Joint Chiefs of Staff

  • Lt. General William Smith

• Director of Central Intelligence

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director
  • John Despres
  • [name not declassified]

• White House

  • David Aaron

• National Security Council

  • Thomas Thornton
  • Henry Owen
  • Reg Bartholomew
  • Jessica Mathews
  • Rutherford Poats

Christopher: I would like to have this meeting address four questions. First, steps that we should take to achieve compliance with the Symington Amendment. Second, means of preventing Pakistan from securing materials for its nuclear program. Third, how we can persuade the Pakistanis from pursuing their nuclear option. And four, how we can maintain the best possible relationships with Pakistan. Moving to the first item, we are now at the point where the Symington Amendment has been triggered and we must take the reach of that law into account. The issue is not reprocessing so much as it is enrichment and the material that they have gotten for their enrichment program. This is all well documented. The CIA agrees?

Turner: We agree absolutely. The Pakistanis are determined to have at least a nuclear option. They have a program underway, including a small scale plant that they will test this month and a large scale plant that they will perhaps have in operation by next year.

Aaron: We have consulted with Congress on this and I don’t think that automatic implementation necessarily flows at this point. The law is specific but we should seek to keep maximum flexibility. How, for instance, is Congress going to press us on this? Senator Glenn has been briefed. We should wait until we hear back from Congress before we take any automatic action.

Christopher: The law requires that we supply no development assistance or military equipment on concessional terms, nor IMET.

Benson: We are not allowed to undertake any new obligations. We are going to have to work out what this means in terms of IMET since each of the services has different obligating procedures etc.

Smith: What is the trigger that sets off the Symington Amendment?

Christopher: The receipt of enrichment technology after August of 1977.

Smith: Then what really has happened since the last time we met; how are things different so that we have to trigger the amendment? At that time we just said that it was imminent.²

Christopher: We now have evidence of the transfer of critical equipment.

Aaron: What evidence do we have that this is for nuclear weapons purposes?

Turner: Our evidence is strictly by deduction, arising from the fact that they do not have a nuclear power program that would require enriched uranium of this type.

Christopher: The purpose is not set forth in the statute.

Mathews: The purpose is to avoid the transfer of sensitive equipment.

Christopher: In effect the escape clause in the legislation defines the purpose—it provides for a waiver if we have reliable assurances that there is no nuclear weapons program.

Aaron: As a matter of fact then the equipment has arrived and is being installed?

Christopher: Yes, the buildings are there and we have photographs.

Owen: I have to leave at this point, but I want to make the point that we cannot enter into any new development assistance obligations. PL–480 is not covered by the law, but we will have to consult Congress about further sales. We are going to need consultations on the Hill and must tell the Pakistanis that ultimately PL–480 will also be affected.

Newsom: It is hard to argue that the statute has not been triggered. It is not just a question of the intelligence that we have, but also the equivocation of the Pakistanis in discussing the matter with us.

We seem to be excluding the option of consulting with Congress and laying out to them the implications of an abrupt triggering of the Symington amendment. We could explain to them that we are hoping to gain time. There are three aid items that we have to think about immediately. One of these has been signed by the Pakistanis and has come back to us for cover signature; the other two are ready for signing. The Pakistanis expect us to sign them. Thus, we cannot simply let things drift, the Pakistanis will know that we are implementing the amendment.

Christopher: We cannot, however, sign agreements at this point without putting the person who signs them in some jeopardy under the law.

Thornton: The issue is not whether the Pakistanis know that we are implementing the amendment, rather whether it becomes public knowledge here.

Christopher: The Pakistanis would not want to make it public. They asked us to proceed as quietly as possible in doing what we have to do. We can let these agreements slip for a while. The legal adviser cannot authorize the signing of them in contravention of the law, and consultation with Congress does not solve this legal problem.

Aaron: What is actually a commitment or an obligation? We make a commitment, they sign it, and we should counter-sign it. I assume that in that case we are already obligated. Could we not consult with Congress and then go forward with these commitments?

Newsom: Perhaps this would be a subterfuge, but couldn’t we generate a piece of paper that would specify a trigger date so that whatever was signed prior to that date would be legal? Could we, for instance, put into such a paper everything that we know and then have the Secretary of State conclude that, say, March 15th would be the triggering date?

Christopher: The legal interpretation is that we cannot enter into any new obligations. I am willing to stretch this as much as possible.

Smith: How does the trigger mechanism actually work?

Pickering: There is no specific form. The test is the shipment of equipment and that has happened. We know this based on intelligence.

McGiffert: We can ask for a formal opinion, or for a decision by the Secretary of State.

Christopher: We can’t delay very much. On the basis of the evidence we should have taken this step long ago. We can follow a deliberate process, but at the same time we cannot ignore reality.

McGiffert: The process could extend beyond the scheduled signing of these three agreements couldn’t it?

Smith: I have no piece of paper in front of me that tells me we have crossed a specific line that would require triggering.

Christopher: The intelligence is overwhelming that that line has been crossed.

Turner: Actually, we have had almost all of this intelligence since last August. There is really nothing new. We just didn’t ask the question in these terms before.

Aaron: Yes, there is one new piece of intelligence. Zia did not deny their enrichment program when he talked to Deputy Secretary Christopher.³ That is the most important piece of overt intelligence that we have received and that is the real trigger.

Benson: The situation is still harder with IMET because we don’t know when the remaining money is actually obligated.

Christopher: We will go forward deliberately and have a legal finding at an early date. We will carry out the law but not with an exaggerated effect.

We will look into the situation of the matters that are now on the table. Where we have already made an oral commitment, perhaps that will justify signing.

Keeny: I thought that at the last meeting we had decided to put off all things that might require signing.

Aaron: Does this apply to all U.S. grants?

Benson: It includes map, IMET, SSA, Development Assistance, and FMS Credits.

Mathews: What signal will we be sending to the Pakistanis if we seek a legal expedient to be as helpful as we can in signing these agreements?

Christopher: We may have to advise them that on a certain date we will not be able to sign any further agreements. Turning to the second item, steps that we can take with the allies to foreclose shipment of materials to Pakistan, shouldn’t we be doing more?

Pickering: We have stayed in touch with our allies all along and have now agreed with the Commerce Department on a list of exports to be prohibited from the United States.⁴ We are sending this to our allies and will be adding to it over time. We are now doing all that we can.

Aaron: Does anybody really think we are going to stop the Pakistanis through this?

Benson: No.

Christopher: We certainly won’t be able to stop their desire. Perhaps, however, we can slow it down or impair it.

Pickering: Our actions can slow it down but nobody is going to say that we will be able to stop them. We estimate now they may be 3–5 years away from an explosive capability; perhaps we could double these figures.

Deutsch: We do not think that you have 3–5 years to work with.

Pickering: Yours is the only Agency that doubts that estimate.

Benson: This method itself is not going to work, but there are other things that we can do alongside it that will help slow them down.

Christopher: We probably cannot stop them from completing the 70 centrifuge installation, but perhaps we could keep them from completing the 1,000 centrifuge installation, and that would make a difference.

Turner: [2 lines not declassified]

DesPres: [5 lines not declassified]

Deutsch: When will the 1,000 machine array become operational?

DesPres: About December 1980, and they should have enough material for a weapon by the first quarter of 1982.

Deutsch: We also have to bear in mind that if they are able to get any slightly enriched uranium at all this would greatly accelerate their timetable.

Turner: We also have to take into account that the Indians are extremely concerned and might take action against the Pakistani facilities.

Newsom: We should ask ourselves how important Pakistan is to us. It is a critical area, a weak but populous country, it is near the Soviet border. The effect of Iran has been great in Pakistan. We cannot ignore their nuclear programs, but if they are determined and if our allies are not as committed to non-proliferation as we will we not further alienate the Pakistanis in addition to the actions taken under the Symington amendment by prodding our allies to take restrictive moves against Pakistan?

Benson: I agree but we should broaden the consideration. There are other options. We need to fit these kinds of decisions into broader scenarios. I, for my part, think that Pakistan is important.

Keeny: Do we also not think that our non-proliferation objectives, and our relations with India are important? These should also affect our judgments.

Benson: I am concerned with preventing an Indo-Pakistani nuclear race.

Aaron: When we cut off new commitments it will become known that Pakistan is on the way to a nuclear capability. This will tend to undercut INFCE. We will have the first case of a public Nth country since India.

Keeny: No, South Africa has also come along since then. When does the triggering action become public? What if we were to sign these few things pending and then perhaps delay everything else to gain time?

Christopher: We are not going to announce that Pakistan is building a bomb, we will just refer to their enrichment capability. The position of the President as regards nuclear technology is well enough known that this would be credible. Even with the maximum discretion, however, we have only a month or so. We can define very carefully what triggering involves.

Newsom: And we must tell the Congress.

Christopher: Turning to the third item, ways to dissuade the Pakistanis, perhaps there are some Indo-Pakistani bilateral arrangements possible, for instance, declarations against weapons or explosive capabilities. This would necessarily bring the United States, Soviet Union, and China into the picture. All of these are long-shots.

Newsom: Perhaps the only real avenue open to us is the diplomatic exploration of the Pakistani offer of a no-weapons formula and Desai’s opposition to weapons. These might offer an approach to the problem. I suggest that we set up a mechanism to prepare diplomatic scenarios on approaching India and Pakistan, and enlisting third countries’ support.

Smith: I would support that. I am troubled because the Pakistanis are involved in what they are doing because of India. We cannot deal with the Pakistan problem in isolation.

Newsom: There is an additional possibility. Could we gain time either through getting greater understanding in Congress or a change in the Symington amendment language? We need to have maximum leverage in this matter. If we start by cutting Pakistan off, it will lessen our chances of influencing them. Could we perhaps get a one-year moratorium on implementing the Symington amendment?

Aaron: We would need to have some encouragement from the Pakistanis to build on.

Christopher: We would need “reliable assurances” that they are not building a nuclear weapon.

Aaron: If they, for instance, say they are prepared to work with India, and that they are not building anything now, we would be able to confirm that through intelligence. If, on top of that, they are willing to negotiate, then that might be an adequate basis for the President to invoke the waiver.

Christopher: The Pakistanis might be interested in something along that line, which would be like the South Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, but that would raise problems for us with regard to transit, etc.

Aaron: The problem is that India now has a nuclear device. It is hard to see how Pakistan could be involved, in light of that, in what we could consider a good faith negotiation.

Keeny: It would depend on the wording that was chosen. One could talk about deployment or testing, or perhaps involve a grandfather clause.

McGiffert: Could not the Pakistanis say that they haven’t made a decision to build a weapon? The language of the waiver has to do with producing a military capability, not simply keeping options open.

Aaron: You would have to have some kind of ongoing negotiations.

Benson: And also you would have to persuade the Indians to talk to the Pakistanis. This would be a further underpinning of the scenario.

Christopher: Let’s have several scenarios worked up.

Aaron: Let the record show that I never said I thought they might agree to this! (laughs)

Keeny: Turning to the State paper, you may not need all of the assurances that are suggested in that.⁵ An agreement between India and Pakistan might make safeguards unnecessary. [less than 1 line not declassified] we [less than 1 line not declassified] have good intelligence on the Pakistani program.

Christopher: Let’s pursue the scenarios. The whole trend in India and Pakistan is going the other way. Desai is under great domestic pressure. We should not be too euphoric. Furthermore, we should consider whether we can provide carrots to dissuade Pakistan from its nuclear option. I am afraid, though, that these would be expensive and hard to relate to the Symington amendment.

McGiffert: Wouldn’t it be worth a very high price to us?

Bartholomew: If you do that, though, you are opening yourself to blackmail from other possible nuclear powers.

Newsom: Is there any chance that other suppliers and Pakistani creditors could make a total debt rescheduling dependent on Pakistan’s abandoning its nuclear program?

Pickering: Perhaps. The supplier countries are interested in the commercial angle, but if the Pakistani debt situation falls apart, then there will be no commercial sales. These countries also have their domestic anti-nuclear lobbies. The problem we would confront is that we might isolate Pakistan completely from the West.

Newsom: Aside from the non-proliferation aspect, the diversion of resources to the nuclear program is a bad thing for Pakistan itself.

Christopher: What is the cost of the program?

DesPres: Perhaps $20–$30 million a year; the cost of the whole large facility is from $100–$150 million.

Christopher: Are funds coming from the outside?

DesPres: [1 line not declassified]

Christopher: Concerning the fourth agenda item, how to maintain good relations with Pakistan, we should presumably not cut back on PL–480 and keep our diplomatic channels open. How hard should we push other countries? Are there legal obligations to do so?

Pickering: We have policy obligations to do so in the suppliers group, and there is an implied legal obligation in the Symington amendment. We also have to be careful of our own suppliers.

Aaron: Are these items not on a control list?

Pickering: We are going to put out a list next week.

Aaron: My judgment is this: We should go ahead with the loans that are ready to be signed, and tell the Pakistanis that there will be nothing more under present circumstances. We should then try to create a change in the circumstances and make a major effort on the supply front.

Keeny: Why is it taking us so long to get our own house in order?

Newsom: The Commerce Department has been reluctant.

Mathews: That’s not really the problem. The issue is that it is hard to set up a list that is sufficiently specific, but at the same time does not tell you how to make an enrichment facility.

Pickering: We have things in order now. We are showing the list to the other suppliers and have been in touch with them all along on specific cases.

Christopher: Should we set this working group up on an interagency basis?

Aaron: Yes.

Christopher: We will get representation from each of you. We will try to make a finding in a way that leaves open the possibility of change.

Aaron: We will need a tight deadline.

Newsom: What will be the form of the finding—the minutes of a meeting such as this?

Christopher: It should probably be a finding by the Secretary of State.

Newsom: What shall we do with regard to Congress? We have talked to Glenn. Should we move on quickly to Zablocki and perhaps the Leadership? We should tell them that evidence is building up; the Pakistanis have refused to accept our inspection. We should tell Congress that we have not made any final determination, but that we are continuing to explore further options.

Deutsch: Bear in mind that when the Secretary of State makes this finding, you will have to take into account the responsibility of the Secretary of Energy for making findings on enrichment matters.

Christopher: If Congress asks for an intelligence briefing, and we say that we are still studying the matter, we are going to look very bad once they know how far things have gone.

DesPres: That depends on how it is done. We would simply brief on the facts, not on any finding.

Aaron: It is similar to the verification issue where CIA briefs only on the facts, but leaves determinations to others.

Keeny: We should finish this study in a few days or a week.

Christopher: We could brief the Congress and tell them that we had arranged to suspend all programs while we explore other options.

Newsom: Is it agreed that we will authorize the two pending obligations?

Christopher: The legal adviser will have to check that out.

Duncan: If it is legal, then we will proceed.

Benson: There is still the IMET question.

McGiffert: There must be enough flexibility there to do something.

Aaron: Let us just make sure that the lawyers make it easy for us to do what we want to do, not the other way around.

Christopher: I will get the committee underway and we will set tight deadlines.

Thereupon the meeting ended.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Subject File, Box 102, Pakistan 3/9/79: 3/79. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The Summary of Conclusions of the meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 73, PRC 096, 3/9/79, Pakistan.
2. See Document 321.
3. See Document 325.
4. Telegram 58001 to London, March 9, transmitted a draft list of items to be prohibited. The items relate to centrifuge equipment and components. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0956)
5. An undated discussion paper, entitled “US Policy Toward Pakistan’s Nuclear Programs,” which was prepared in the Department of State for the March 9 meeting, reviewed the history and current intelligence on Pakistan’s suspected nuclear weapons project. The paper also outlined suggested courses of actions regarding the Symington Amendment and Pakistan’s nuclear program. Concluding with the issue of assurances in the event that Pakistan declared its intention to stop the transfer of nuclear technology, the paper argued that reliance on verbal assurances and intelligence alone would be insufficient. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Entry P–14, Lot 81D113, Box 22, Pakistan III)