Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

300. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, August 24, 1978, 0650Z

8289. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subj: Pakistani Views of Afghanistan Developments and Pak/US Relations. Ref: (A) Islamabad 7941;² (B) Islamabad 7508;³ (C) Islamabad 7688;⁴ (D) Islamabad 7726;⁵ (E) Islamabad 8095.⁶

1. Summary: Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz—in a lengthy discussion with Ambassador Dubs and me—provided us with some revealing views of the Pakistani attitude vis-a-vis the new Afghan regime. Shahnawaz sees the possibility of resurrecting a meaningful dialog between Kabul and Islamabad within the next few months and says the GOP is committed to test Kabul’s willingness. The FonSec considers US/Pakistani relations as a vital factor in any reestablishment of a modus vivendi with the Afghans as well as an important ingredient in regional stability. He seems optimistic that the reprocessing issue will soon be settled definitively thus making possible more real and visible US support for Pakistan. End summary.

2. I hosted a small dinner for Amb. Dubs August 21 attended by FonSec Shahnawaz, MFA Director General for Afghanistan Amir Usman, DCM and Acting Pol Couns. Shahnawaz had told me earlier he would welcome small affair limited to Pak and US participants to pursue meaningful discussions with Ambassador Dubs (ref A).

3. Shahnawaz and Usman showed an admirable depth of knowledge and sensitive understanding of the new Afghan regime and characterized relative power of various ministers and factions in manner very similar to our own perceptions.

—Shahnawaz said FonMin Amin is the “real power” in the DRA regime and Taraki is the senior “father figure,” (the latter being Dubs’ term fully agreed to by Shahnawaz).

—He said the Parchamist faction “exile” was by no means pervasive and that the Soviets permitted Taraki to purge certain elements as a domestic political necessity. The Soviets, however, maintain close relations with the Parchamists (both purged and in Afghanistan), probably regarding them as an alternative regime—almost a government in exile—for use if and when Taraki’s government should stumble.

4. Pak/Afghan relations. Shahnawaz reiterated his earlier remarks to me (ref B) about Afghan foreign policy being “two faced” with a critical quarrelsomeness in their public stance but a much more amenable attitude in private. He said the Pak Minister of Commerce visit to Kabul is now firming up and will take place either in the third week of September or in early October.

—If the Afghans want to talk about political matters Shahnawaz may accompany and the meetings would then provide an opportunity to test possibility of resuming dialogue on Durand Line interrupted by overthrow of Daoud.

—Shahnawaz believed that DRA would quickly come to appreciate (as had Daoud) security advantages for Afghanistan of a settlement with Pakistan, and would want to enter into serious negotiations. He expressed some doubt whether Soviets would permit DRA to reach an overall settlement with Pakistan unless it were achieved under Soviet auspices.

—Shahnawaz strongly reiterated his previous assurances to me that the GOP is doing all it can to discourage any trouble-making along Pak/Afghan frontier. He also indicated this assurance has been repeated to DRA. He noted that there are refugees coming into Pakistan who have to be accommodated here. He emphasized, however, that they are firmly instructed that no anti-DRA activity will be tolerated from Pak soil.

—The handling of the MiG–17 which strayed into Pakistan recently (ref C and D) was, according to Shahnawaz, a good signal to the DRA of Pakistan’s intentions regarding Afghanistan and that the DRA expressed sincere appreciation for all the GOP had done in effecting the smooth return of the aircraft and pilot. He mentioned, incidentally, that although the GOP invited the DRA Ambassador in Islamabad to sit in on the debriefing of the wayward pilot, Kabul did not permit him to participate.

—On the subject of the DRA’s representative here, I mentioned to Shahnawaz the knowledge in the diplomatic community of the intemperate remarks made to Italian Ambassador by DRA Ambassador Baryalai (ref E). Shahnawaz remarked that Baryalai was showing the effect of his Moscow indoctrination. The FonSec appeared to place no undue significance on the matter.

5. Pak/US relations. Shahnawaz lamented the general state of Pak/US relations. He said US support for Pakistan is the key to regional stability and—more specifically—to effecting a modus vivendi with the DRA. The overt lack of traditional US support, he continued, makes the GOP foreign policy considerably more difficult. I responded that a satisfactory resolution of the reprocessing issue is a necessary first step to a resumption of a more normal relationship.

—Shahnawaz illustrated the unsatisfactory state of US/Pak relations by citing the discussion I had with him concerning the US position on the Durand Line (ref A), complaining mildly that this was the only result of the serious discussion between CMLA Zia and Under Secretary Newsom.⁷ He also expressed Zia’s unhappiness with our position—not for its content but for its central reference to the 1956 communique of the defunct SEATO.⁸ Shahnawaz said he hoped we could somehow publicly state our support for the Durand Line without the unwelcome historical reference.

Hummel

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780346–0493. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Ankara, Colombo, Dacca, Kabul, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, Tehran, and CINCPAC.
2. In telegram 7941 from Islamabad, August 15, Hummel reported that he told Zia about an official statement by the U.S. Government which reaffirmed the Durand Line to be the boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Hummel also reported that on the following day he gave Shahnawaz a non-paper that cited a statement in a SEATO communiqué reaffirming the Durand Line as the boundary. Hummel noted that “Shahnawaz was puzzled about citation of SEATO rpt SEATO communique pointing out that SEATO is defunct.” Hummel emphasized that the content of the statement “was the important point.” Hummel explained to the Department that “I used occasion to extend to Shahnawaz an invitation to a small dinner I am giving for Amb Dubs on Aug. 21. He accepted and indicated it would be a good occasion for more in-depth discussions of Pak/Afghan situation. He also felt MinState Agha Shahi (who returns tonight from Rome) might want to attend this dinner to participate in talks with Amb Dubs.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780333–1145)
3. In telegram 7508 from Islamabad, August 2, Hummel reported his August 2 meeting with Shahnawaz, during which he shared the substance of Dubs’s discussion with Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister. Dubs reported that the Afghans were anxious to reestablish a meaningful dialogue with Pakistan. Shahnawaz “stated that GOP/DRA relations being conducted on two levels—on rhetorical level frictions emphasized but in private Afghans appear anxious for reestablishment of some sort of meaningful dialogue.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780317–0423)
4. In telegram 7688 from Islamabad, August 7, the Embassy reported on an Associated Press story about an Afghan Air Force MiG–17 that flew to Pakistan on August 7 and landed. The Embassy added that it “has no further information on possible defection.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780322–0771)
5. In telegram 7726 from Islamabad, August 8, the Embassy relayed Shahnawaz’s explanation to Hummel regarding the Afghan Air Force MiG–17 that landed in Pakistan on August 7 (see footnote 4 above). Shahnawaz maintained that the pilot had simply strayed off course and run low on fuel. Shahnawaz “stated flatly that pilot was not a defector and acknowledged that defection would have caused serious problems in Pak-Afghan relations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780323–1136)
6. In telegram 8095 from Islamabad, August 18, Hummel reported that, according to the Italian Chargé d’Affaires in Afghanistan, the Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan, Mahmoud Baryalai, “stated flatly and unmistakably that Pakistan’s dismemberment is inevitable. He predicted that agreement would be reached with India and possibly Iran by which Afgahns would get all areas west of Indus River as their rightful due, India would absorb most of the rest, and the Shah would probably be satisfied if he got Karachi.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780339–0426)
7. See Document 294.
8. The relevant portion of the SEATO Council communiqué of March 8, 1956, reads: “Insofar as these (Soviet) statements referred to ‛Pakhtoonistan’, the members of the Council severally declared that their governments recognized that the sovereignty of Pakistan extends up to the Durand Line, the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan.” (Quoted in telegram 203315 to Islamabad, August 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780328–1136)