Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

288. Report Prepared in the National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency¹

RP INBR 78–013

Washington, June 21, 1978

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW

[Omitted here are the title page, the table of contents, and the first two sections of the report.]

PAKISTAN: An Uninspiring Approach to Narcotics Control

Pakistani officials appear to have little interest in narcotics control. Addiction is not considered a significant domestic problem and Pakistan is not believed to have any obligation to use its limited resources, or deprive farmers of income in order to help solve the richer industrialized nations’ addiction problems. There have been notable exceptions, however, as in the case of the recent successful raid on a morphine/heroin conversion laboratory earlier this month, after much prompting from US representatives in Islamabad.²

The overall impetus for narcotics control comes from abroad. The Pakistanis need economic, diplomatic, and military support from Western nations—especially the US—and recognize that their narcotics policies are an important factor both in bilateral relations with individual Western nations and in Pakistan’s image in the West. Narcotics control is, however, only one of many issues in Pakistan’s foreign relations, and Islamabad’s willingness to pursue narcotics control policies is influenced by the willingness of other countries to support Pakistan on other issues. Declining support from the US and disagreements on problems such as Pakistan’s nuclear plans, however, have not been the major factor in Pakistani reluctance to pursue narcotics control vigorously. Far more important has been the internal situation.

The poppy-growing areas of Pakistan—the North-West Frontier Province and the adjoining Federally Administered Tribal Areas—are of secondary political and economic importance to any Pakistani government. The government—whether civilian or military—depends on support in the Punjab, and to a lesser extent the Sind, and little if any opium is produced in either province.

Nevertheless, the government in Islamabad has no desire to add to its difficulties by creating unnecessary problems in the historically troublesome NWFP.

[Omitted here is a map of the opium growing region of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran.]

Moreover, Islamabad’s concern with secessionist tendencies in the province and a belief that Afghanistan and the USSR would exploit any dissidence in an effort to break up Pakistan give additional weight to arguments against policies on narcotics, or any other issue, likely to antagonize the people on the Frontier. Officials at the provincial and local levels, who must carry out anti-narcotics programs, are much less likely to be concerned with the foreign policy benefits of narcotics control, and give much higher priority to maintaining peace.

The part of Pakistan in which opium is produced is generally divided into three areas:

—The tribal areas, some under federal administration, others under provincial control. The authority of Islamabad and Peshawar, the provincial capital, is very limited in this area. The enforcement of unpopular laws can require a military expedition, and tribal rebellions—although generally minor—are frequent.

—The “merged” areas, former princely states merged into the NWFP. Provincial and federal control is considerably greater in this part of the province, but still limited in many places.³

—The “settled” areas—those parts of the NWFP which have long been under central government control.

This division of the poppy-growing area, however, gives only a general picture of the degree of government authority. In some parts of the settled areas, for example, official authority is probably as weak as any place in the tribal areas. Moreover, law enforcement is complicated, even in places where the government is in full control, by the possibility of a reaction in a part of the province where central authority is weak. (CONFIDENTIAL)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

1. Source: Carter Library, Records of Peter Bourne, Special Assistant to the President for Health Issues, Subject Files, Box 41, Narcotics, Intelligence and Policy, 6/15/78–9/5/78 [CF. O/A 157]. Secret; Noforn; Nocontract.
2. In telegram 5761 from Islamabad, June 13, the Embassy reported on the June 13 raid by Pakistani forces on a morphine/heroin conversion laboratory in the village of Gandaf. The DEA officer stationed in Pakistan supplied the information and logistics for the raid. The Embassy commented: “It is apparent that the efforts of Ambassador Hummel and the Mission have finally paid off. The Ambassador’s constant pressuring of the CMLA staff into taking positive action against morphine/heroin conversion laboratories ultimately committed the GOP into a positive enforcement effort in the NWFP. We hope that this new impetus on their part will continue in future similar operations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780246–0898)
3. The unofficial “tribal areas” correspond closely to the official “Federally Administered Tribal Areas”; the “merged areas” to the official “Provincially Administered Tribal Areas.” [Footnote is in the original.]