270. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter1

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

3. Pakistan. It is becoming clear to Pakistan that it will not receive from the French the necessary transfers to complete its reprocessing plant. The French have indicated privately that they will not transfer to Pakistan technology that will produce weapons usable material, and instead will offer to study development of a more proliferation-resistant reprocessing technology.2

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The Zia Government does not appear to desire a confrontation with us over the reprocessing plant and seems inclined to minimize the political impact and publicity of the French decision. Acting Foreign Minister Agha Shahi admitted in a press backgrounder in Karachi recently that the reprocessing deal is not going well. He also told the press that there is no evidence to support former Prime Minister Bhutto’s claim of US interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs.

We are exploring various approaches, including aid decisions and assistance in meeting Pakistan’s energy needs, that might be viewed by Pakistanis as positive US steps to infuse our relations with a new, more cooperative tone.3

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

  1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 9/77. Secret. Carter wrote “Cy, J” at the top of the memorandum.
  2. In a November 12 memorandum, Vance informed Carter that “although the public position of their government remains unchanged, reports from our Embassies in Paris and Islamabad make it increasingly evident that France will not proceed with transfers for the Pakistani reprocessing plant. Furthermore, in private conversations with Gerry Smith and Joe Nye this week, Andre Giraud, head of the French Atomic Energy Commission, confirmed that France will not transfer to Pakistan technology that will produce weapons usable material. France will only offer to study with Pakistan the development of a safeguardable reprocessing technology.” (Ibid.) In a meeting with Carter on January 5, 1978, Giscard “said that he would not authorize the shipment of sensitive material to Pakistan but that this matter presented great difficulties for him internally. The Pakistanis are pressing for deliveries under the contract and he wished to avoid any explanation of this problem at the present time.” See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 361.
  3. In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “ok.”