269. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
10778. Subject: Reprocessing: Comments on Ambassador’s Conversation With General Zia, October 29. Ref: Islamabad 10710.2
1. As promised reftel, the following observations are offered on my conversation with Gen. Zia on reprocessing.
(a) If we or Washington had any lingering hopes that we could persuade Martial Law Administration to back off reprocessing issue, the hard line taken by Zia and his most senior civilian advisers should end them. I think there are two reasons for Zia’s inflexibility. The first is the internal political difficulty of changing past policies. But secondly, Gen. Zia and his advisers share the nearly unanimous opinion here that reprocessing offers the prospect of a fundamental gain in Pakistan’s search for security vis-a-vis India. This has become an accepted article of faith which will not be shaken by logical arguments to the contrary.
(b) We will not move the GOP on the reprocessing issue either by pressure or inducement, and if we are to succeed in obtaining cancellation of the contract, it will have to be through the French. I believe that a future civilian government here will prove as intractable as the present one.
(c) In dealing with the French, I hope we can continue to hammer home our conviction that Pakistan’s purpose in acquiring reprocessing is to obtain a nuclear explosive capability. Public statements by political leaders and newspaper editorials often address the reprocessing plant in terms of Pakistan’s security requirements. We will continue to keep the Dept. posted on these statements for whatever use can be made of them.
(d) Cancellation by the French will be a sharp blow to Pakistan’s self-esteem and to its sense of security. While there will be resentment against the French, the U.S. will be the principal object of widespread popular wrath and official dismay. We believe it is preferable to go through this difficult period while the Martial Law Administration is [Page 652] in power, rather than experiencing it with a new elected government a year hence. A new government with no responsibility for the reprocessing issue would start off with a cleaner slate in its dealings with the US and we would have fresh opportunities to rebuild our relationship. I hope this timing aspect can be borne in mind in urging the French towards settlement of this problem.
2. In our next approach to the French, I think it would be useful to brief the GOF on my conversation with Zia, emphasizing our conclusions that the GOP is unlikely to cooperate voluntarily in terminating the reprocessing contract and that the GOI purpose, shared by Zia, continues to be development of a nuclear explosives option.
3. Recommend this be repeated to Paris.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Cherokee; Nodis.↩
- Telegram 10710 from Islamabad, October 30, transmitted the details of Hummel’s October 29 meeting with Zia, Agha Shahi, and an MFA official referred to as “SecGen in Chief Bhulam Ishaq Khan.” Hummel reported that although he carried out instructions from the Department of State to discuss the nuclear fuel reprocessing issue (see Document 268), he “could not shake Pak determination to proceed with reprocessing contract.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077–2295)↩