266. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France1
243490. Cherokee for Ambs Hartman and Hummel only. Subject: Pakistani Reprocessing: Meeting Between Secretary and de Guiringaud.
1. De Guiringaud, accompanied by de Laboulaye, called on Secretary in New York to report on his latest meeting with Agha Shahi on Pakistan reprocessing plant. De Guiringaud recalled that when he had seen Agha Shahi in Paris September 8,2 he had proposed modifying the blueprint to change the proposed plant from a reprocessing to a co-processing plant, the final phase of which would produce reactor fuel but no weapons grade plutonium. At that time Agha Shahi had no satisfactory answer to the question of what Pakistan would do with plutonium produced by the reprocessing plant. He had simply reiterated that Pakistan had no nuclear weapons intentions and would [Page 646] accept any additional safeguards, had made much of the argument of discrimination between Pakistan and India, had thrown in arguments about South Africa, Brazil and Japan, and had stressed that Pakistan was the only state in the region resisting the Soviets. Agha Shahi had promised, however, to report the French proposal to his government for study and to provide a reply to the French in New York.
2. De Guiringaud said he had now had a meeting in New York with Agha Shahi (accompanied by the Pakistani Perm Rep plus two others). Agha Shahi had reported that the Pakistani interim military government had decided that the French proposal was not repeat not acceptable. While reiterating Pakistan’s peaceful intentions, he said Pakistan had contracted for a certain type of plant and was not prepared to change it. This time, de Guiringaud continued, Agha Shahi had an answer to the question of what it would do with the plutonium. He said it was needed for use in reactors Pakistan was building or planning to build. According to Agha Shahi, Pakistan had ordered a 600 megawatt light-water reactor, had a 180 megawatt reactor under construction and planned to order another one.
3. De Guiringaud told the Secretary this answer was not repeat not satisfactory. The reprocessing plant would produce 100 kilograms of plutonium per year. Pakistan would need six 600 megawatt reactors to use the reprocessing plant to full capacity. Furthermore, his experts had told him that the use of pure plutonium in such reactors has never been tried and is still in the developmental stage. It was therefore clear that the proposed reprocessing plant had no economic purpose.
4. De Guiringaud said it had been foolish to sign the agreement with Pakistan but this had taken place at a time when no one was focusing on the proliferation problem. He said that he and President Giscard want to get out of this contract; the question was how. When the French had said publicly they would keep their commitment to Pakistan, they had meant their commitment to build “a” plant.
5. De Guiringaud said France was not prepared to transfer any equipment for the reprocessing plant until Pakistan had signed other contracts with France (he mentioned an auto plant and aircraft specifically). Even then, he said, France would not permit the transfer of anything which was not available on the open market (e.g., pumps). No sensitive equipment would be transferred.
6. De Guiringaud said that the next play was now up to the United States. The military regime in Pakistan would face difficulty in a few weeks. France, he said, had no confidence in General Zia. In this connection, he recounted a conversation with Iranian Foreign Minister Khalatbary, who had expressed great concern about possible Indian and Soviet moves leading to the dismemberment of Pakistan. The Secretary said he had found both the Indian and the Afghan Foreign Ministers [Page 647] very concerned about Pakistan, fearing that things were heading for a mess but no one saw any way to turn things around.
7. De Laboulaye commented that since Pakistan needed help for its army, the U.S. had a means of influencing Pakistan. The Secretary noted that we have been continuing our military supply to Pakistan and have a substantial economic assistance program. We do have leverage, he said, and will have to take a hard look at how we deal with this problem.
8. De Guiringaud concluded by saying that France would make no moves without getting in touch with the U.S. He strongly requested that this conversation be most closely held. The Secretary assured him that it would be.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076–0684, N770006–0337. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. Sent for information Immediate to Islamabad. Drafted by Atherton; cleared in S/S–O; approved by Atherton. On October 10, this telegram was repeated to the White House. (Ibid.)↩
- See Document 261.↩