Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

265. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

New York, October 7, 1977, 2329Z

Secto 10065. For S/S–S. Subject: Secretary’s Conversation With Agha Shahi, Secretary General of the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 7.

1. Summary: Agha Shahi stressed Pakistan’s concerns about the President’s visit to India without a stopover in Pakistan. The visit, coupled with recent US statements on Indian preeminence in the sub-continent, could lead Delhi to conclude that the US/Pakistan connection had been weakened. Given Pakistan’s military vulnerability, he felt it important that the GOI understand that the US/Pakistan link remains strong. He reported that Pakistan had proposed a joint declaration by South Asian nations that they would not develop or use nuclear weapons. The Pakistanis also asked us to reconsider our position on a South Asian Nuclear Free Zone (SANFZ).² The Secretary strongly reaffirmed our belief in sovereign equality of nations and the importance we attach to our relations with Pakistan. He also reviewed the status of the negotiations on SALT and the Middle East. He undertook to reexamine our position on SANFZ. End summary.

2. The Secretary met with Agha Shahi, Secretary General of the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in New York on October 7. Shahi was accompanied by Pakistan Ambassador to the UN Iqbal Akhund, Ambassador Yaqub Khan and Mr. Naik from the Foreign Ministry. Under Secretary Habib, Assistant Secretary Atherton and Country Director Jane Coon were also present.

3. Agha Shahi conveyed to the Secretary greetings from General Zia and said the General looked forward to a visit by the Secretary whenever he was traveling to the sub-continent or at any other convenient time. The Secretary expressed appreciation, but regretted he would be unable to stop off during his forthcoming trip with the President.

4. In response to a question, the Secretary said that we had made progress on SALT and narrowed differences with the Soviets on some major issues. In his judgment these issues would be resolved although he was not sure how soon. He was firmly of the opinion that we would reach an agreement.

5. On the Middle East, the Secretary said we have been making some progress, slow progress, but we believe all parties want to enter into serious negotiations and go to Geneva. They are willing to find ways around the obstacles rather than magnify them. However, he does not minimize the problems which we will be confronting. Agha Shahi wished us every success and expressed gratification on the progress made.

6. Agha Shahi referred to the luncheon hosted by President Carter on October 5 for Asian Chiefs of State and Heads of UN delegations.³ He said he had reported to General Zia the President’s personal greetings and his remarks that General Zia was doing a fine job in the face of great difficulties. According to Shahi, when he said he was sorry that Pakistan would not have the pleasure of welcoming the President, the President responded that he could come back.

7. Shahi went on to say that he was sure that Ambassador Hummel had reported General Zia’s invitation to the President to stop over in Islamabad and the concerns of the people of Pakistan that this would be the first time an American President had visited India without stopping in Pakistan. He cited the long alliance relationship and underscored Pakistan’s concerns with both substance and the appearance of the visit, seeing it as heralding a new chapter in US foreign policy. The visit, coupled with recent US statements including that of our Ambassador in Delhi, are causing great anxiety.⁴ He also mentioned the exchange of letters between President Carter and Prime Minister Desai leading up to the visit,⁵ noting that Pakistan will have no way of knowing what transpires and therefore no way of correcting any slanted picture given by the Indian Prime Minister. Shahi felt it important that India not draw the wrong conclusions for the Presidential visit, namely that the US/Pakistan connection has been weakened. For 30 years the US has been Pakistan’s primary connection, with China the second important connection in more recent years. He noted Pakistan’s military vulnerability given the preoccupation of the armed forces with internal matters and their inability to rebuild adequately after our arms embargo. Indian policy toward Pakistan is now correct, but it is important that the GOI understand that the US/Pakistan tie remains strong. He also indicated anxiety over Soviet policies, noting that they seemed to be intervening internally in support of the PPP.

8. The Secretary referred to Agha Shahi’s comments about remarks by US officials where the word preeminence was used with respect to India. He wished to make it very clear that we believe in the sovereign equality of all nations. He felt, as does the President, that nations large and small can take leadership roles. There was no intention to single out India as a leader vis-a-vis Pakistan. We want no one to draw the conclusion that we do not regard a strong and vital relationship with Pakistan as important to us. We will make it clear to India that our relations with Pakistan are in no way weakened. Pakistan has our support and good will and we attach great importance to the relationship. The Secretary added that he wished there was some way to add another stop in the President’s itinerary, but this was not possible given the time constraints. We will do everything possible to see that the omission is not interpreted as downgrading our relations with Pakistan. Agha Shahi said he was grateful for the Secretary’s comments and would report them to General Zia.

9. Shahi went on the express concern about Indian nuclear capability given its independent fuel cycle. Pakistan has been convinced that India is going for a weapons option. Shahi said the GOP has proposed that the countries of South said [Asia] make a joint declaration that they would neither develop nor use nuclear weapons. There had been no positive response from the Gandhi government, but yesterday he raised the matter with Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee who assured him that Desai had strong moral convictions on this issue. Vajpayee undertook to raise the subject with the Prime Minister. (Naik later told us that Pakistan had approached other South Asian nations with the proposal including Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka—the latter before the change of government. He made a clear distinction between this proposal and both the SANFZ resolution and the suggested “no-war” pact.⁶) Ambassador Akhund raised the question of the US attitude toward the South Asia Nuclear Free Zone (SANFZ) and saw some inconsistencies in the US stance on non-proliferation and its position that the parties concerned should consult with each other. He asked that we reconsider our position since by supporting SANFZ we could thereby signal to the GOI our seriousness of purpose on non-proliferation.

10. The Secretary said that nuclear matters had been an area of difference with India; that we have been discussing them and would be discussing them during the visit. On SANFZ, the Secretary said he would look into the matter personally.

11. Shahi welcomed the President’s speech in the UNGA, noting particularly the section on arms sales.⁷ He hoped we would take into account indigenous production capabilities so that our policy does not leave some countries virtually defenseless. He thought we should give equal weight in our decisions to the extent to which some countries are accumulating arms. He referred to our decision on the A–7’s,⁸ noting that 100 A–7’s would scarcely give Pakistan the capability to conquer India. In any event, he hoped we would continue to act on pending Pakistan requests for arms. The Secretary said he understood there had been no interruption and the processing of requests was proceeding normally. Ambassador Yaqub Khan confirmed that this was substantially correct.

12. The Secretary thanked Shahi for the congratulatory letters on the Panama Canal Treaty,⁹ and also spoke highly of Ambassador Akhund’s leadership of the Group of 77. The Secretary said he had a great personal interest in the North/South dialogue and he would be picking up discussions soon with Jamaica. An important UNCTAD meeting is coming up and we must continue to devote a great deal of attention to this.¹⁰

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770367–0494. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to the Department of State, Colombo, Dacca, Kathmandu, and New Delhi. Vance was in New York to attend the 32nd United Nations General Assembly.
2. See footnote 4, Document 82.
3. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter hosted a working lunch with Asian Foreign Ministers and Heads of Delegations to the UN from 1:12 to 2:18 p.m. on October 5 at USUN. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)
4. From a September 26 interview with Goheen, the New York Times reported: “For one thing, he said, the United States has now acknowledged that ‛India is clear and away the pre-eminent nation on the subcontinent,’ and has stopped trying to treat Pakistan as India’s equal, which ‛was a terrific cause of friction between India and ourselves. Whether you look at it in geographical terms, in military terms or in economic terms, India and Pakistan really aren’t competitors anymore, so that the game we played for many years of trying to balance one off against the other, greatly influenced by concern about Russia—that’s a dead game’.” (“Goheen Sees U.S. Ties With India Improving,” New York Times, September 27, 1977, p. 13)
5. See Documents 80 and 84.
6. In telegram 3453 from Islamabad, April 9, the Embassy informed the Department: “In case anyone has been holding his breath, we must report that PM Bhutto has rejected Indian Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee’s recent renewal of India’s long-standing offer of a no-war pact. Speaking to newsmen at Lahore airport April 8, Bhutto stated that without the settlement of the Kashmir issue or the provision for a self-executing or mandatory machinery, a no-war pact would mean acceptance of the status-quo. As Bhutto noted, this position is a reiteration of a line the Paks have consistently taken toward the no-war pact offer.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770124–0676)
7. In his October 4 address to the 32nd United Nations General Assembly, Carter said: “For our part, the United States has now begun to reduce its arms exports. Our aim is to reduce both the quantity and the deadliness of the weapons that we sell. We have already taken the first few steps, but we cannot go very far alone. Nations whose neighbors are purchasing large quantities of arms feel constrained to do the same. Supplier nations who practice restraint in arms sales sometimes find that they simply lose valuable commercial markets to other suppliers.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II, p. 1719) The full text of Carter’s address is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 56.
8. See footnote 4, Document 251.
9. Not found.
10. Telegram Secto 10063 from USUN, October 7, reported that at the end of their October 7 meeting, Shahi asked to speak to Vance alone, with only Yaqub Kahn present. Shahi raised with Vance the nuclear reprocessing issue, noting that it had “become such a political issue in Pakistan that the interim government cannot change the Pakistani position.” Shahi said Pakistan was prepared “to do anything to show that it had no nuclear weapons intentions.” However, when Vance “asked if this meant that Pakistan was prepared to accept full scope safeguards,” Shahi did not answer and shifted the conversation to Indian nuclear policy. Later, when Vance asked about Pakistani-French relations, Shahi replied that “the French were delaying implementation of the reprocessing agreement, claiming that they have certain administrative problems. In any case, he said, they are not shipping anything to Pakistan.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072–1992, N770006–0296)