213. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Indo-US Relations; Afghanistan (U)
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Thomas P. Thornton, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council
- K.R. Narayanan, Ambassador of India
- S. Haksar, Minister, Embassy of India
Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting with the hope that Indo-American relations would continue to improve. He pointed out that the Carter Administration has done all that it could to move these relations in the right direction. In this, the personal correspondence between President Carter and the two Indian Prime Ministers was a major factor. The President found this correspondence extremely important to him; he was very much impressed and influenced by what was contained in these very personal exchanges. (C)
Brzezinski pointed out that the United States has been attempting recently to improve its strategic position. Unfortunately, we face the traditional dilemma that physical power is still an extremely important determinant of global affairs. Despite this situation, however, we have sought to respect the new central reality in the world. That is, the Euroentric age has come to an end; the countries of the Third World are now in the majority, and there is a new distribution of economic and political power throughout the world. Relations between India and the United States are particularly crucial in this context, since India is a leader, indeed, even the leader of the Third World. We sincerely hope that we have made significant progress in our relations with India. (C)
We are convinced that we must keep the East-West confrontation out of the Third World. For instance, our response to Cuban and Soviet activities in Ethiopia and Afghanistan is not an attempt on our part to export East-West tensions into the Third World, rather, to prevent their spread. We and India share an interest in this. The prospects for world peace will be poisoned if East-West conflicts are exported to the Third World. (C)
[Page 535]We have no interest in establishing a position in Afghanistan. I would like to point out that the presence of American ships in the Indian Ocean, which are trampling on nobody, can by no means be equated to the presence of Soviet tanks and helicopters in Afghanistan which are killing Afghans. We would, indeed, be happy to diminish our presence in the Indian Ocean region if the Soviets leave Afghanistan and if our access to Persian Gulf oil is assured. Obviously, however, we cannot accept the idea of being co-guarantors with the Soviet Union of this access. They are the ones who would be most likely to cut it off. In this regard, we are very impressed by what President Reddy said recently.2 We hope that India will use its moral and political influence to get the Soviets to leave Afghanistan. As I said before, we are not seeking a special position in Afghanistan, and we recognize that the Soviets do have a special concern there. (C)
I would also hope that India will do what it can to prevent a Soviet invasion of Poland. This would be the end of detente and would have world-wide repercussions. There would probably be a world-wide boycott, which we would help organize, by trade unions directed against Soviet goods. Perhaps it might even lead to “U.S.-Chinese military relations.” We will not exploit the Polish situation for our advantage, but we also will not be passive. (C)
Ambassador Narayanan replied that Prime Minister Gandhi had appreciated the personal exchange of correspondence with President Carter, and she had mentioned to him specifically when he made his call on her how pleased she had been with this. (C)
Ambassador Narayanan said that India is very aware that the United States has done much to improve Indo-US relations in the last four years, although obviously there are some points of difference. We recognize this period as one of very significant forward movement. (C)
We also appreciate your view that East-West conflicts should not intrude into the Third World. This is indeed part of India’s rationale of non-alignment—that the Third World should not become involved in the Cold War. This is important to India for two reasons. First, in terms of simple self-interest, India does not want this to happen since it wants to concentrate on its own development. Second, a confrontation between the two superpowers has become too direct and unavoidable. Thus, the existence of a non-aligned group makes a contribution to world peace. We believe that world peace ultimately depends on the reaching of a modus vivendi between the U.S. and the USSR. Neither of these two superpowers can put the other down. It is for this reason [Page 536] that we relate nonalignment to peaceful coexistence and are pleased that you agree that the Third World must remain free from Cold War conflicts. (C)
India recognizes Soviet action in Afghanistan as a major historical event. Indeed, India is more directly threatened perhaps than any other country. We know very well that in the past invasions have come into India through Afghanistan. We do not know, however, how to deal with this problem. (C)
Up until the Mughal period the military threat to the sub-continent was from the North through Afghanistan. After that, it came from the sea as the Portuguese, Dutch, British and others conquered India from that direction. This is the latest memory that we have—these attacks from the sea. In addition, there was also a brief threat from China in 1962, and of course we have had three wars from Pakistan. (C)
Therefore, our assessment of the threat involves all four of these problems. That is the reason why we are so keen on creating a zone of peace on the Indian Ocean. These two hundred years of colonial history are deep in the Indian mind. (C)
We know conceptually that there is a threat from Central Asia. But the present generation of Indians has never experienced this threat. The Soviet action in Afghanistan has summoned this memory from the depths of history, and we are beginning to take it into account. (C)
At the very beginning we tried to talk to Pakistan in this context. The quarrel between India and Pakistan has never been in our interest, and is even less so in the post-Afghan period. We have tried to bury the hatchet with them and form a basis of cooperation, in terms of Indo-Pakistani policy, not military cooperation or anti-Soviet cooperation. We have, of course, no interest in being anti-Soviet. (C)
Dr. Brzezinski concluded the meeting by saying that more discussions of this type are needed. We do not have these kinds of discussions often enough with other governments—not just India. Usually we talk only when we have something specific to negotiate. There is a great need to share our perspectives and concerns with each other. It was good of you to make time for me so that we could have this talk, even though it was only brief. (C)
Thereupon the meeting ended at 5:25 p.m.
The Indian side had pictures taken at the beginning of the meeting.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 60, Chron: 12/20–23/80. Confidential. Drafted on December 22. The meeting took place in Brzezinski’s office.↩
- Reference is to Reddy’s comments in his December 8 speech; see footnote 2, Document 210.↩