210. Memorandum From the White House Situation Room to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Additional Information Items
Indian Handling of the Brezhnev Visit: Indian Foreign Secretary Sathe [less than 1 line not declassified] that he thought Brezhnev’s visit to India would be viewed as a turning point in New Delhi’s relations with Moscow because it represented the first time India publicly displayed its disenchantment with Soviet actions in Afghanistan.2 According to Sathe, India has taken this stance for three reasons:
—Gandhi believes world opinion, particularly in Asia, expects India to stand up to the Soviet Union and insist on a serious commitment for Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan.
—Up to this point, India’s position as a leading nonaligned country has been eroded by its compliance with Soviet actions in Afghanistan.
—India wants to repair its relations with ASEAN which were damaged by New Delhi’s recognition of the Heng Samrin regime in July 1980. (S)
[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily CIA Brief File, Box 33, 12/9/80–12/12/80. Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.↩
- Telegram 25696 from New Delhi, December 9, reported on Brezhnev’s visit to India December 8–11. According to the report, the visit was marked by demonstrations and hostility from the Indian press, which was a “striking departure from the usually uncritical press coverage of high level Soviet visits.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800586–0902) Telegram 25697 from New Delhi, December 9, noted Reddy’s criticism of Soviet foreign policy in his December 8 banquet speech, quoting his statement to Brezhnev: “We in India remain opposed to any form of intervention, covert or overt, by outside forces in the internal affairs of the region.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800586–0891)↩