199. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter1
[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]
2. Indian Reaction to Congressional Committee Action on Tarapur: The Government of India’s public reaction to the negative Tarapur votes was careful and restrained, and paralleled the positions taken with us privately.2 In a press statement, the Indians reiterated that the votes were “domestic processes of decision-making within the US.”3 India was concerned only with the continued implementation of the 1963 Indo-US Agreement. This, they said, “would require the immediate shipment of the already delayed consignments of fuel,” a point designed to avoid any suggestion that India has accepted in advance the compromise agreed to with Senator Church.4 The statement also expressed appreciation for your efforts.5
The Committees’ votes got heavy press play, reflecting the prominence the Tarapur issue has so long been given. Editorial reaction, gloomy about the eventual outcome, reflected a sense of weariness and frustration with our lengthy administrative/legislative processes. (C)
[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State): 9/80. Secret. Carter initialed the top of the memorandum.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 197. In telegram 19029 from New Delhi, September 11, Blood relayed Gonsalves’s plan for responding to the Indian press regarding the negative vote in the SFRC. Gonsalves told Blood that “two essential elements of their position would be (1) the legislative process is an internal matter for the US, and (2) the GOI continues to believe that the USG is obliged under the terms of the Tarapur agreement to proceed with the shipment.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800432–0915)↩
- Muskie was quoting from the MEA press statement that Blood relayed to the Department of State in telegram 19155 from New Delhi, September 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800433–0287)↩
- See footnote 3, Document 197. According to telegram 240035 to Bombay and New Delhi, September 10, Coon informed Haksar that Muskie conceded to Church’s request for assurances regarding the second shipment. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800430–0796) The assurances were based on the Nye compromise; see footnote 2, Document 196.↩
- In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “Pursue analysis of the peremptory shipment option.”↩