Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

180. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, April 25, 1980

SUBJECT

• Fuel Supply for Indian Nuclear Reactor—Decision Memorandum (S)

At Tab A is an interagency paper setting forth several options for you to consider regarding further supply of enriched uranium for the Indian nuclear power plant at Tarapur.² The first two pages provide a concise background, and a number of options are then treated at some length. This covering memorandum summarizes the options. (S)

The options cluster around three poles: A decision to terminate supply now; agreement to approve one or two of the pending export requests (with several variants); and further procrastination of the issue. (S)

NSC supports the first option in the interagency memo, an immediate cutoff, based on the fact that the Indians are unwilling to provide us with assurances that, in the event of a break in the contract, they would not reprocess our spent fuel or use it for nuclear explosives. This is the option most compatible with our non-proliferation policies and has the virtue of getting the agony over with quickly. It will, however, cause serious trouble with India at a critical time and will probably mean loss of controls over the spent fuel already in storage at Tarapur. (There is no way we can secure Indian agreement to maintain those controls except by amending the Non-Proliferation Act or continuing to waive its full-scope safeguards requirement.)³ (S)

Most agencies want to provide one or both of the pending licenses but there are several views on how to go about this. (S)

State and JCS⁴ prefer Option 2A, to seek NRC/Congressional approval of both licenses but make no commitment or decision as to whether we will try to continue the supply relationship beyond that (i.e., seek revision of the NNPA to India’s benefit). This would postpone, for some months at least, the negative effects of an immediate cutoff but it will only defer the evil day. There is also no assurance that the NRC or Congress will go along with us since we will not have any credible prospect of long-term control over spent fuel. It will also, of course, cast doubt on our seriousness of purpose concerning non-proliferation and be seen by the Pakistanis as discrimination in favor of India on nuclear matters.⁵ (S)

Defense favors Option 2B, approval of both licenses but would inform the Indians that there is no prospect of future supply beyond that. Possible benefits would include a less acrimonious break than a full and immediate cut-off and greater receptivity in Congress than a policy with no clear end in sight. It is doubtful, however, that this variant would cut much ice with the Indians, and it would provide more nuclear material under conditions virtually assuring the loss of US non-proliferation controls.⁶ (S)

OSTP (Option 2C) would remedy one of the problems in the above options by seeking approval of both licenses backed up by a decision, if necessary, to seek amendment of the NNPA. This would certainly be the most beneficial for Indo-US relations and would permit us to tell Congress and the NRC that we had prospects for maintaining control over the spent fuel because the contract would remain intact. It is, of course, another question whether the Congress—or you—would want to amend the NNPA and make a major shift in the full-scope safeguards aspect of our non-proliferation policy.⁷ (S)

The proposal for further procrastination (Option 3) is supported by DOE. The main argument in its favor is that something may turn up if we wait long enough. In fact, though, nobody expects anything to turn up, and dragging out the uncertainty is inadvisable. In addition, the Indians have just told us that they want a quick answer.⁸ In the light of this most recent development, I do not believe that this is a viable option.⁹ (S)

ACDA would approve only the first pending license with no future commitment. (This option was not included in the interagency paper.) India’s need for the fuel covered by the second license is not pressing and this partial stringing-out of the [omission in the original—decision?] will give us more time to see whether Mrs. Gandhi plans a PNE. These are marginal benefits over some other options, counterbalanced by the marginal disadvantages compared to still others.¹⁰ (S)

The fundamental issue that you must decide, of course, is between the integrity of a global non-proliferation policy that is already under severe pressure, and our relations with India—a country with which you have sought close ties and is now of special importance in the light of developments in Southwest Asia. The effects in Pakistan, both for our political relationship and the Pakistani nuclear program, must also be weighed, since Pakistan would see any course of action except Option 1 as discrimination in favor of India. (S)

Unfortunately, there is no weight of opinion behind any option. I would suggest that you focus on the NSC, State/JCS, and OSTP options as the most serious contenders. (S)

Action Requested

That you indicate below your preference among the various options:¹¹

End fuel supply now (NSC) (# 1)

Provide two pending shipments

—and make no decision or commitment as to the future (State, JCS) (# 2A)

—and make clear that there will be no further supply (DOD) (# 2B)

—and be prepared, as necessary, to indicate preparedness to amend the NNPA (OSTP) (# 2C)

Put off making a decision (DOE) (# 3)

Provide only the first pending shipment (ACDA)>

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 79, PRC 137, 4/9/80, Non-Proliferation and Tarapur (I). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.
2. Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “Tarapur Fuel” that outlined options to address the nuclear fuel supply issue. Option 1 called for termination of nuclear cooperation with India. Option 2A called for approving the first shipment, supporting the second, and leaving open the issue of future shipments. Option 2B called for approving the first shipment, supporting the second, and indicating to the Indian government that there would be no further fuel shipments in the future. Option 2C called for proceeding with the two pending licenses and “seeking a change in the NNPA to make full-scope safeguards an ‛important goal’ rather than a requirement.” Option 3 called for continuing to defer a decision on the pending licenses, but resuming a broader bilateral dialogue on regional nuclear issues.
3. In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “no.”
4. After the abbreviation JCS, Carter drew a line to the margin above the text and wrote: “G Smith.”
5. In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “no,” crossed it out, and then wrote a question mark.
6. In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “no.”
7. In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “no.”
8. Telegram 8101 from New Delhi, April 22, reported that Gonsalves presented Goheen with an aide-mémoire regarding delays in fuel shipments for Tarapur, calling them “wholly unjustified and inordinate.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800200–0332)
9. In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “no.”
10. In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “?”
11. Carter did not select any of the options; he wrote at the top of the first page of the memorandum: “Zbig—Poll others between 2A & ACDA—Expedite results to me. J.”