Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

157. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, December 5, 1979, 2:15–2:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Minutes: PRC Meeting on Indian Nuclear (C)

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary
  • Mrs. Jane Coon, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
  • Les Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Oceans and Internat. Environmental & Scientific Affairs

• Defense

  • W. Graham Claytor, Jr., Deputy Secretary
  • Robert Murray, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Near Eastern, African & South Asian Affairs

• Energy

  • John Deutch, Deputy Secretary
  • Amb. Holsey Handyside, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Internat., Nuclear & Technical Programs

• OMB

  • Dan Taft, Deputy Associate Director, Special Studies

• ACDA

  • George Seignious, Director
  • Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy Director

• JCS

  • Lt. General John Pustay

• OSTP

  • Ben Huberman, Assoc. Director, Nat’l. Security & Internat. & Space Affairs

• White House

  • Amb. Henry Owen

• NSC

  • Thomas P. Thornton

Christopher. The circumstances have changed considerably on this matter following the many postponements that we have had.² The discussions that Gerry Smith had in Delhi³ show that none of the three options presented in the paper is likely to be acceptable to the Indians.⁴ This is especially true in the campaign period in India. Therefore, we come to the discussion of a very stark question—whether to cut off our nuclear relationship with India, or to go ahead with it at whatever cost might be necessary. I believe that the election results could considerably alter both the possibilities for compromise and the costs to us. But I would like to hear your comments now on whether we should fulfill our agreements with the Indians. (S)

Seignious. I would like to make three points: First, we should not take a risk in our relations with an important country in that part of the world unless we have to. Secondly, we should sound out the Congress thoroughly on this matter. Third, if we want to grant the first license, we must put the new government of India on very clear notice as to what our legal position is. We do not expect full-scope safeguards, but we must have evidence that they are proceeding toward that goal. Therefore, I pretty clearly oppose reneging on an obligation that we have incurred. But the new Indian government must agree to move in our direction. (S)

Christopher. What if they won’t do so? (U)

Seignious. We should get three minimum conditions when we agree to the second package (i.e. an agreement to supply the material requested under the second license, subject to negotiation). First, we need perpetual IAEA safeguards on all U.S.-supplied fuel. Secondly, the Madras and CANDU reactors should be put under safeguards. Third, the Indians should give us private reassurances on the matter of transfer of nuclear technology and they should make a public statement that it is not the policy of their government to conduct nuclear explosions. (S)

Owen. Why not hold up the first license to wait for the new government? (U)

Seignious. We would like to lay a framework for cooperation prior to the election and then give the new government ample warning as to our position. (S)

Christopher. I feel that with the election only a month away, there really isn’t much chance of our doing anything useful at all in that period. I would wait for a new government before we attempt to do anything. (S)

Owen. Jerry Oplinger cannot be here today and I would like to present his views. He feels that we have no option but to cease cooperation with India. The Indians have had plenty of opportunities to cooperate with us, and the President has made clear his views in his conversation with Vajpayee.⁵ To continue cooperation would damage our non-proliferation goals. Speaking on my own behalf I would prefer to go in the direction of continued cooperation but do not want to do anything until after the elections. If on the other hand we were to follow Oplinger’s course then maybe we should inform the Indians now of our decision. (S)

Claytor. I agree. We should do nothing now. We do not have to ship anything before March 1980. We have created a bad situation in our relationship because we are backing out of a contract. They could cause us a lot of trouble and take it, for instance, to the World Court. (S)

Coon. I do not believe that the elections will make much difference one way or the other. Probably Mrs. Gandhi will come out as the leader of a coalition. She will not accept full-scope safeguards nor will any other government. They will not be likely to agree to most of the conditions that we would put. If we hold off on issuing a license and link it to specific performance, Mrs. Gandhi will see this as a personal attack on her. My preference would be to grant one license now without any negotiations or conditions—or at least set the process in motion for the granting of the license. (S)

THORNTON. That, however, leaves you with the same problem when you approach Mrs. Gandhi about the second license and try to negotiate conditions for that. (S)

OWEN. Congress would go through the roof if we did that. (S)

COON. I also would argue that this is not the time to have still another contentious issue in our relations with one of the countries of Southwest Asia. (S)

DEUTCH. I think we should wait for January as you (Christopher) and Henry Owen suggest. Then however I would favor Oplinger’s point of view. I would also like to point out that the basic options in the State Department paper simply are not implementable in terms of realities here in the United States. (S)

THORNTON. I would want to emphasize the basic issue: We must have some idea of which direction we want to go and recognize the fact that if we are going to have continued cooperation with India we are going to have to make some major concessions in our policy. (S)

OWEN. You mean we could, for instance, go the route of continuing waivers. (S)

KEENY. What would the impact of a move now be on the Indian elections scene? (S)

CHRISTOPHER. If you do something for the Indians now it could easily cause a misunderstanding. We would be seen as meddling in favor of the present government. (S)

OWEN. Everybody agrees then that we should not do anything until after the elections. But if we are unable to negotiate full-scope safeguards which way should we go? (S)

CHRISTOPHER. I would favor a waiver. (S)

OWEN. I tend to favor continuing cooperation, but we don’t have to decide that now. (S)

CHRISTOPHER. India might be extremely uncooperative. I, however, would go a long way to find a means of working us out of reneging on a moral commitment. (S)

DEUTCH. Bear in mind that the Indians might engage in other activities, such as conducting nuclear explosions, which would cause us difficulties. (S)

PUSTAY. I realize this is not a meeting about Pakistan but shouldn’t we also think of the implications that our actions have for our policy with regard to Pakistan? (S)

CHRISTOPHER. We would certainly try our best to get Indian agreement on non-development of nuclear weapons and no further nuclear tests. (S)

OWEN. Mrs. Gandhi also might be beastly on a whole range of other issues. (S)

CHRISTOPHER. We should however hear more in favor of the case for doing something within the next month. (S)

COON. I think it is very unlikely that we will be able to negotiate anything before we give the first license that will sell with Congress. What we are trying to do is to buy time to get over the first difficult period of our relationship with the new government. (S)

CHRISTOPHER. But if we could grant one license to the new government, would that not help? (S)

COON. Perhaps, but the fact that Mrs. Gandhi is likely to be leading that new government will make it difficult for us to get Congressional approval. (S)

DEUTCH. I don’t see that the problem with Congress is as severe as you are portraying it. Most of the opinion on the Hill is in favor of being more forthcoming. It is only a few Congressmen with special interests that will cause trouble. (S)

BROWN. That may be true but those few key people will give the cue for the other members. We certainly don’t see any ground swell of opinion for doing anything for the Indians. (S)

DEUTCH. I just don’t agree with you. There will be plenty of other nuclear issues to occupy the attention of the critics. (S)

CHRISTOPHER. Let me summarize the consensus: First, we should not grant a license during the elections. Second, most of the members of the PRC want to engage the new government and continue cooperation;⁶ there is, however, a minority that does not think it useful to try to do this. Third, we may be able to decide these matters better in the second week of January. We do not want to chart a course for the President at this point. (S)

SEIGNIOUS. We should also take note of the advantage of granting the first license without putting any heavy demands on the Indians for reciprocity. (S)

OWEN. Let’s look at that question again in January. (S)

THORNTON. It would also be helpful for that meeting to have worked out some more specific ideas as to the kinds of proposals that we could put before the Indians and the cost that we are willing to pay. (S)

CHRISTOPHER. We also should get a much better idea of Congressional attitudes. (S)

Thereupon the meeting concluded at 2:45 p.m. (U)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Box 45, Proliferation, India, 12/79–1/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. The PRC meeting was originally scheduled for November 14, rescheduled for November 21, and rescheduled again for December 5.
3. See Document 156.
4. See footnote 2, Document 155.
5. See Document 139.
6. In the Summary of Conclusions of this PRC meeting, Carter underlined the following portion of the section summarizing this point: “to continue cooperation, on some basis other than Indian acceptance of full scope safeguards,” and wrote in the left-hand margin next to it: “better, I believe.” Carter also wrote: “ok, J” at the top of the Summary of Conclusions. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 45, Proliferation: India: 12/79–1/80) In a December 12 memorandum, Brzezinski asked Carter to clarify what he meant by the comment “better, I believe.” Carter wrote on the memorandum: “I underlined pertinent words. This is a fallback position, preferable to terminating relationship. J.” (Ibid.)