156. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1
22136. For the Secretary from Gerald Smith and Ambassador Goheen. Subject: Bilaterals With India on Tarapur.
1. Secret–Entire text.
2. Nothing we heard from Sethna and company2 changed opinion contained in New Delhi 21671,3 which we believe should be the line any US decisional efforts should try to follow.
[Page 413]3. Only step that should be considered at this time is prompt issuance by President of Executive Order granting the first license. This could be justified on basis that:
—This license has been before the NRC for over a year, and further delay would be excessive;
—Since this license was filed more than a year before the deadline specified in Section 128,4 this order does not involve a waiver of that section, or any diminution of our strong interest in achieving comprehensive full scope safeguards as a norm of nuclear supply;
—The withholding of this license would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of US non-proliferation objectives since it
A. Would risk losing safeguards and other rights we now have over the US origin nuclear materials now in India;
B. Could reduce the prospects for discussions over the longer term on a constructive outcome to the current impasse; and
C. Could reduce the prospects for constructive Indian participation in discussion of measures designed to reduce the risk of a nuclear arms race in South Asia.
4. I recommend against further discussions of other solutions before the Indian elections. My hunch is that Indian “stonewall” position taken by Sethna December 3 reflected concern of possible leaks during up-coming mudslinging phase of pre-election period and that similar treatment would be given to any further talks before the elections.
5. It does not rpt not appear feasible to obtain, in connection with first license, binding Indian assurance that safeguards and non-explosive use commitments regarding our fuel would survive cut-off of nuclear supply.
6. All members of delegation concur in foregoing recommendation, since they believe in the time thus gained changes may develop which could be more promising for a long-term solution.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–2667, N790009–0580. Secret; Immediate; Niact; Nodis.↩
- Telegram 22137 from New Delhi, December 4, reported Smith’s December 3 meeting in New Delhi with Sethna, Vellodi, Gonzalves, and other Indian officials. Accompanying Smith were Goheen, Kirk, Van Doren, Nosenzo, Bengelsdorf, and Courtney. Smith began the discussion, which focused on the Tarapur refueling issue, by noting that he had hoped that he would have “authoritative instructions for this session, but that the meeting planned to develop such instructions had fallen victim to the Iranian crisis.” As a result, U.S. officials could only “begin informal exploration of the possibilities—on a personal, non-authoritative basis.” During the meeting, Indian officials “took hard line but said they would look at the ideas” put forth by U.S. officials. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790559–0348)↩
- In telegram 21671 from New Delhi, November 28, Smith conveyed his reaction to the options under consideration for the December 5 PRC meeting (see footnote 2, Document 155). Smith considered “none of the options realistic. Recommend first license be issued as soon as possible (in context of prospective negotiation looking to safeguards continuance).” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790547–0831)↩
- Reference is to Section 128 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.↩