150. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- The Charan Singh Government: Implications for the U.S.
It is difficult to say much about a government led by a man who has no known foreign policy views and has only once been out of India (last year, to Sri Lanka). Also, Charan Singh is on such a tenuous base that he probably won’t last long—and even while he does last, will find it difficult to take substantial policy initiatives. (C)
The overall prospect, then, is for stagnation in foreign affairs. There are, however, some likely trends that would develop if Singh stays in office for a while. Even if his stay is short, we may encounter some of the manifestations. In any event, we should start thinking how we want to handle a Charan Singh government. (C)
The Carter-Desai period has marked a high-point in recent Indo-U.S. relations. It is unlikely that relations will be as good under the new Indian government. (S)
The first issue that the new government will face with us is Tarapur. Assuming that we will be unable to make concessions to the Indians, [Page 400] we will be off to a bad start indeed. The start will be still worse if, as is likely, Singh is interested in a nuclear weapons option. (S)
The high value that Prime Minister Desai attached to his relationship to President Carter will cease to be a factor. While we will want to establish good relations with Singh, they are unlikely to be anywhere near as warm. Singh, in any case, is little interested in foreign policy. (C)
The new government will want to differentiate itself from the Desai era. Since Desai was popularly perceived as being pro-American, there will be impetus in the other direction. Indeed, this impetus would be there in almost any event since Desai is probably unique among current Indian leaders in his positive attitude to the U.S., mistrust of the U.S.S.R., nuclear issues, and commitment to moral values in foreign policy. (S)
Domestically, the government has shifted somewhat toward the left. This could mean a still chillier climate for U.S. business and investment. (C)
India’s relations with its neighbors may also worsen somewhat. Desai bent over backwards (as seen from India’s viewpoint) to accommodate the neighbors. The new regime is more nationalistic and less likely to be accommodating. (C)
These, however, are matters of degree. A dust-up over Tarapur would have happened in almost any event. The Carter-Desai relationship was productive more in tone than in substance. Desai, too, recognized the importance, perhaps even primacy, of India’s ties to the U.S.S.R. (S)
Above all, India’s foreign policy options are not all that extensive, limited by its own national interests and the political environment within which it operates. Broad Indian foreign policy lines have been entrenched since the 1950s and there is no strong pressure for change. (C)
The major difficulty for our relationship may be that marginal Indian policy changes (e.g., on recognition of Kampuchea) could become major issues in a relationship that does not have all that many real major issues. These could build into the familiar circularity of complaints and counter-complaints that poisoned our relations in earlier years. (S)
We cannot prevent this unilaterally from happening. Also, while we may need to show a bit of tolerance to a new government in India, there is no reason for us to bend over very far backward. (C)
Our initial moves should be twofold:
1. Goheen should seek early appointments with the Prime Minister and foreign minister and set forth in clear detail our agenda of concerns—drawn in part from the Carter-Desai correspondence, but add [Page 401] ing any issues that we think may be about to become troublesome. At least, we will have made clear to the Indians where our sore toes are. If they step on them, it will be their own fault. It should go without saying, however, that this list should be a reasonable one—emphasizing those four or five issues that could play back with seriously negative effect into our overall relationship. Vance should restate this material when he meets with the leader of the Indian delegation to the UNGA in October. (C)
2. Once it is clear that Singh has some longevity (probably after the mid-August resumption of Parliament), the President should write to him, recalling his correspondence with Morarji and hoping that a similar candid relationship can be established. This letter should not, however, delve into specifics unless there is some especially important issue on the platter. (C)
3. Somewhat later, if Singh looks well entrenched, we should make a direct, high-level contact. Around December-January, a senior American (Vance, Brzezinski, or even Mondale, as part of a larger tour) should visit India or the Indian new foreign minister should be invited here. (A heads-of-state meeting is not recommended.) (C)
For some time we should be careful in not overreacting to Indian foreign policy moves. It is a new government and will need some time. If they do something that we have warned them about and directly affects the U.S., we should of course hit them hard. If, however, the issue is not central to our relationship (e.g., Kampuchean recognition), we should seek to keep it in proportion. (S)
Until Gerry Smith completes his study,2 we aren’t sure where he will come out on the Tarapur question. We will, however, have to move fairly quickly, once we have a policy. Barring some feasible ground for a waiver, we will probably have to kill off the Indians’ hopes for even the pending license. With Desai gone, there is hardly any justification for going through with it. We probably should, however, go through the process of determining that the new government has no give on the issue. (C)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 10/78–12/79. Secret. A stamped notation indicates that Brzezinski saw the memorandum.↩
- See Document 156.↩