Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

139. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 24, 1979, 11–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Foreign Minister Vajpayee of India

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Robert Goheen, U.S. Ambassador to India
• Thomas Thornton, National Security Council
• Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Foreign Minister of India
• Jagat S. Mehta, Foreign Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs
• N.A. Palkhivala, Ambassador of India
• P.P. D’Souza, Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs
• A.B. Gokhale, Minister, Embassy of India

The President and Foreign Minister Vajpayee spent a few minutes in the Oval Office for picture-taking and Vajpayee gave the President a letter from Prime Minister Desai.² They then joined the rest of the party in the Cabinet Room. (U)

The President thanked Vajpayee for bringing the letter and said that he found his correspondence with Desai of greater benefit than with almost any other world leader. He values Desai’s advice and counsel. (S)

The President then said that we are confronted with matters of great political and strategic importance. The United States has no interest in gaining a leading role in South Asia and will defer to India on most matters of regional importance. We are however deeply concerned about an Indo-Pakistani nuclear weapons race. The President said that American policy has been set forth in his correspondence with Prime Minister Desai and is also reflected in US laws with which the Government of India is familiar. We do not seek to impose our will on other countries but the law (which the President signed himself) governs our ability to engage in nuclear cooperation. India will have to decide how it wants to proceed, whether it wishes to go into plutonium reprocessing or even peaceful nuclear explosions. That is India’s decision to make. Pakistan, the President said, clearly intends to develop a nuclear explosive capability and we have been much tougher on Pakistan than on India. The President said he was eager to see direct consultations on these matters between India and Pakistan. He is well aware of the attempts India has made to improve relations and hopes that India will make still more. The United States is friends with both India and Pakistan but we do not want to become a mediator. (S)

The President said he had been disconcerted at the distortion of Vajpayee’s important trip to China by the invasion of Vietnam. He hoped that this lack of Chinese sensitivity would not damage Sino-Indian relations. He pointed out that while Deng was here he was very enthusiastic about improved relations with India and expected much from Foreign Minister Vajpayee’s visit. Deng hoped that the new governments in both the countries would develop new relations of cooperation and understanding. (S)

Foreign Minister Vajpayee pointed out that he had been personally criticized in India and the Indians had been very offended by the comparison the Chinese drew to the 1962 invasion. India however has not lost hope for the relationship. (S)

The President agreed that the Vietnamese episode had been a wet blanket and it was certainly not India’s fault. Criticism of Foreign Minister Vajpayee was unjust. (S)

Vajpayee suggested that the Chinese sought to improve relations with India in order to undercut the USSR.

The President replied that he did not think this was the case. Deng had made frequent positive statements and seems to feel that the time had come for the strengthening of Sino-Indian relations. Deng had been very enthusiastic and talked of solving long term disputes. (S)

Vajpayee interjected that the Chinese were modernizing their defense forces and this caused particular concern to India when coupled with their assertion of the right to punish neighbors. (S)

The President replied that we are not trying to justify the Chinese action. We had done our utmost to prevent it and still think that it was a mistake. (S)

Vajpayee expressed indignation that the Chinese had not even told him that they were going to launch an invasion. (S)

The President replied that they should have done so and he would make no apologies for them. He hoped however that damage to the Sino-Indian relationship would not be permanent. (S)

Vajpayee then addressed regional questions and asked if the United States was thinking in terms of new military arrangements. (S)

The President said we were not and have no inclination to play a greater leadership role in southern Asia. We look on India as the strongest and most influential nation in the area and will most often defer to Indian suggestions. We will not always agree with India. We have close friendship with Pakistan and other regional states and we have nuclear concerns over which we strongly disagree with India. It is important however that we understand each other and that these disagreements not stand in the way of our overall relationships. (S)

Concerning Tarapur, the President said that he could not predict the future but India must realize that if there is no agreement on safeguards, further cooperation on Tarapur would be impossible. There are other sources to which the Indians could turn for fuel including the Soviet Union. Canada, Australia and others share our views on nuclear explosions; perhaps other countries may have different views. The President said he hoped it would not come to a cut-off but he could not circumvent the law. The decision was up to India. (S)

Vajpayee objected that the US law is retrospective. (sic) (S)

The President said that he does not agree with that interpretation, as he had told Prime Minister Desai. (S)

Vajpayee said that India was grateful for the most recent installment of uranium and hopes supply will continue not only until 1980 but to 1993.

The President warned against going on false premises. The United States wants to avoid difficulties and still hopes that India and Pakistan, working directly together and without US involvement, can reach a mutual understanding. If they are unsuccessful in devising a safeguard arrangement Pakistan will certainly move to develop a nuclear explosive and this will put India in a very difficult situation. South Asia could become embroiled in a nuclear arms race which would be very embarrassing to India’s international position. (S)

Vajpayee pointed out that India did not embark on a nuclear arms race against China and the Pakistanis should show similar self-restraint. (S)

The President emphasized that we have done everything possible [3 lines not declassified].

Vajpayee said however that the United States could do still more. (S)

Secretary Vance noted that he had told the Foreign Minister that our talks with Pakistan are continuing and that it is in their interest to work with us. (S)

Vajpayee said that the Pakistani nuclear program had no military justification and that the Pakistan economy could not sustain it. (S)

The President agreed completely on both points. He then mentioned that Prime Minister Desai had said that Israel was the motivation for the Pakistani program but the President disagreed. In his view, India is the focus of Pakistan’s problem. The President thought that if India were to put its spent fuel under safeguards Pakistan would be challenged to do the same and that would have a calming effect. This effect would be felt even in South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan and other countries that are within six months of a nuclear explosive capability. (S)

The President noted that we have established a unique relationship with the Soviets in restraining nuclear weaponry. Never before have two countries agreed on something like this and we are continuing to work to expand the area of agreement. There are however 10 or 12 countries who could build nuclear weapons almost immediately. They are waiting to see what happens in India and Pakistan. (S)

The President said he knew that India had disavowed nuclear explosions, but if Pakistan conducted a test India would find it hard to keep to that line. That is a situation that must be avoided. The President admitted that doing this without impinging on India’s sovereignty and pride poses an almost insoluble problem. The decision is India’s whether it will seek to get fuel for Tarapur elsewhere and perhaps become involved in a nuclear arms race. The President suggested that he might have a better view of this matter because he can see what is happening in other countries. (S)

The President stressed his hope that this difference of opinion will not detract from the precious relationship we have with India in other areas. He urged Vajpayee, in his public statements, to say what he was telling him—that we are not trying to abuse India. This is a continuing problem not only with India but with Germany, France, Argentina, Brazil and other countries. We are eager to help in any way that we can. (S)

Vajpayee reminded the President that India had to cope with the democratic public opinion. (S)

The President recognized this and admitted that we do not have a solution. The decision rests with India. (S)

Vajpayee raised the question of storage of spent fuel at Tarapur but the President suggested he discuss that elsewhere since he was not familiar with the technical issues. (S)

Vajpayee complained that in the nuclear area the United States was again following a policy of parity between India and Pakistan. (S)

The President objected that it was hard for him to talk about balancing relations. He said that if General Zia were in the room he would tell him that our relations with India are warmer. He went on to say that he does not equate the two countries in his mind and on this issue the Pakistanis are clearly moving towards a nuclear explosive capability. (S)

Vajpayee then raised the problem of military hardware, notably the American offer of F–5Es to Pakistan.³ He said that Pakistan does not need armaments for their problem is political and economic. (S)

The President responded that he would not attempt to compare what the Pakistanis have and what India has recently purchased. It is not a matter for us to decide, and all countries should practice restraint. He agreed with Vajpayee that military forces, as the Iranian case had shown, did not protect a government from its people. He noted that the American military’s mission was world peace, not protecting him from the American people. (S)

Secretary Vance pointed out that we have continually refused to sell the Pakistanis advanced or long range aircraft such as the A–7, F–16 or F–18. (S)

The President pointed out that his first decision in the arms sales area was to reverse a commitment that had been made to sell A–7s to Pakistan.⁴ He pointed out that the F–5 is a defensive, short range aircraft. When we have sold it to Egypt the Israelis have not particularly objected. (S)

The President concluded by saying that he was pleased to have had this chance to talk with Vajpayee and promised to read Desai’s letter with great care. He expressed his great admiration for Vajpayee personally and said that both he and Secretary Vance were always glad to consult with him. The President said that the relationship with India was precious to him and he wants it to be still closer and firmer. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 37, Memcons: President: 4–5/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. After his meeting with Carter, Vajpayee met with Brzezinski, Goheen, and Thornton in Brzezinski’s office from 11:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. to discuss multilateral issues. (Memorandum of Conversation, April 24; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 93, India: Presidential Correspondence: 1–5/79)
2. Telegram 104660 to New Delhi, April 26, transmitted the text of Desai’s April 19 letter to Carter, which, besides discussing regional issues and Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear program, expressed Desai’s appreciation that the NRC had approved the most recent shipment of 16.8 tons of uranium, and his appreciation for the release of the next shipment of 19.6 tons. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790190–0786)
3. See footnote 6, Document 315.
4. In the margin of an April 2, 1977, memorandum from Christopher, Carter indicated his decision to exclude A–7’s from a potential aid package for Pakistan. See footnote 4, Document 240.