Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

315. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, November 30, 1978, 10:30 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• PRC on Pakistan—Summary of Conclusions

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
  • Lucy Benson, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology
  • Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

• Defense

  • Charles Duncan, Deputy Secretary
  • Robert Murray, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs

• Office of Management and Budget

  • Randy Jayne, Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs
  • Ed Sanders, Associate Director for International Affairs

• Agency for International Development

  • John Gilligan, Administrator, Agency for International Development
  • Malcolm Butler, Deputy Assistant for Intragovernmental Affairs

• Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

  • Spurgeon Keeny, Acting Director
  • Thomas Hirchfeld, Deputy Assistant Director

• Joint Chiefs of Staff

  • Lt. General William Smith

• Central Intelligence Agency

  • Sayre Stevens, Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
  • Robert Ames, Acting NIO for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

• White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

• National Security Council

  • Thomas Thornton
  • Gary Sick

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The PRC met to discuss specific issues relating to Pakistan and the broader regional context of which Pakistan is a critical part.

Regional Context: There was general agreement that we need to look beyond Pakistan. What we are primarily concerned about is the impact that problems in Pakistan (and Iran and Afghanistan) are likely to have on the West Asian and Persian Gulf region (the Subcontinent to the Red Sea). We should approach our policy choices in Pakistan within this broader context.

At this point we lack such a broad framework, both geographically (in that we have not dealt with the Subcontinent-through-Red Sea region as a whole) and conceptually (in that we have not examined a range of alternatives that goes beyond near-term restraints posed by resource shortages and by current public and Congressional attitudes).

The PRC agreed to set up an Interagency Working Group on an urgent basis to look at the region in broad geographic and conceptual terms. The group will consist of DOD, JCS, NSC, and State as chairman. AID, ACDA, Treasury and others will be called on to assist as appropriate. It will draw up a plan for further study and action and present it to the PRC for approval before the end of December.

CIA will provide appropriate estimative intelligence inputs.

The PRC addressed some specific Pakistani issues that can be dealt with even before the formulation of a broader framework:

Political: It was agreed to keep open the question of inviting President Zia to visit the United States; a decision on this cannot be made until the outcome of the Bhutto case is clear.² In addition, we will concentrate on more substantive exchanges with the Pakistanis at all levels to show attentiveness, and seek to encourage Western European and Japanese support for maintaining Pakistan’s western orientation.

Nuclear Issues: It is clear that the Pakistanis continue to look for ways to develop a nuclear explosive capability and that their activities, if unchecked, will ultimately force us to cut off our economic assistance and military sales. A Pakistani explosive capability seems about five years away, and there are some steps that they may take before then that would force a cutoff. Meanwhile our current strategy should not be confrontational. We will continue to monitor the situation closely, continue to impress on the Pakistanis the effect that their nuclear program can have on our relationship, and seek to gain influence by building up other areas of our relationship. We are not at the moment at a critical juncture; thus we should move ahead with certain positive steps (see below) and then resume the nuclear dialog forcefully and make clear what specific kinds of Pakistani behavior are unacceptable, so that they will not be surprised if we are forced to cut off aid because they have passed certain milestones on the road to a nuclear capability.

Military Sales: During Lucy Benson’s visit the Pakistanis agreed to prepare a want list of material that is uniquely of US origin and fits within our arms sales policy.³ We expect the list to be forthcoming.

In the meantime, however, the Pakistanis have specifically asked us about the availability of aircraft and helicopter-borne TOWs. We will need Presidential approval for both of these.

—While we have turned them down on A–7s and told them we would react receptively to requests for the F–16 or F–18, the PRC proposes to increase to 76 the number of F–5Es that we are willing to sell Pakistan from the 40 approved earlier by the President.⁴ (The Pakistanis had suggested 100.) These additional aircraft would be provided as one-for-one replacements of obsolete F–86s.

—The Pakistanis have legitimate concerns about Indian and Afghan tank forces and the PRC recommends making available a helicopter TOW system. The PRC, except for ACDA, agreed that this sale would not require the President to make an exception to PD–13.⁵

The PRC further agreed that: FMS financing is not available although we may have to reconsider later; we would consider approval of third-country transfer of US-origin equipment to Pakistan (specifically tanks); and if the Pakistanis request, we will recommend to the Saudis and UAE that they pay the bills.

The PRC also agreed, at DOD request, that a clarification is needed in existing Presidential guidance on arms sales policy to South Asia as regards equality of treatment for India and Pakistan. NSC undertook to provide clarification.

Economic Assistance: The Pakistanis believe that we are committed to restore earlier aid levels ($60 million and more annually) now that they have been denied the French reprocessing plant. At current FY 80 budget levels it will be very hard to eke out more funds for Pakistan than the $40 million now provided for. State believes that at a minimum the level should be $50 million. AID, OMB and Henry Owen expressed strong reservations in view of Pakistan’s poor economic performance. The PRC did recognize the need for modest additional resources and it was agreed to look into the possibility of making Pakistan eligible for Security Supporting Assistance in FY 80 if funds could be found. In any event, this should be looked at in connection with FY 81. State noted that $10 million might be taken from both the Egyptian and Israeli SSA allocations in FY 80.

There was general consensus that debt relief at this time is not appropriate for Pakistan but the question will be kept under review with Treasury.⁶

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 74, Policy Review Committee: 11/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes of the meeting are in the Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 71, PRC 079, 11/30/78, Pakistan.
2. In a November 15 memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton argued against inviting Zia to Washington. Pointing to Bhutto’s possible execution as grounds to postpone a visit, Thorton argued: “This is especially advisable since we would then be able to better assess the internal situation in Pakistan. If Zia gets in bad trouble we probably would be well-advised to keep away from him; if he weathers the storm well, then we should have a better perspective on where Pakistan is heading and what we can do about it. I also do not want to have Zia here until we know what we want to say to him and I don’t think we know at this point.” In a handwritten note in the left-hand margin of the memorandum, Brzezinski indicated his agreement. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 1–12/78)
3. See footnote 4, Document 312.
4. See Document 292.
5. PD/NSC–13, “Conventional Arms Transfer Policy,” May 13, 1977, aimed to restrain the transfer of conventional weapons. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 271.
6. Under a December 4 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski forwarded the Summary of Conclusions and recommended: “That you approve the Summary of Conclusions, specifically including the improved offer on F–5s and the helicopter TOWs. This recommendation is supported by all PRC participants.” Carter checked the Approve option and initialed Brzezinski’s memorandum. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 71, PRC 079, 11/30/78, Pakistan)