Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

103. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 13, 1978, 11:25 a.m.–12:18 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting Between President Carter and Prime Minister Morarji Desai of New Delhi

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President
• Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher
• David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Ambassador Robert Goheen, United States Ambassador to New Delhi
• Joseph Nye, Deputy to the Under Secretary
• Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary
• Thomas Thornton, Member, National Security Council
• Peter Lande, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
• Prime Minister Morarji Desai
• Foreign Minister Atul Vajpayee
• Mr. Vidya Shankar, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister
• Mr. Jagat Mehta, Foreign Secretary
• Ambassador N.A. Palkhivala
• Mr. Arjrun Asrani
• Mr. V.Y. Tonpe
• Mr. H.S. Shah
• Mr. S.V. Purushottam

The President and Prime Minister joined their staffs at 11:25 after a 20-minute private meeting.² The President gave Desai two books.

President Carter then outlined the results of their private conversations. Each side had reaffirmed its well understood positions on the supply of nuclear fuel. Desai understands that we are talking with the Soviets on CTB and SALT and the two sides understand each other very well. They had agreed on the explosive nature of the African problem; the need for restraint in approaching it and for minimizing outside interference. They discussed the need for progress in Zimbabwe and Namibia and the problems and opportunities represented by the new situation in Afghanistan. The President outlined Pakistan’s concerns; the Prime Minister stressed his belief that the Afghanistans are independent-minded and religious.

Prime Minister Desai reported that he had had good talks in Brussels and London. The Belgian Prime Minister was worried about Zaire and agreed with Desai that the Africans should solve their own problems. The OAU should be helpful in this regard. He had also discussed Africa with Prime Minister Callaghan. Desai said that Africa is creating much anxiety and asked if the President had seen Nyerere’s statement.³

President Carter replied that he and Nyerere had exchanged letters on this subject.

Desai said that Nyerere is worried about foreign forces in Africa. Desai recognizes that the United States is clearly opposed to this. He said that since the Cubans were invited however one cannot find fault with their presence. Desai said he had passed on to the Soviets the President’s concerns about Ethiopia and Somalia. The Soviets replied that matters should be solved through discussions and that the Cubans were only helping to defend Somalia. Desai had answered that this was alright but the Cubans should not stay on and he chided the Soviets on the way they had shifted back and forth in supporting Somalia and Ethiopia.

Desai continued, urging that the Cold War not recur. America can be very helpful by taking an objective view and enabling Russia to do it (sic). The US and the Soviet Union should come closer together; this will also make the nuclear talks successful more quickly. Public rhetoric causes problems. He noted that China and the Soviet Union are on bad terms but believes that China will ultimately fall in line if the US and USSR cooperate. The Chinese have shown more open-mindedness after the death of Mao.

Desai further said that Sino-Indian relations are bad and it’s mainly China’s fault. Chou En-lai had criticized Desai in 1961 for sheltering Tibetan refugees. Desai had countered that Nehru had helped China by recognizing Chinese suzerainty in Tibet but China had failed to grant Tibet autonomy. India was only providing refuge to the Tibetans and would do the same for Chou En-lai if he needed it. (The President interjected humorously that he would remember that.) Desai said that the Chinese had attacked in 1962. They had been successful because Krishna Menon and General Kaul had mismanaged the Army. When Desai came to power last year he said India would be friends with China but Peking did not respond. India would not work through intermediaries. The Chinese did then send a delegation and made an important statement in Nepal. Desai had a frank talk with the delegation, which they took well. He pointed out to them India’s long standing support of China since 1938. The issue of Chinese seizure of Indian land had to be settled so that the two countries can become true friends. The Chinese said they would solve it through friendly discussions. Thus relations are improving now. The Romanian Prime Minister⁴ came to Delhi after visiting Peking and said the Chinese are eager for friendship. The Foreign Minister will go to China perhaps in September. Desai concluded by saying the report in the June 12 New York Times was wrong since there is no question of India giving up land.⁵

The President said we have found the new Chinese leadership to be much more interested in friendship and we are pursuing normalization.

Desai said he was worried that we had promised equipment to China that we had refused the Soviets. The United States should not appear to be using China against the Soviets.

The President replied that the computer in question⁶ could be used by the Soviets for missile guidance but Chinese technology is not that far advanced and they can use it only for peaceful purposes. We have explained this to the Soviets.

Desai replied that that was good but the Soviets are worried and he is anxious to see the US and the Soviet Union become very friendly.

The President reassured him that we are making steady progress in our negotiations. The press tends to emphasize negative aspects.

Desai said he is impressed by Soviet sincerity and the United States should not use China as a lever on them. He asked how our relations with China could be good unless we gave up Taiwan. That, however, would be a breach of trust.

The President pointed out that we do not own Taiwan but agreed that it was a difficult problem. He said that we are certainly not moving too rapidly forward in the area of international friendship and that the pace was too slow for his taste.

The President then discussed follow-up to the January meeting. He mentioned that Secretary Kreps and Deputy Secretary Christopher would be going to India in the fall and that the business community was going to send a full-time representative to Delhi to facilitate Indo-US cooperation. He also noted that the visa rules have been changed at India’s request.⁷

A discussion of the Indian student visa problem ensued between Ambassador Goheen and Foreign Minister Mehta.

The President noted that the Prime Minister had said that the flow of scholars had been interrupted by Mrs. Gandhi and asked Deputy Secretary Christopher to see if that could be reversed. (The reference was to the Experiment in International Living.) He said that he would write to Desai on how this could be started up again.

Foreign Secretary Mehta pointed out that some exchanges had been resumed, notably the Harvard program.

The President said Desai had told him that the name “Peace Corps” was badly received in India because it had been too much involved in political matters. Desai had told him however that India would welcome technicians under a different name.

The President then asked if the Joint Commission was functioning well.

Ambassador Goheen said that it was, especially in the Science and Technology area, including solar energy.

The President urged Desai to write to him anytime a problem arose. He went on to suggest Indo-US diplomatic consultations before the UN Human Rights Commission meeting this September. (Desai agreed.)

The President cited human rights progress in Latin America, Indonesia, and Philippines and noted the commitment in the human rights area that we share with India.

The President expressed his hope for success in the MTN and that we had added two or three Indian export items on the tariff-free list.

Desai noted that textiles are a particularly great problem.

Ambassador Palkhivala described the great demand for Indian textiles here and said that in the first four months of the year India had disposed of its entire quota.

The President asked if there was any possibility to give special consideration to Indian hand-woven fabrics that are not competitive with American textiles.

Deputy Secretary Christopher said he would look into it.

Foreign Minister Vajpayee noted that India had liberalized its imports.

The President expressed pleasure at the increase in Indo-US trade which is mutually beneficial. He then asked about the status of the Nepal-India joint water project.

Desai responded that they have an agreement and may be asking for outside financial assistance. He then went on to describe a large-scale irrigation project which the FAO and IBRD are looking at. If successful, this would stretch from the Himalayas to southern India, provide great amounts of power, and a three-fold increase in crops. It has to be examined closely however since the Himalayas are unstable mountains.

Desai said they had been worried about the presence of a nuclear device on Nanda Devi but took responsibility since it was there at their request.⁸

The President expressed appreciation for the way this had been handled by Desai and said he was glad that neither of them had been involved in it. He asked what the possibilities were for a nuclear free zone in South Asia.

Desai said it was meaningless to have just one area free of nuclear weapons and noted that India has declared it will not have nuclear weapons.

The President said that we and others have signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco.⁹ This was a step in the right direction although he cannot say how important it is. He then said we are concerned about Pakistan.

Desai said that if that satisfies them and that if they became friendly. . . . (Note: Desai obviously intended to be ambiguous here.) He wondered however who they feel insecure about.

The President named India and Afghanistan.

Desai said they shouldn’t be. India had never attacked them or taken anything from them. The problem should be solved through more friendly relations throughout the region. Pakistan has more powerful weapons than India but India is not worried about that. He will not complain if we give arms to Pakistan but it will be dangerous.

The President noted that our arms sales in South Asia are very low.

Desai said that the Pakistanis threatened to turn to the Soviet Union and reject CENTO.

The President observed that CENTO is a pretty dormant organization and that Pakistan feels insecure.

Desai said that their own attitude is at fault. India should have helped Bangladesh in April 1971 but the Soviets kept Mrs. Gandhi from doing that. India wants to be of assistance to Bangladesh which is not aggressive. The Punjabis are the problem. There is danger of Pakistan splitting into four parts and this would mean danger for all of us. India prefers to have a strong neighbor.

The President expressed fear that if Pakistan feels weak it will turn to large arms purchases and nuclear weapons unless we assure them.

Desai said they should be reassured that India will not attack them.

Turning to the Bhutto case, Desai said he doesn’t think Bhutto will be hanged.¹⁰ India has said nothing directly to them but Desai has indirectly pointed out that he doesn’t believe in capital punishment.

The President said we have expressed our concern privately.

Desai said Pakistan would misunderstand any Indian statement; they look for opportunities to misunderstand. India looks forward to the time when the whole region draws closer together. Iran wants to have a rail connection but Pakistan refuses.

The President asked if there is a place for Afghanistan in that circle of friendship. (Desai nodded yes.) He asked if India envisions a written friendship agreement.

Desai said that the frontier people are the problem but would not be if the Pakistanis treated them well. The Pakistanis always do the opposite of what India says. It is the principle of their existence.

Foreign Secretary Mehta said he had pointed out to the Pakistanis that India had not interfered in their recent political difficulties and told them not to talk about Afghanistan and India as a pincers directed against them.

Desai said he did not want to see an increase in the Soviet presence anywhere, including Afghanistan.

Thereupon the meeting ended at 12:18.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President: 6–7/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Desai was in Washington June 12–15 after visiting New York, San Francisco, and Omaha. Vance’s June 7 memorandum to Carter briefing him for Desai’s visit is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 5, India: Prime Minister Desai, 6/12–15/78: Briefing Book.
2. No memorandum of conversation was found of the meeting.
3. According to telegram 2455 from Dar es Salaam, June 8, Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania, condemned “Western neocolonialism in Africa.” The Embassy suggested that Nyerere’s statement “represents a sudden (but possibly temporary) collapse of faith in U.S. intentions.” Days before, the United States supported French and Belgian troops’ efforts to evacuate Europeans from Kolwezi in Southern Zaire, who were being threatened by the Congolese National Liberation Front. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2642)
4. Manea Manescu.
5. Citing Desai’s June 11 interview on NBC’s “Meet the Press,” the article claimed India was “prepared to accept China’s seizure of 14,000 square miles of disputed territory between 1957 and 1962 and to acknowledge the present boundary formally at some point in the future.” (David Binder, “India Ready to Drop China Border Claim,” New York Times, June 12, 1978, p. A6)
6. Telegram 134548 to all East Asian and Pacific diplomatic posts, May 26, reported that IBM had received an order from the Chinese Government for a computer system for Shenyang Air Compression. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780223–0271)
7. See footnote 15, Document 90.
8. See Documents 99 and 100.
9. See footnote 5, Document 87.
10. See Document 272.