Office of the Historian

100. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1

New Delhi, April 17, 1978, 1326Z

5991. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subject: Prime Minister’s Statement on the Himalayan Incident.2 Ref: New Delhi 59593 and New Delhi 5988.4

1. We believe that Prime Minister’s statement to Parliament today has effectively defused what was becoming an increasingly emotional issue here and one that might have had long-lasting reverberations.

2. While the Prime Minister’s decision to reveal that the alleged activities had occurred did not follow the policy we sought to urge on the GOI, we believe that the manner in which he presented the matter not only was judicious and sound in the context of internal Indian politics but that it also projects and reinforces the attitudes of cooperativeness and credibility which he seeks to have characterize the relationship between his government and ours.

3. Consequently, I wish to suggest that the President’s next letter might contain words of appreciation for the judicious and effective way in which Morarji has handled this problem.5 He has made it work to build a stronger acceptance of close Indo-U.S. relations when it might have been instead a cause of festering distrust.

Goheen
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780164–0251. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Bombay, Calcutta, CINCPAC, Dacca, Hong Kong, Islamabad, Kabul, Kathmandu, London, Moscow, and Beijing. Sent for information to Colombo and Madras.↩
  2. See Document 99.↩
  3. Telegram 5959 from New Delhi, April 17, transmitted the text of Desai’s April 17 message to the Lok Sabha regarding the discovery of a nuclear-powered monitoring device in the Himalayas. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780164–0193)↩
  4. Telegram 5988 from New Delhi, April 17, which provided a summary and analysis of Desai’s April 17 message to the Lok Sabha, reported that in response to questions concerning “CIA activities in India,” Desai “turned aside the CIA angle rather deftly by repeatedly emphasizing that the decision on the device was ‛taken at the highest levels of both governments.’ He said: ‛Don’t blame the CIA or the CBI (India’s Central Bureau of Investigation). They were just acting on orders from the highest political levels.’” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780164–0239)↩
  5. See Document 102.↩