94. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya1
240302. Subject: Libyan-American Relations. Refs: A. Tripoli 1186 B. Tripoli 1139 C. Tripoli 1138.2
1. Department is following closely reports of your initial meetings with Libyan officials and is pleased to learn of Qadhafi’s alleged interest in better relations with U.S. However, Department recalls that in recent past similar professions by Qadhafi have been accompanied by actions and public accusations incompatible with any improvement in bilateral relations. There does not appear to be any novel element in the current situation, e.g. persuasive evidence of serious strain in Libyan-Soviet relations, which might be prompting Qadhafi to consider the changes in Libyan policy which his emissaries have been informed would be necessary for more normal relations with U.S. There also are other foreign and domestic policy reasons which argue against modification of our current policy of indicating our displeasure with Libyan behavior by refusing to discourse with them at a senior level.
2. Department does appreciate and share your desire to work, where possible, for an improvement in bilateral relations. Department has informed Madfa’i it is prepared to resume the discussions initiated before his departure on consultations. Department is pleased action is [Page 232] underway which will give you a channel to Qadhafi. Department will continue to monitor closely Libya’s behavior regarding terrorism, its neighbors, and Middle East peace process, while indicating to Libyan officials that these are areas where more responsible action on their government’s part offers the possibility for more normal bilateral relations.
3. You should inform the GOL immediately, and we will inform Madfa’i, that the Department has decided to consult with Congress on its attitude toward the sale of two 727s. Sale would be subject to obtaining guarantee that aircraft would not be used other than for normal commercial purposes and would only be made with clear understanding that supply of spare parts for all LAA’s 727s could be cut off if any of these aircraft were used for other than commercial purposes.3 In your discussions with GOL, you should seek GOL reaction to sale under these conditions.4 (FYI: We hope to have congressional reaction by end of September and to reach definitive position soon thereafter on the sale of the two 727s.) You should mention in this context that Department expects congressional attitudes to be influenced by Libyan reaction to Camp David Agreements; that while we realize Libya disapproves of these agreements, ad hominen attacks on President Carter and/or any physical injury to U.S. persons or property would be resented by Congress.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 2/77–12/78. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Dodson wrote: “(DA approved) (paragraph 3)” in the upper right-hand corner. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Bishop; cleared by Sick and Tarnoff and in M/CT and NEA; approved by Newsom. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])↩
- In telegram 1186 from Tripoli, August 28, Eagleton reported on August 24 and 25 meetings which included Congressman Sikes, Turayki, and Shahati, in which the Libyans expressed frustration with their inability to meet with Carter or Vance. Eagleton reported: “In support of our effort to initiate a dialogue here, it would be most useful if the Secretary could have a brief meeting with Turayki during the upcoming UNGA session.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780350–1244) In telegram 1139 from Tripoli, August 17, regarding the sale of Boeing 727 airplanes to Libya, Eagleton wrote: “I therefore recommend that some time during the month of September we be in a position to tell the Libyans that we have heard their message, and in order to encourage the dialogue and cooperation in the field of terrorism, we are permitting the sale of Boeings to go forward.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780338–0107) In telegram 1138 from Tripoli, August 17, Eagleton reported on an August 16 meeting with Ahmed Madfai, Libyan Chargé in Washington, currently in Tripoli for consultation, who discussed his private conversation with Qadhafi on August 11: “Qadhafi wished not only to maintain relations but to improve them because it was in Libya’s interest to have a balanced position in the world and avoid dependence on the Soviet Union.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780336–0466)↩
- Aaron placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.↩
- In telegram 1407 from Tripoli, October 3, Eagleton wrote: “During conversation Oct 3 with Under Secretary for Political Affairs at Foreign Ministry, Sha’aban, I referred to our proposed consultation with Congress on sale of two 727 Boeings. Sha’aban said he was aware of our proposal but that he was troubled by ‛conditions.’ He said it was obvious that Boeings were for civilian use, but he did not like idea of setting a precedent by making a ‛guarantee’ in this regard.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–2402) In telegram 1508 from Tripoli, October 26, Eagleton transmitted the text of a letter from the Chairman of the Libyan Arab Airlines to the Chairman of Boeing, providing assurances regarding the use of the 727s: “The aircraft in question will be used solely in civil aviation and will not be state aircraft.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 2/77–12/78)↩