Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

95. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Embassy in Libya and the Department of State¹

New York, October 2, 1978, 2328Z

3953. Subject: UNGA: Newsom Bilateral With Libya PermRep. Ref: Tripoli 1384.²

1. Under Secretary Newsom called on Libyan PermRep Kikhia at Newsom request for one hour Oct 2. After short discussion of Camp David Accords, during which Kikhia made standard plea for US to recognize PLO, Newsom switched conversation to bilateral relations. He said he was prepared to see if some improvement is possible. Private links continue to prosper through companies, unofficial trips, and the US-Arab Dialogue scheduled for Tripoli later this week.³ Newsom reported that administration going to Congress to try to get consensus on proceeding with the sale of commercial aircraft to Libya. Agreement has been given for the export of the 400 Oshkosh trucks. Dept has noted with pleasure that Libya has ratified The Hague Convention.⁴ With regard to C–130s, because of Libya’s active support for “terrorist” activities, we are not able to move on military items.

2. Kikhia expressed his great personal interest in improving relations. On positive side, he cited existence of diplomatic relations, fact that US imports approx. 40 percent of Libyan oil at annual cost of 4 billion dollars, 4,000 US citizens working in Libya, and 3,000 Libyan students in the US. What bothers him is that every American official gives him a different reason for the lack of high level official relations. Some have said because of support for PLO and Pentagon has put Libya in category of nations “dangerous to U.S.” which makes no sense. Libyan policies were almost identical to those of Algeria and Iraq and there is no such campaign against them. Stories such as threat to US Amb in Cairo and its connection with Moro revolt have been incorrect or exaggerated.⁵ Finally, he alleged US had put out statements suggesting Libya is seeking to improve relations, under pressure from U.S. This puts Libya in a “humiliating” position. Kikhia concluding that US needs a scapegoat in the region for domestic political reasons and Libya serves the purpose.

3. Newsom said we are dealing with public impressions and it is not useful to argue about allegations of Libyan involvement in acts against US interests—that is what is believed in the public and in the Congress. His call was “informal” to find out Libyan desires. He understood they include exchange of Ambassadors, beginning of high-level dialogue, and more normal diplomatic exchanges. Newsom said he will examine these ideas. He could then meet again with Kikhia or FM Turayki to try to clear away some of the misunderstandings. Department sees desirability of better relations, but we must justify each step we take in view of prevailing impressions of Libyan policies.

4. In closing, Kikhia raised possibility of following such future meeting with a joint communique in which each side would state its position. This would be preferable to unilateral US statement which suggests Libya responding to US pressure.

5. Department has been taking look at Libyan-US relations and will give further attention in light this conversation. Newsom will plan contact Kikhia again when Under Secretary returns from Europe Oct 10.⁶

Young

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 2/77–12/78. Confidential; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. In telegram 1384 from Tripoli, October 1, Eagleton wrote: “I hope it will be possible for Newsom to see Kikhya sometime soon. We have been going around in circles for many months on who should see whom when. A meeting between Newsom and Kikhya should clear the air and permit future contacts at levels we consider most appropriate and useful.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780401–0634)
3. The Arab-American Dialogue, sponsored by the Libyan Foreign Liaison Bureau, opened on October 10 in Tripoli. Telegram 1443 from Tripoli, October 11, reported on the proceedings. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780415–1233)
4. Libya officially ratified the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft on October 4.
5. An unknown hand underlined “incorrect or exaggerated,” circled “exaggerated,” and placed an exclamation point in the right-hand margin. See Documents 86–88.
6. An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin.