68. Paper Prepared in the Department of State1
Post-Boumediene Algeria
Summary
Boumediene is expected to be succeeded by a collegial leadership drawn from the country’s current political establishment. The process probably will be peaceful, and no immediate major changes are anticipated in Algerian domestic or foreign policies.
Collegial Leadership Expected
President Boumediene has been in a coma since November 18. Death could occur at any moment. A recovery sufficient to permit him to function as Chief of State is believed impossible by the American physicians who have attended him.2
[Page 179]When he seized power in 1965 from Ahmed Ben Bella, independent Algeria’s first ruler, Boumediene created a 26-man Council of the Revolution. Composed primarily of military officers who had supported his takeover, the Council was a collective leadership group in which Boumediene’s status was that of first among equals. In the intervening years the Council has lost members and influence as Boumediene out-maneuvered his rivals and asserted his political dominance. Since Boumediene became ill, the eight active surviving members of the Council have taken the reins of government in hand. They are of the Algerian political establishment and probably will designate, and to a major extent serve as Boumediene’s successors, providing considerable continuity in state policy.
Algeria’s leaders are extraordinarily secretive, a characteristic not unrelated to their clandestine experiences during Algeria’s independence struggle. We have had almost no access to most members of the Revolutionary Council and have little meaningful secondhand intelligence about them. Our imperfect understanding is that there currently are at least two major factions within the Council. One, headed by Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika, is considered more interested in good relations with the West than the other, which is headed by Party Chief Mohamed Yahiaoui. The two other key members of the Council seem to be Oran Military District Commander Chadly Bendjedid, who has the support of some other senior military officers, and Interior Minister Mohamed Abdelghani. The loyalties, if any, of Bendjedid and Abdelghani are uncertain. Unclear also are the preferences of less influential Council members.
Recognizing there are wide gaps in our intelligence, we have concluded nevertheless that to preserve their status the Council members will patch over their differences and reestablish collegial leadership. This is consistent with the risk minimizing and turf protective propensities in Algerian political life. It also is what appears to be occurring at present and it is the pattern which first followed independence and was adopted by Boumediene at the beginning of his own reign.
Over time however we would expect the evolution which then occurred under Boumediene to be repeated—one member of the collegium eventually will become dominant. Although it is difficult to predict, the final struggle may well be among a leading military figure such as Bendjedid, who would have significant Army support; Bouteflika, with the backing of moderates and technocrats; and Yahiaoui, with student and Party support. The successful contender would not be able to rely exclusively on his initial power base but would have to expand it at the expense of his competitors. An essential element would be his acceptability to senior military officers.
Algerians outside the Council could make a bid for power. Only two of the six regional military commanders are Council members. No [Page 180] unit commanders, most of whom we cannot even identify, are on the Council. The presence of powerful Islamic currents within Algerian society, including the apparent organization of conservative Muslims in the civilian sector, makes it possible there is some cohesion among fundamentalist officers and NCO’s. However, the Council appears to have the country in hand. It has instructed the Army and the Party to maintain order, and it has the security services watching each other and the Army. The 4,000 Americans in Algeria therefore are believed to be in little danger at present.
The Algerian Constitution would make National Assembly President Rabah Bitat interim Chief of State during the 45 days following Boumediene’s death. He is an ideal figurehead: one of the founders of the Algerian revolution and a man of modest ambition. The Council probably will follow constitutional provisions to the extent of allowing Bitat to assume the Presidency for the interim period. It is less clear what will happen thereafter. The Constitution says the Party is to meet and nominate a successor, whose mandate would be affirmed in a general election. Although a Party Congress is tentatively scheduled for 1979, there has been no Party Congress since the sixties, and the Council might not feel confident it could control one now.
Whatever the Council decides, it clearly must bring into senior leadership positions representatives of the technocrats needed to administer the Government. Boumediene included them in his cabinet, and this could be the procedure followed again. However, the relationship between the Council, which has no constitutional standing, and a cabinet would be awkward. One possible solution would be for the Council members to take for themselves the principal state and army offices either held by Boumediene or vacant at the time of his death. In addition to the Presidency, these include the positions of Vice President, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Chief of Staff.
Policies Likely to be Unchanged
It is unclear who, if anyone, would dominate an “interim” collective leadership. Bouteflika’s health is uncertain and his acceptability to the Army doubtful. Yahiaoui is almost totally unknown to us, and Bendjedid’s ambitions are believed limited to retaining control of his Oran fiefdom. The international orientations of the Council’s leading figures also are obscure. Although he defends articulately Soviet positions in exchanges with American officials, Bouteflika is said to value Algeria’s connections with the West, and to be distrusted by the Soviets. The Soviets and radical Arabs are said to favor Yahiaoui, but this is the only evidence we have that he may be any more sympathetic to their ideologies than Boumediene.
No major reorientation of Algeria’s domestic and international policies is likely, although the new leadership, at least initially, might [Page 181] be less active internationally. Whoever governs Algeria is expected to recognize that Western technology, finance and marketing are essential to the development of Algeria’s hydrocarbon sector, and that the earnings from this sector are the sine qua non for Algerian growth. We therefore would expect a continuation of Algeria’s extensive economic ties with the United States (i.e., $1.4 billion in Exim credits) and other Western Governments without any letup in criticism of Western economic “imperialism”. Algerian petroleum exports (8 percent of our oil imports) also will continue. There is little basis to hope that the Algerians will turn away from their military assistance relationship with the Soviets, but good reason to believe that as ardent nationalists they will guard their independence zealously. On the Middle East, any change probably would be marginal, which means they will remain in the steadfastness camp and are unlikely to give our peacemaking efforts any support.
Mismanagement, corruption and shortages of consumer goods have eroded much of the public support Boumediene’s regime won by bringing order to a nation still divided after independence. New leaders might seek public favor by allowing the private sector a larger role at the margins of what will remain a socialized economy. Given public apathy about Algeria’s role in the Sahara conflict, and the popular impression this is responsible for some of the country’s economic problems, new leaders might be more willing to compromise than Boumediene. For him the war by proxy against Hassan was personal. However, any such change, if it were to come, would not be immediate.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 2, Algeria: 1977–1978. Secret. Sent to Brzezinski on December 11 under a covering memorandum from Tarnoff.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 66. In telegram 3438 from Algiers, December 3, the Embassy reported: “The collective decision of international medical specialists (including now a team from Communist China) is that President Boumediene should not have surgery for the two cerebellar hematomas that showed up on the German CAT scanner (Algiers 3423). His medical treatment will continue to be conservative. Meanwhile, Boumediene remains in critical condition.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780497–0649) Telegram 3423 from Algiers, November 30, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780494–0315.↩